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The primary purpose of this dissertation is to argue
that, through the first three parts of Book I of the
Treatise, Hume had a causal theory of the justification of
empirical belief. In particular, he held that, among beliefs
that are caused by other beliefs, a belief is justified if
and only if it is caused by the process Hume calls "causal
inference"
.
In the first chapter it is argued that Hume held that
all empirical beliefs (that are caused by other beliefs)
which are not caused by causal inference are unjustified. This
is by no means obvious, but careful attention to some hereto-
fore neglected sections of Part (iii) of Book I make this
attribution quite plausible. In Chapter II an argument for
this substantive claim of Hume's is developed. It is at
least in part implicit in his discussion of the seven
philo-
sophical relations. This argument is meant to
demonstrate
V
how, on the basis of Hume's psychological theory he could
have argued for the assertion that all beliefs not caused
by causal inference are unjustified.
In Chapters III and IV an argument is offered for the
converse of the interpretive claim of Chapter I, viz.
that Hume held that all beliefs caused by causal inference
are justified. In defense of this claim one is almost im-
mediately faced with an enormous interpretive problem. In
Part (iii) Section 6 Hume discusses the justification of
beliefs arrived at via inductive (causal) inference. It
is the received opinion that Hume was highly sceptical of
such beliefs. He is alleged to have held that beliefs about
the observed provide no ground or warrant for beliefs about
the unobserved. It is the contention of this dissertation
that this interpretation is completely mistaken; Hume was
only concerned to establish that all such inferences have
less than the highest possible measure of epistemic warrant.
Since one of Hume's primary aims in the Treatise is
the construction of an elaborate psychological theory of the
operations of the human mind, it is not surprising to find
that, throughout the first three parts of Book I, Hume
assumes that "arguments from experience" that constitute
causal (inductive) inference have some measure of
epistemic
warrant. The crucial question in Part (iii) Section
6
VI
is only, "How much?".
It is not until Part (iv) that he reaches the more
sceptical conclusion that has customarily been attributed
to him. His arguments here are completely independent of
any arguments of Part (iii) , notably Part (iii) Section 6
wherein he is alleged to pose the so-called "Problem of
Induction"
.
Scattered throughout Book I of the Treatise are a
number of suggestions concerning the grounds for our belief
in the legitimacy of inductive inference. In the last
chapter an attempt is made to state clearly exactly what the
Problem of Induction is and to evaluate critically six pro-
posals that have obvious roots in Hume’s philosophy. Finally,
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Since the publication of Norman Kemp Smith's The
Philosophy of David Hume , a landmark in Hume scholarship,
it has been generally acknov;ledged that Hume's A Treatise
of Human Nature has philosophical significance that extends
beyond his sceptical and essentially negative conclusions.
However, as yet there is no firm consensus about even the
general nature and purport of Hume's positive philosophi-
cal views.
Many commentators have noted that, while many of the
particular arguments that Hume offers for various claims
are relatively clear, the overall pattern of the argument
of the Treatise is puzzling and obscure. The main problem
seems to be that Hume's aims are two-fold: On the one
hand, he is trying to construct a psychological theory
v;hich, he believes, can serve as the only solid foundation
for all the sciences (see his Introduction to the Treatise )
On the other hand, he has philosophical aims as well, i.e.
to evaluate our claims about the nature of the self, the
existence of bodies, the necessity of causal connection,
and so on. In terms of the number of pages, the psycho-
logical theory predominates.
Nonetheless, it is the evaluation of beliefs which
1
are in some sense fundamental and of systematic impor-
tance that is a distinctively philosophical task. One of
the most distressing tendencies in the secondary litera-
ture on Hume (which is perhaps best exemplified by Kemp
Smith) is to interpret Hume as maintaining that these
evaluations are, in some sense, "absorbed" by the psycho-
logical theory. Evidence for this view is not wanting.
Consider the following passage from the opening paragraph
of Book I Part (iv) Section 2:
We may well ask. Wha t causes induce us to
believe in the existence of~a body ? but~tis
in vain to ask. Whether there be body or
not ? That is a point, which we must take
for granted in all our reasonings.^
This general line of interpretation holds that Hume con-
fuses or deliberately conflates psychological questions
and philosophical ones.
Speaking very generally, this line of interpretation
is almost entirely pernicious. In a work such as Kemp
Smith's, one is repeatedly faced with the following kind
of situation: Hume is faced with a philosophical problem
^David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nautre, L.A. Selby-Bigg
editoF) TOxford, lF73) , p.”169. xMl references
to Hume's Treatise will be to the Selby-Bigge
edition, hereafter abbreviated, e.g. T. 222.
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and by following the thread of the commentary, one finds
that the answer "disappears" in the psychological theory.
This is pernicious because the two kinds of questions can
be separated and usually were separated by Hume. If and
when they are not properly separated, Hume should be
brought to task for it. In short, the philosophical sig-
nificance of Hume's psychological theory has been vastly
overrated
.
Obviously these are quite general remarks, and there
is not the space here to substantiate them. Hov;ever, if
one adopts the attitude implicitly recommended by these
remarks, I am confident that one will find Hume easier to
understand and his commentators easier to evaluate.
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to discuss
Hume's evaluation of one kind of belief--empirical beliefs
that are caused by other beliefs. Before discussing in
more detail how I have gone about this, I should like to
discuss briefly the motivations that have shaped this pro-
ject and the grander scheme into which it fits. My
original intention was to produce a definitive study of
Hume's epistemological theory of moral judgments. In
particular, I was concerned to answer the following
questions that are relevant to an epistemology of morals:
a) What are moral judgments?
4
b) Are they truth-valued?
c) If they are truth-valued, under what conditions are
they true?
d) If they are truth-valued, are they corrigible?
e) If they are corrigible, how are they to be justified?
In the secondary literature on Hume's moral theory,
there has been a heated controversy concerning his views
on some of these questions. Nonetheless, to the best of
my knowledge (see Bibliography) none of these commentators
has systematically addressed the counterparts of the above
questions [especially (a) , (c) , and (e)] for ordinary
empirical claims. That is, there has been no attempt to
offer a systematic interpretation and reconstruction of
Hume's theory of the nature and justification of our opin-
ions concerning matters of fact. It would seem that this
would be a good idea for a variety of reasons:
(i) Often it is maintained that Hume held that moral
judgments are significantly different in various
respects from ordinary empirical judgments (opinions
concerning matters of fact) . It is difficult to
evaluate such claims without an interpretation of
Hume's views on the latter. This sort of deficiency
is particularly glaring with regard to so-called
5
"non-cognitivist" interpretations of Hume's ethics.
Interpreters of this stripe often fail to tell us
much about the class of "cognitive" judgments of
which moral judgments are not members.
(ii) From the point of view of philosophical theory, it
is good business to reduce, as much as possible, the
number of basic principles without sacrificing
explanatory power. The systematic unity— or lack
thereof--of Hume's Treatise can be appraised in part
by examining the relationship between the basic
principles of the general theory of knowledge and
the moral epistemology.
In a paper I wrote two years ago, I answered the first
four of the questions asked on the preceding page. Some
of these answers required some interpolation because
there were some obvious lacunae in Hume's epistemology
(i.e. he never says what an ordinary predicative judgment
is)
.
The last question, however, raises considerable
difficulties when one turns to Hume's discussion of the
justification of ordinary empirical judgments. It is this
question—and these difficulties which have given rise
to this dissertation.
There can be little doubt that, at the end of Book I,
Hume espoused a radical form of scepticism concerning all
6
of the mind's important claims to knowledge. This scep-
ticism cuts the epistemological grounds out from under his
psychological theory, not only as it is developed in Book I,
but also as it is worked out in Books II and III. A closer
look at Book I reveals, however, that the arguments that
lead Hume into this scepticism are peculiar to Part (iv) .
This suggests that perhaps prior to these arguments, Hume
endorsed some criterion of justification.
This view gets some indirect corroboration from a
quite plausible hypothesis advanced by Norman Kemp Smith.
He argues, on a variety of grounds, that Hume wrote Book I
of the Treatise after he wrote Books II and III. This
would explain why Books II and III, which contain an
elaborate psychological theory, appear after the last
Part of Book I where he indulges in a most profound scep-
ticism. It is m.y contention, to be argued in detail in
this thesis, that he did not argue for this profound
scepticism, until Part (iv) . In fact, prior to that, he
had the elements of a substantial positive theory of the
justification of empirical belief. The bulk of this
thesis consists of an elucidation and defence of this as
a correct interpretation of Hume.
^This will be argued in detail in Chapter 4 . ^
7
However, my efforts have been restricted to just
those beliefs that are caused by other beliefs. This re-
striction requires some defence,. Conspicuous by their
absence are beliefs in the continued and distinct exis-
tence of bodies. Hume has a long and complex discussion
of such beliefs in Part (iv) . In addition, I have made
no attempt to discuss beliefs that arise from the opera-
tion of the memory. There are three reasons for not
discussing the justification of these beliefs:
(i) I shall argue that, among those beliefs that
are caused by other beliefs, a belief is justified if and
only if it has a certain sort of cause. Since the cause
of a belief is relevant to its justification, it may
not be the case that beliefs that have radically different
kinds of causes can be easily assimilated to this theory.
That is, Hume might have had a bipartite theory of the
justification of empirical belief. Thus, the division
between beliefs that are caused by other beliefs and those
that are not so caused is a natural one from an epistemo-
logical point of view.
(ii) An adequate interpretation of Hume's views on
the justification of these other beliefs would require
an adjudication of a number of major interpretive and
philosophical problems that go beyond the scope of what
8
can be accomplished here. It would require an interpre-
tation or rational reconstruction of Hume's views on the
nature of perceptions and the relation between per-
ceptions and their objects (or contents)
; it would also
require a decision about where Hume stands on the debate
between realists and phenomenalists . Finally, since
some of the arguments that lead to Hume's deep scepti-
cism arise out of his discussion of the belief in the con-
tinued and distinct existence of bodies, it would probably
be necessary to discuss and evaluate Hume's scepticism.
The latter topic alone would, I suspect, be sufficient
for an entire dissertation.
(iii) Finally, since moral judgments are caused by
beliefs ( viz . , beliefs about a persons ' s character or
motives) the theory developed in this thesis will be suf-
ficient for the purposes of comparison with (and, if my
ultimate views are correct, assimilation of) the theory
of the justification of moral judgments. Thus, if the
present work meets with sufficient approbation, I should
like to carry out at some future time the "Grand Scheme"
of laying out Hume's epistemology of moral judgments. The
theory of the justification of empirical belief worked
out in this thesis should provide an adequate foundation
for a discussion of correlative issues in the moral theory.
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Consequently, in this thesis I shall restrict my
attention to Hume's theory of the justification of em-
pirical beliefs that are caused by other beliefs.
*******
This thesis makes three modest contributions to Hume
scholarship and the philosophical problems about which
Hume wrote
:
1. That Hume held a causal theory of the justification
of belief in at least the first three parts of Book I of
the Treatise is, as far as I am able to determine, en-
tirely original with this dissertation. In the first
chapter I argue that Hume held that all empirical beliefs
(that are caused by other beliefs) which are not caused
by the process Hume calls "causal inference" are un-
justified. This is by no means obvious, but careful
attention to some heretofore neglected sections of
Part (iii) make this attribution quite plausible. In
Chapter 2 I develop an argument for this substantive
claim of Hume's that is at least in part implicit in his
discussion of the seven philosophical relations. It is
meant to demonstrate how, on the basis of Hume's psycho-
logical theory, he could have argued for the assertion
10
that all beliefs not caused by causal inference are
unjustified
.
2. In Chapters 3 and 4 I argue for the converse of the
interpretive claim of Chapter 1, viz . that Hume held that
all beliefs caused by causal inference are justified. In
defence of this claim one is almost immediately faced
with an enormous interpretive problem. In Part (iii)
Section 6 Hume discusses the justification of beliefs
arrived at via inductive (causal) inference. It is the
received opinion that Hume was highly sceptical of such
beliefs. He is alleged to have held that beliefs about
the observed provide no ground or warrant for beliefs
I
about the unobserved. It is my contention that this in-
terpretation is completely mistaken; Hume was only con-
;
cerned to establish that all such inferences have less
than the highest possible measure of epistemic warrant.
I
This interpretation is not original with me. In recent
years, a few philosophers have maintained it. However,
the alternative view has many adherents and at least one
I
I




no means obvious. The problem with those philosophers
I
who adopt the same position as I do on this problem is
1
j






our opponents, nor do they provide a very detailed posi-
tive argument for their own position.
What is unique about my discussion of this issue is
that I have argued for this interpretation on different
grounds and with more care and detail than has heretofore
been done. This argument occupies almost one half of the
thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) . Though there may be arguments
for my interpretation that I have not recognized, I
venture to affirm that no such argument will be more
conclusive than the one here offered. And, though my
argument does not constitute a proof about what Hume was
trying to do, it is, I think, sufficiently powerful to
daunt anyone tempted to argue for its contrary.
3. From a substantive point of view, Hume's epistemological
position on inductive inference has two parts: (i) He
claims that such inferences have less than the highest
possible measure of epistemic warrant. (ii) He believes
that some inductive inferences are epistemically "better
off" than others. Hume's argument for (i) is carefully
laid out in Chapter 3. I have made little effort to
supplement it. The argument is virtually flawless
and constitutes one of the most brilliant pieces of reason-
ing in the history of philosophy. On the other hand, it
is not at all clear if Hume has much of an argument for (ii)
.
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In Chapter 5 I offer a critical evaluation of a number of
proposals intended to substantiate (ii) or something
similar. All of these proposals are "Humean" in that they
are suggested by things that Hume said. Finally, I shall
offer what I take to be the correct view on this matter.
In effect, I shall be outlining what I believe to be the
solution to the Problem of Induction.
CHAPTER I
A major problem facing an interpreter of Hume's A
Treatise of Human Nature is the identification and clari-
fication of major epistemological doctrines. Since his
avowed aim is to construct a "science of human nature",
much of what we find is a purely psychological theory,
the aim of which is to give a causal explanation of the
operations of the mind. However, Hume's most profound
reasonings in Book I--those concerning causality, personal
identity, induction, and the continued and distinct exis-
tence of bodies--clearly concern metaphysical and epis-
temological issues. It is important, though sometimes
difficult, to separate the two kinds of problems.
Throughout much of Book I, Hum.e is concerned to provide
an account of the causes of belief. In the course of
doing this, however, he also addresses himself to the ques-
tion of the justification of beliefs. My concern in this
dissertation will be primarily with the latter issue. I
shall show that there is an intimate connection between
Hume's psychological theory and his views on the justifi-
cation of our empirical beliefs. In particular, I shall
show that Hume held that such beliefs are justified if
and only if they have certain sorts of causes. Throughout
13
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much of what follows I shall use certain epistemic terms
(e.g. 'justified', 'warranted', etc.) as though their
meanings are relatively clear. This calls for special
explanation. There are primarily three reasons why this
is an acceptable procedure:
1. For the most part, Hume's use of peculiary epistemo-
logical terms is informal, and he relies on a rough
and intuitive understanding of such terms in order to
make his point. The contexts where he uses such
terms with more precision (e.g. his discussion of the
difference between judgments about matters of fact
and those concerning relations of ideas) are often
peripheral to the present task.
2. Part of the purpose of this dissertation is to show
that Hume was not a sceptic about empirical claims.
That is, I shall show that Hume held that some of
these claims are "epistemologically better off" than
others. For that purpose, an intuitive understanding
of such terms is sufficient.
3. Finally, and most importantly, it v;ill be possible
to attain a clearer understanding of these terms only
when we are able to see why and under what circumstan-




Thus, as a noteworthy philosopher has said (in another
connection) ;
. . .we have been obliged to advance
in this seemingly preposterous manner,
and make use of terms before we are
able to exactly define them or fix
their meaning. (T. 169)
The bulk of Hume's discussion of the justification
of ordinary empirical claims is found in Part (iii).^ In
this Part, his primary concern is to provide a psychological
explanation of the causes of the mind's beliefs in accord-
ance with his basic methodological principles outlined in
Part (i)
.
However, it is primarily in Part (iii) that he
addresses the epistemological question of the justification
of our beliefs concerning matters of fact. In the re-
mainder of this chapter, I should like to focus on one
part of this discussion. I shall show that Hum.e held that
certain sorts of beliefs concerning matters of fact are
unjustified and that they are unjustified because they are
not caused by the process Hume calls "causal inference".
I . Un j
u
stified Belief and the Systems of Realities
In the early sections of Part (iii) Hume establishes
^All Part and Section references are to Book I unless other-
wise indicated.
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the centrality and importance of the relation of causation
and the mind's reasoning concerning it. All of this is
done from the point of view of a psychological theory of
the operations of the mind. In Section 8 he discusses
how causal and reasoning engenders belief. Briefly, the
process is this: After the mind has observed a constant
conjunction of two objects, an impression of the one
object will determine the mind to form an idea of the cor-
relative object. Some of the force and vivacity of the
impression will be "transferred" to the idea. This sub-
sequent forceful and lively idea the belief in the un-
observed occurrence of the cause or effect.
Ostensibly, the purpose of the next few sections is to
discuss the effects of other relations and habits which
are responsible for the association of ideas. In particu-
lar, he will be concerned with the effects of other rela-
tions and habits on belief.
The immediate problem at the beginning of Section 9
is that the relations of contiguity and resemblance
would seem to have the same effect as causation, viz , to
enliven the related idea and thereby engender belief.
I'he reason for this apparent problem is that contiguity
and resemblance, as well as causation, are natural rela-
tions. That is, the mind tends to associate ideas in the
imagination that bear (or are believed to boar) these
17
relations. Since these relations do not in fact engender
belief (or at least not very often)
, Huine feels obliged to
explain why.
To accomplish this task, he first sketches two inter-
locking systems of beliefs that do not depend on resemblance
and contiguity; these systems of belief are engendered by
the operation of memory and by the operation of causal
inference. Hume says that we dignify these beliefs by
calling them realities. He goes on to point out the cen-
trality and importance of these systems.
He then claims that resemblance and contiguity can
"assist" causal reasoning; the resultant beliefs will be
more firmly infixed in the mind. The former relations
alone, however, are not enough to cause belief. Thus,
Hume argues that resemblance and contiguity are unlike ob-
served constant conjunction, which, together with a present
impression, cause belief in the occurrence of an event.
That is, the effect of the relation of causation is belief ,
whereas resemblance and/or contiguity alone do not have
this effect.
Throughout the remainder of Section 9 and at one place
in tlie beginning of Section 10, he considers the effect of
other relations and habits; unlike resemblance and contig-
other relations and habits do engenderuity, some of these
18
belief. These beliefs have causes other than the process
involved in causal inference. Thus much of these sections
is devoted to providing a psychological account of the
causes of certain sorts of beliefs. Interspersed with this
causal account, he argues that each of these kinds of
beliefs (which are engendered by other relations and habits)
is unjustified or unwarranted. In each case he either
explicitly says or clearly implies that the reason that
such beliefs are unjustified is that the causes of these
beliefs are different from the causes of beliefs arrived at
through causal inference. In what follows I shall show
this in detail.
Since much of what follows involves contrasting cer-
tain kinds of beliefs with beliefs that belong to the
"systems of realities", it will be helpful to get a clearer
idea of what kinds of beliefs Hume claims belong to these
systems. As noted previously, there are two interlocking
systems--one based on memory (connected with some present
impressions) and the other based on causal inference. With
regard to the former, he says:
Of these impressions or ideas of the
memory we form a kind of system,
comprehending whatever we remember to
have been present, either to our in-
ternal perception or senses; and
every particular of that system,
joined to the present impressions, we
are pleased to call a reality. (T. 108)
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Since the survey of this system of memories is
activated by a present impression or impressions, some
measure of the force and vivacity of the latter is
transferred to the memory system, thereby engendering
belief. However, our system of belief would be quite
impoverished, if it was limited to our memories. We
find that there is another system connected to it by what
Hume calls 'custom or the relation of cause and effect'
(i.e. causal inference) . He says,
and as it [the mind] feel that tis
in a manner necessarily determined
to view these particular ideas, and
that the custom or relation, by
which it is determined, admits not
of the least change, it forms them
into a new system, which it like-
wise dignifies with the title of
realities . The first of these
systems is the object of the memory
and senses; the second of the judg-
ment. (T. 108)
Thus there are two interlocking systems of belief
that might be called "systems of realities". As subse-
quent quotations will clearly demonstrate, Hume held that
not all of our beliefs arise from memory or causal infer-
ence. These other kinds of beliefs are not memories and
arise from kinds of causes that are different from the
causes of those beliefs that belong to the system of the
judgment. Again, though the primary concern is to give a
psychological explanation of these beliefs, he also
maintains that those kinds of beliefs are unjustified.
The relevant discussions are those concerning Credulity,
Education, and Fools and Madmen.
20
Credulity . Hume defines credulity as a too easy
faith (or belief) in the testimony of others. Our belief
in the testimony of others arises from our experience of
those who testify. Generally, we find (presumably by a
kind of corroborative checking) that men tell the truth
and report, with reasonable accuracy, what actually
occurs. Our reasoning is causal in that we find that it
is generally the case that (at least part of) the cause
of someone's testimony is a lively idea or series of ideas
that the testifier has; these ideas constitute his belief
that the event actually occurred. Lapses here make a per-
son a liar. We in turn find that (at least part of) the
cause of his or her forceful and lively ideas is the occur-
rence of the event in question. Hume says that the ideas
"represent and resemble the facts or objects."
These facts are "known through" (or perhaps are
identical to) certain impressions that the testifier has
had. In the overwhelming majority of cases when someone
testifies, they do so on the basis of their memory of what
was present to their senses. It is not clear what Hume
would say about cases of testimony where one is reporting
21
what one is currently witnessing (e.g. sportscasting) . He
may want to say that there are two sets of perceptions— the
impressions and the ideas which constitute beliefs about
those impressions. One of his definitions of belief
feee Treatise
, p. 96) suggests that no impression is iden-
tical to a belief. Whatever is the correct description of
this kind of case on the basis of Hume's psychological
theory, let us restrict our attention (as Hume seems to
have done) to those cases where the proximate cause of
the testifier's testimony (i.e. utterances) is a series of
purported memory ideas. Of the connection between these
ideas and the past impressions, Hume says.
This . . . connection is generally much
overrated and commands our assent beyond
what experience will justify; which can
proceed from nothing beside the resem-
blance betwixt the ideas and the facts.
(T. 113)
Lapses here are perhaps more frequent that in the case
of lying; in this case the cause of the testifier's
(mistaken) belief is a faulty memory or a misinterpreta-
tion of what was observed. Generally speaking, however, we
find that the grounding link in a causal chain which results
in our belief in the testimony of others is the occurrence
of the event that the testifier describes.
Experience (i.e. causal inference) will cause only a
22
limited faith in the testimony of others. That is, we
find that there is often, but not always, a resemblance
between (what we believe to be) the testifier's memory
ideas and the facts. What, then, is the cause of our too
easy faith in the testimony of others? Though it is hard
to pin Hume down exactly on this, he seems to suggest that
our discovery in the past of a resemblance between (what
we believe to be) the testifier's ideas and the events
described in the veridical cases has, as an effect on our
minds, the enlivening of our ideas (which are the result
of the testimony) beyond what experience will justify.
That is, our degree of belief is greater than it would be
if we let past experience of genuine cases be our sole
guide. Thus, it is the relation of resemblance and not
past experience based solely on causal inference that
guides us when it comes to the testimony of others.
But though experience be the true
standard of this, as well as of all
other judgments, we seldon regulate
ourselves entirely by it. . . .No
wonder, therefore, we are so rash
in drawing our inferences from it
[testimony] and are less guided by
experience in our judgments
concerning it, than in those upon
any other subject. (T. 113)
This passage makes clear that Hume holds that our
too easy faith in the testimony of others is unjustified
or unw’ar r an ted . Furthermore, he holds that this credulity
23
is not caused by a causal inference or a series of causal
inferences. Causal inferences only warrant a limited
faith in the testimony of others. What causes credulity
is a (past) frequently discovered resemblance between
the ideas of the testifier and what actually occurs.
Thus, a too easy belief in the testimony of others is
unjustified; the reason that it is unjustified is that it
is caused by something other than causal inference, viz.
an alleged resemblance.
B. Education . Hume teaches that custom may operate in
two ways in "invigorating" an idea and thereby engendering
belief. First, the mind may experience a constant con-
junction of the two objects. Upon the occurrence of an
impression of the one, the mind will form a strong and
lively idea of the other; this is what occurs in causal
inference. On the other hand, an idea may be frequently
introduced without any of this preparation. Hume says
that this idea will eventually become firmly infixed in
the mind, thereby engendering belief. Beliefs introduced
in this manner are what Hume calls the result of Education,
(We might be inclined to call it, more accurately, in-
doctrination . )
Such beliefs may operate in much the same way as those
that belong to the Systems of Realities. He says.
2/1
so the judgment, or rather the
imagination, by the like means,
may have ideas so strongly
imprinted on it, and conceive them
in so full a light, that they may
operate upon the mind in the same
manner with those, which the
senses, memory or reason present
to us. (T. 117)
Note that Hume first says that these ideas are imprinted
on the judgment (i.e. the system of realities engendered
by causal inference) but immediately corrects himself and
says that they are imprinted on the imagination (that is,
they become believed) . As the context of this passage and
the footnote that follows it make clear, Hume here means
by 'reason' what he customarily means by 'causal reason-
ing ' .
Thus the cause of beliefs induced by Education is the
repeated introduction of the idea into the mind. This is
obviously different from the cause of beliefs that are
induced by causal inference, which requires a constant
conjunction of impressions of objects and a present impres-
sion (or memory idea) of one of the objects.
What is Hume's evaluation of opinions induced by
education? His answer is clear: They are not, on that
account, warranted.
But as education is an artifical
and not a natural cause, and as
its maxims are frequently contrary
to reason and even to themselves
25
in different places and different
times, it is never upon that account
recognized by philosophers. . . ,
But though education be disclaimed
by philosophy, as a fallacious
ground of assent to any opinion, it
prevails nevertheless in the
world . . . (T. 117, 118)
The philosophers here, as elsewhere in Part (iii)
, are
the Wise. V/hile the Vulgar may accept views that are
induced by education, the Wise do not accept a proposition
solely because someone has tried to "educate" them with
respect to it. Of course, Hume is not saying that all
opinions derived from education are false. Rather, he
says that their being engendered by education does not,
upon that account (for that reason) recommend such beliefs
to the Wise. Thus because such beliefs have the causes
that they do, they are unjustified. In particular, such
causes are not the causes that give rise to belief via
causal inference.
C. Fools and Madmen . In Section 10 Hume discussed the
influence of belief on the passions and the influence of
poets on the imagination. When a skillful poet describes
something in very vivid terms, the mind's resultant ideas
are so lively and intense that it becomes difficult to
withhold assent. Indeed, some people (weak-minded members
of the Vulgar, no doubt'.) fail in this respect and actually
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believe some preposterous poetical system. Hume notes that
the poets themselves are often victims of this.
A lively imagination may have other effects as well.
Sometimes such an imagination degenerates into madness or
folly. On Hume's account of physiological psychology, an
extraordinary ferment of blood and animal spirits causes
a vivacity of ideas (i.e. belief) which indicates that the
powers and faculties of the mind have become disordered.
When this happens,
. . . there is no means of dis-
tinguishing betwixt truth and
falsehood; but every loose fiction
or idea, having the same influence
as the impressions of the memory or
the conclusions of the judgment is
received on the same footing . . .
A present impression and a customary
transition are no longer necessary
to enliven our ideas. Every
chimera of the brain is as vivid
and intense as any of those in-
ferences v;hich we formerly
dignify 'd with the name of con-
clusions concerning matters of
fact. (T. 123)
Here, more clearly than in any other passage, Hume
explicitly states the views that I have been attributing to
him. The beliefs of fools and madmen are caused by some-
thing other than causal inference (the causes are aberrant
physiology) . Because such beliefs are so caused, these
individuals have no way of distinguishing the true ones
from the false ones. That is, they have no means by which
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to judge which beliefs are justified and which are not.




Hume's discussion of Credulity, Education, and
Fools and Madmen clearly shovs that beliefs can arise from
causes other than the operation of memory and causal in-
ference. Thus, not all beliefs belong to the Systems of
Realities. Furthermore, he argues that these beliefs are
unjustified and that they are unjustified because they
have causes other than causal inference.
It would be a mistake to conclude from this discussion
that the only causes of unjustified belief are aberrant
physiology, education, and that which results in a too easy
faith in the testimony of others. In Sections 11 through
13 of Part (iii), Hume's doctrine of belief gets complicated
by the fact that, as a consequence of his definition of
belief, belief admits of degree. Furthermore, he appears
to claim in Section 13 that the degree of belief can be
unwarranted or unjustified if it has certain causes. To
get a complete picture of Hume's views on unjustified
belief and its causes, it will be necessary to examine his
position in Section 13, "Of Unphilosophical Probability".
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II . Of Unphi losophical Probability
and Un just ified Belie f
Up through the end of Section 10 Huine has supposed,
for expository purposes, that all of the mind's beliefs
concerning matters of fact which arise from causal in-
ference require an observed constant conjunction together
with an impression or memory idea. In Sections 11 through
13 he discusses variations and complications of this basic
pattern of reasoning. His main concern, as in the past,
is to provide a psychological explanation of how such
reasoning causes belief.
At the beginning of Section 11 he remarks that he, as
well as other philosophers, have divided human reason into
knowledge and probability. Knowledge arises from a com-
parison of ideas and admits of no doubt or uncertainty.
As a consequence of this division, all arguments from
causation are merely probable. The conclusion of any such
argument is not entirely free of doubt and uncertainty.
Hume recognizes that this is somewhat unfortunate because,
in common parlance, it is ridiculous to say, for example,
that it is only probable that all men must die. The con-
clusions of well-established causal arguments achieve a
kind of practical certainty that needs to be taken into
account. Accordingly, Hume designates such arguments as
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"proofs", and it seems reasonable to say that their con-
clusions are practically certain.
Arguments that proceed from some variation on causal
reasoning and whose conclusions are attended with some
measure of uncertainty are rebaptized as "probabilities".
This class is in turn divided into two subclasses ; one
subclass concerns arguments founded on chance. An example
of this would be the argument whose conclusion is that it
is likely that the next poker hand to be dealt will not be
a straight flush. These arguments and the beliefs that
attend their conclusions are the subject of Section 11.
Section 12 concerns arguments that suppose the secret
(unknown) operation of contrary causes to account for a
contrariety of effects. VJhat Hume has in mind here can
best be made clear by an example. Suppose that we observe,
on a number of occasions, that a certain metal bar attracts
iron filings. We then suppose that the cause of the motion
of the filings is the operation of a force exerted by the
bar. On a few later occasions, however, the filings fail
to move when the bar is appropriately placed. Thereafter,
our expectations about what will happen on a given occasion
in the future will be attended with uncertainty. The
Vulgar (falsely) suppose that causes do not always bring
about their effects; Philosophers know better; they suppose
the secret operation of contrary causes (such as someone's
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having coated the bar with some special substance before
the occasions when the filings did not move) to account
foir the contrariety of effects. Usually the secret causes,
either by dint of their minuteness or remoteness, are not
readily discoverable.
However, past observations still have an effect; the
Philosophers, as well as the Vulgar, will still retain some
degree of conviction that the iron filings will move
towards the bar on the next occasion. Since belief is only
a more forceful and lively conception of an object or
event, and since the force and vivacity of a perception
admits of degree, Hume allows that there can be degrees
of belief. The degree of belief that is caused by an
uncertainty about the cause (s) or effect (s) of an event
is the subject of Section 12. His main task, in both
Sections 11 and 12, is to provide a (causal) explanation
for the various degrees of belief that are engendered by
these variants of causal inference that are employed under
conditions of uncertainty.
Hume seems to approve of these kinds of inferences (see
especially his opening remarks in Section 13)
.
None-
theless, all of these kinds of inference depend, in one
way or another, on causal inference. Thus the question of
Hume's views on the justification of beliefs arrived at
through these kinds of inferences will depend on what Hume
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thinks about the justification of causal inference. I
shall discuss this topic in detail in a later chapter.
Section 13, however, involves a discussion of beliefs
that Hume thinks are clearly unjustified. He discusses
four kinds of situations that result in unjustified
belief. Again, his primary concern is to provide a
causal account of the beliefs in question. In what
follows, I shall show in detail that, in these situations
the beliefs are unjustified because they have certain
sorts of causes.
The first three kinds of situations concern beliefs
that arise directly from causal inference. In these cases
the degree of belief is weaker than it would be ordinarily.
Hume is interested in explaining why this occurs.
Case 1 . In causal reasoning from an idea of the memory,
the idea which is the conclusion of the causal inference
gets its force and vivacity (in part, at least) from the
memory idea. Thus the degree of belief that attends the
conclusion of a causal inference will be, in part, a function
of the degree of the force and vivacity of the memory
idea. Hume puts the matter this way:
The argument, which we found on
any matter of fact we remember,
is more or less convincing,
according as the fact is recent
or remote; (T. 143)
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An example will make this clear. Suppose that at
one time in the past I observed my Uncle Joe board a
plane for Paris. A few months later, someone asks me if
I believe that my Uncle Joe has ever been to Paris. I
recall my observation of him boarding the plane; by causal
reasoning I infer that an effect of this action was his
arrival at Orly Airport in Paris. My memory idea is
quite lively and vivid because this happened a relatively
short time ago; consequently, the degree of my belief that
Uncle Joe has been to Paris is quite high. A number of
years later, someone asks me the same question. This time
my memory idea is not as lively and vivid as it was pre-
viously (but, let us suppose, not so faint that I doubt
that Uncle Joe boarded the plane) . Again, by causal
reasoning I come to believe that Uncle Joe has been to
Paris. However, the degree of belief is much less because
the force and vivacity of the memory idea is less.
Hume thinks that the difference in the evidence afford-
ed by the two memory ideas is unwarranted; he argues for
this by a kind of reductio ad absurdem .
tho' the difference in these degrees
of evidence be not received by
philosophy as solid and legitimate;
because in that case an argument
shall have a different force today
from what it shall have a month
hence. (T. 143)
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Hume seems to claim that the degree of belief in the
case where the belief arises from the fainter memory is
unjustified. His argument for this is something like the
following
:
On two different occasions, the mind has before it
ideas that it believes to be memories (e.g. an image of
U^cle Joe smiling and waving as he boards an Air France
jet) . The ideas differ in their force and vivacity. Hume
cannot hold that the mind doubt s whether the fainter image
is in fact a memory (rather than a mere imagining) . Other-
wise, it seems reasonable to say that the diminution of
the degree of the subsequent belief is warranted. In
neither case is there any doubt that the ideas are memories.
In each case, by causal reasoning, the mind arrives at a
belief that is not a memory. The degrees of these beliefs
are, however, different. Hume seems to hold that the
degree of belief in the case where it is weaker is unjusti-
fied. The cause of the degree of this belief is the rela-
tive faintness of the memory idea--a cause that is extrin-
sic to the process involved in the causal inference.
There are a number of difficulties with this claim
that it is the degree of belief that is unjustified. There
are some relevcint questions that need to be answered. How
do we determine w’hich degree (or range of degrees) is
justified? Presumably, the force and vivacity of the rele-
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vant memory ideas can vary considerably. Which degree of
belief is appropriate? Furthermore, it is not clear what
the Wise (the Philosophers) do in such cases. Is the degree
of belief the same for them in both cases? If, as Hume
intends, his argument is a causal one, the Wise would be
affected with the same changes in degree of belief as the
Vulgar. What does it mean, on this account, to say that
they do not receive these changes as solid and legitimate?
Hume does not even address these questions. Furthermore,
given the machinery that he has to work with, it is hard
to see how he could reply to these questions. Fortunately
there is another way to understand what is going on here
which avoids these problems.
Recall that Hume claims that well-established causal
arguments can rightly be called "proofs". Their conclu-
sions can be regarded as practically certain. My reasoning
concerning Uncle Joe's having been in Paris seems to be such
an argument, as long as there is no doubt that what are
believed to be memory ideas in each case are in fact memory
ideas. Nonetheless, in each case, the degree of belief is
different
.
What do the wise actually do in such a case? Since
presumably they are human, and since Hume's arguments apply
to all human minds, they must also suffer a diminution in
the degree of their belief in the second case. However,
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they do not take account of this difference; it is not
regarded as "solid and legitimate". Both chains of
reasoning are regarded as proofs. The conclusions are
viewed as practically certain. That is, the Wise, in
effect, make or are disposed to make an epistemic judgment
about the argument. They regard the premises of the argu-
ment as bestowing a practical certainty on the conclusion.
It is on the basis of this epistemic judgment (or their
disposition to make such a judgment) and not the momentary
feeling of less than full conviction that they guide their
future inferences and actions.
What of the Vulgar in such cases? It is tem.pting
to say that they too make an epistemic judgment. Given
their proclivity (often noted by Hume) for taking things
as they appear, they might judge that the conclusion is
less than certain, thereby taking their degree of conviction
as the sole indication of the conclusiveness of the argu-
ment .
But isn't this crediting the Vulgar with too much?
Don't the Vulgar merely entertain the conclusion with a
degree of belief less than that of full conviction? Don't
the Vulgar have, for the most part, no epistemological
beliefs? On Hume's account of belief, where belief is
occurrent rather than dispositional, the answer seems to
be "Yes." However, it does not seem unreasonable to say
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that the Vulgar are disposed to have the kind of epistemic
belief or to make the epistemic judgment suggested above.
Not only is the second argument, about Uncle Joe subjective-
ly less convincing than the first, the Vulgar, on Hume's
reading of the situation, are not disturbed by this. Were
they to be asked about the conclusiveness of the causal
argument and its conclusion, they would reply that its con-
clusiveness is on a par with how convincing it is, viz.,
less than practically certain. This would be unlike the
Wise, whose felt conviction may be less than entire, but
who nonetheless recognize that the argument constitutes a
proof
.
The difference between the Vulgar's (dispositional)
epistemic belief and that of the Wise would, perhaps, be
manifest in long run dispositions to act and make inferences.
The momentary subjective degree of conviction, which, if
Hume's argument is correct, is identical for both the Vulgar
and the Wise, might be manifest in more short-term
dispositions, e.g. the willingness to take, on the "spur
of the moment" and unref lectively , certain bets. Whether
this is all plausible from the standpoint of psychological
theory will be examined shortly. What is being developed
here .is a line of reasoning Hume might well have pursued.
Given all this, what belief is unjustified and why?
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Since, in order for a belief to be unjustified, it
actually occur in the mind as a perception or series
of perceptions (piven Hume' s account of belief as occurrent
rather than dispositional) let us suppose that a represen-
tative Vulgar, say Dr. Johnson, actually believes that the
conclusion is less than certain. Clearly Hume wants to
hold that such a belief is unjustified (cf,. quotation on
p. 32)
.
Can it be shown that such a belief is not caused
by causal inference?
Hume could argue that Dr. Johnson falls prey to the
same sort of process that makes him so gullible. Experience
shows that there is often a resemblance betv;een the degree
of conviction and the degree of conclusiveness of the con-
clusion of an argument (see the discussion of the proba-
bility of chances and the probability of causes in
Part (iii) Sections 11 and 12). As the current discussion
of unphilosophical probability shows, this resemblance is
not always present. However, since resemblance is a natural
relation, responsible (in part) for the association of
ideas. Dr. Johnson extends this resemblance "beyond what
experience will justify". Thus he supposes that the degree
of conclusiveness resembles the degree of conviction and
makes his judgment accordingly. The conclusion is re-
garded as less than certain. Thus, his judgment is not
caused by causal inference.
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Craftier types, such as, say, Adam Smith, make or.
are disposed to make the following causal judgment: "Were
the force and vivacity of the memory ideas equal, there
would be no difference in the degree of conviction in the
two cases." This is what Hume might mean when he says
that the actual difference in degree of conviction is not
regarded as "solid and legitimate". This also captures
the intent of my claim that the degree of conclusiveness
is the same in both cases, though the degree of conviction
differs.
This psychological explanation is obviously not in
Hume's discussion of unphilosophical probability. His
remarks are much more cursory. This explanation does show,
however, how Hume could have proceeded on the basis of his
psychological principles. Furthermore, it shows just exact-
ly what belief is unjustified and that such a belief is not
caused by causal inference.
Actually, there is something about Hume's psychological
explanation and subsequent evaluation that does not ring
true. One might ask, 'Do the Vulgar really behave in the
way Hume seems to suggest?' In addition, the diminution
over time of the liveliness of a memory idea might be
indicative of (in the absence of any corroborative evidence)
legitimate doubt about the veracity of the purported memory
idea. That is, (all else equal) I am less certain, both
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psychologically and epistemically
, about my childhood
memories than I am about my recent ones. In the cases
that Hume describes, the arguments really are not "the
same as Hume suggests. In one case, one begins with a
purported memory idea about which there is doubt. In the
other argument this doubt is not present. It seems that
the conclusiveness of the two arguments differs. Hume
seems to be committed to holding that there is a range of
degrees of force and vivacity v/ithin which legitimate doubt,
minor though it may be, has no place. This seems very odd.
In the absence of corroborative evidence, the liveliness
of a purported memory idea is a prima facie measure of its
legi ti macy
.
Nevertheless, whatever may be the problems with Hume's
actual discussion, the account that I have offered seems
to characterize accurately his intentions. Moreover, in the
remaining cases to be discussed, Hume's psychological
description and his epistemological diagnosis seem to be
much more plausible.
Case 2 . This case is similar in many respects to Case 1.
Here again it is the mind's limited memory capabilities
that have undesirable effects. The observation of a cause
and effect in the past is in part responsible for the belief
that, in similar circumstances, the effect (cause) will occur
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(has occurred) when the cause (effect) has been observed.
When the observation of the past cause and effect is remote,
the mind s recollection of it will be weaker and fainter
than when the observation is more recent. The degree of
the subsequent belief arrived at through causal inference
will vary correspondingly. With regard to this Hume says,
There is a second difference,
which we may frequently observe
in our degrees of belief and
assurance, and which never fails
to take place, tho ' disclaimed by
philosophers. An experiment, that
is recent and fresh in the memory,
affects us more than one that is
in some measure obliterated; and
has a superior influence on the
judgment, as well as on the
passions. (T. 143-144)
As an example, Hume cites the case of a drunkard
who observes his friend die of a debauch. For a short
time thereafter, he more firmly believes that the same
fate will befall him. After a time, however, the memory of
the cause of his friend's demise (the debauch) and its
effect (his friend's death) fades; the degree of his
belief that a similar end awaits him lessens and, as a
consequence, so does his fear. This explains why his
friend's death may bring about a partial reform in his
drinking (or at least a concern if he does not reform) for
only a relatively short time. Thereafter, he reverts to
his old ways. A recent observation of a cause and effect
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has the same result as the more recent memory idea in
Case 1. He says,
A more recent observation has a
like effect; because the custom
and transition is there more
entire, and preserves better the
original force in the communica-
tion. (T. 144)
The degree of belief differs, then, according to how
recent the observation is. As Hume indicates by his remark
that such differences are disclaimed by philosophers (see
the second previous quotation)
, these differences should be
of no account. What this means is that such beliefs should
be viewed as conclusions of proofs (if, indeed, the in-
ference is a genuine causal inference)
, and, as such, the
conclusion should be regarded as practically certain. If
someone comes to believe that a conclusion of this sort is
only probable because his degree of belief has been
weakened by, in effect, the passage of time, his belief is
unjustified. It is unjustified because he has supposed,
without the benefit of causal reasoning, that the degree
of conclusiveness resembles the degree of (actual) conviction.
Case 3 . In this case the degree of belief of the conclu-
sion of a proof gets weakened because the proof requires
many steps. That is, a great number of causal inferences
are required to roach the conclusion from an impression of
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sensation or an idea of the memory. The force and vivacity
of the ideas entertained in the chain of reasoning gets
weaker as the chain of causal inferences grows longer.
Hume describes the mechanics of this process as follows:
Tis from the original impression,
that the vivacity of all the ideas
is deriv'd, by means of the customary
transition of the imagination; and
tis evident this vivacity must
gradually decay in proportion to the
distance, and must lose somewhat in
each transition. (T. 144)
The result of this process is that the degree of
belief that attends the conclusion of this extended chain
of causal inferences is considerably weakened. The Vulgar
unjustifiably regard the conclusion as less than practically
certain, i.e. as merely probable, even though each step is
(in Hume's words) "just and conclusive". The mind un-
warrantedly supposes that the argument is a "mere pro-
bability " .
I add, as a third instance of this
kind [i.e. unphilosophical proba-
bility] that tho ' our reasonings
from proofs and probabi] i ties be
considerably different from each
other, yet the former species of
reasoning often degenerates insen-
sibly into the latter, by nothing
but the multitude of connected
arguments. (T. 144)
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The unjustified belief is the belief that the conclu-
sion is merely probable rather than practically certain.
The cause of this belief is the supposed resemblance be-
tween the degree of conviction and the degree of conclu-
siveness of the conclusion. This supposition is not caused
by causal inference.
In all three of these cases the degree of belief is
irrelevant to the certainty of the conclusion. The con-
clusion is practically certain because the argument upon
which it is based is a causal argument. This is not the
case in other sorts of arguments . In arguments concerning
the probability of causes, the degree of belief that at-
tends the conclusion determines how probable the conclu-
sion is [see Sections 11 and 12 of Part (iii)] .
Case 4. Unlike cases 1, 2 and 3, this case does not result
in the Vulgar supposing that a conclusion is merely proba-
ble when it ought to be judged as certain. Rather, in this
case the Vulgar unjustifiably believe that the conclusion
is practically certain when it is, at best, only probable.
The undesirable effects on the judgment here are the re-
sult of the following (the wrong sort of) general rules.
Hume says,
A fourth unphilosophical species
of probability is that derived
from general rules , which we
rashl^^form to ourselves, and
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which are the source of what we
properly call PREJUDICE. An
Irishman cannot have wit, and
a Frenctima n cannot have
solidity; ... we have enter-
tained such a prejudice against
them, that they must be dunces or
fops in spite of sense and
reason. (T. 146, 147) (emphases
are Hume's)
Hume claims that the formation of such general rules is
the effect of custom or habit. Though the operation of
causal inference is also explained as the effect of custom,
there are considerable differences between the psycho-
genesis of the two.
Hume explains the formation of these unreasonable
general rules as follows: In the mind's observations of
causes and effects, there is usually a complication of cir-
cumstances, some of which are essential to (i.e. are
constantly conjoined with) the production of the effect and
some of which are superfluous (i.e. are only occasionally
present) . If these superfluous features are remarkable
and oft present, their presence, even in the absence of
what is essential, will cause the mind to form an idea of
the alleged effect with a force and vivacity that is
indicative of full conviction. The propensity of the mind
to pass from a perception of the superfluous circumstance
to a forceful and lively idea of the effect ^ the general
rule. The effect of this general rule is that the mind
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will believe, with respect to anything that satisfies the
superfluous circumstance that it also satisfies the other
condition
.
Hume never explicitly says how this accounts for
prejudice, but the implicit account is relatively clear.
If someone observes numerous instances of (what he or she
believes to be) witless Irishmen, then even if he or she
does not observe a constant conjunction of the qualities
of being Irish and being witless, the occurrence of the
superfluous circumstances (being Irish) will still have an
effect on the mind--it will pass to an idea of witless-
ness. The force and vivacity of the idea in question
will be such that the person believes, with full con-
viction, that this particular Irishman is witless. This
belief is the effect of a propensity of the mind to pass
from a perception of the superfluous circumstance to an
idea of the alleged effect. This propensity is the
general rule; its effect is a prejudicial judgment of a
particular Irishman. The cause of this propensity is
the observation of the occasional (but not constant) con-
junction of qualities that are remarkable or prominent.
This is the effect on the mind; how do the Vulgar
respond here? The Vulgar believe with full conviction that
this Irishman is witless. In addition, they are disposed
to believe, on the basis of past experience, that this
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conclusion is (practically) certain, and they guide their
future actions and inferences accordingly. The Vulgar's
epistemic belief (supposing it to be actualized) is
caused by the bigot's supposing, without the benefit of
causal inference, that the degree of conclusiveness of the
conclusion (about a particular Irishman) resembles his
degree of conviction. As the above quotation makes clear,
Hume thinks that such a belief is unjustified. In Hume's
words, it is believed "in spite of sense and reason".
The Wise, on the other hand, are more diffident in their
epistemic dispositions. Even though they may believe with
full conviction that this Irishman is witless, they do not
trust that sentiment to guide their future actions.
Hume's account here makes a good deal of sense. Any
person, whether he be a member of the Wise or of the Vul-
gar cannot help but feel prejudice with regard to an ethnic
or racial group with which he or she has had long and nega-
tive experience. Nonetheless, the judicious person will
not let those sentiments guide his actions (in the absence
of other evidence) in, e.g. hiring and housing.
On the other hand, what if a person believed, on the
basis of past experience, that it is only probable that
the next Irishman is witless (regardless of his actual
degree of conviction) ? This is a judgment quite different
from that of the bigot. Hume discusses probabilistic
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judgments on the basis of frequent--but not constant
—
conjunction in Sections 11 and 12. Though such judgments
are the result of a variant form of causal inference, the
bigot s belief or disposition to believe that it is certain
that the next Irishman to be observed is witless is not the
result of such a process.
This completes my discussion of Hume's catalogue of the
venal sins of epistemology. In each case, I have given
evidence that Hume held that certain beliefs are unjusti-
fied and that they are unjustified because they are not
caused by causal inference. The obvious question to ask
at this point is, "WHY?". That is, from an interpretive
point of view, one might wonder why every time Hume dis-
covers a kind of belief not caused by causal inference he
pronounces it unjustified. Leaving to one side two impor-
tant classes of beliefs that I have not discussed, viz.
those that attend memory and sensation, a partial explana-
tion might be that Hume is committed to the following
principle
:
(*) All beliefs (concerning matters of fact) not
caused by causal inference are unjustified.
This raises two important questions:
(a) Is Hume really committed to (*)?
(b) If so, what arguments did he or might he offer
for ( * )
?
Let us consider question (a) first. This is solely a
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problem of interpretation. It might be argued on inductive
grounds that Hume did indeed hold (*)
.
The argument
would be something like the following:
(1) Hume believes that each kind of belief that he
examines in Part (iii) that is not caused by
causal inference is unjustified.
Therefore, probably
(2) Hume believes that every kind of belief not caused
by causal inference is unjustified.
The evidence for (1) has been accumulated in this chapter.
If inductive arguments are warranted, then this seems to be
a good argument
.
However, in order not to beg any questions and for the
benefit of those what are sceptical of inductive procedures
(and Hum.e might be among them.'), it would be better if a
different sort of interpretive argument could be given. And,
indeed such an argument can be given.
If we take seriously the claim that Hume is trying to
provide a psychological theory of the operations of the
human mind, then we would expect him to provide an exhaust-
ive account of the causes of our beliefs concerning matters
of fact. This is exactly what he appears to be doing in
Sections 4 through 13 of Part (iii) . A desideratum of
any scientific theory is to subsume a variety of apparently
diverse phenomena under a small number of principles. I
shall show that Hume hold that all of our beliefs con-
cerning matters of fact are engendered by a small number
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of processes. I shall also show that he holds that each of
these processes, except for causal inference (and perhaps
the processes that result in beliefs about sensation and
memory) cause unjustified belief. That is, I shall show
that the catalogue of unjustified belief considered in
this chapter is exhaustive. Then I shall proceed to con-
sider Question (b)
.
In Section 7 of Part (iii)
, Hume argues that belief is
to be defined as a lively idea related to or associated with
a present impression. As the mind makes a transition
from the original impression to the subsequent idea, some
of the force and vivacity of the former gets transferred
to the latter. Without the present impression, the subse-
quent idea is weak and feeble; belief is not present. On
the basis of this definition, the causes of belief will be
accounted for by the impression and the principles govern-
ing the transition, which may consist of a number of
ideas. The causes of impressions of sensation are, in part,
unknowable (cf. Treatise
, p. 7). But, Hume clearly allows
that the cooperation of sense organs and a mind in which
they "reside" are necessary for their occurrence. The
occurrence of the constituents of the transition (i.e. the
ideas) is determined by the association of ideas. Ideas
arc associated by the three natural relations, viz. re-
semblance, contiguity, and causation. However, as we have
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already seen (cf. pps. 4-5 above), Hume holds that resem-
blance and contiguity cannot sufficiently enliven ideas
to produce belief; they can, nonetheless, "assist" causa-
tion, which can so enliven ideas. When the transition is
governed by causation, causal inference occurs. There are
a number of distinct processes that Hume calls causal
inference (these will be discussed in Chapter III)
, and
there are some variants on the basic process or processes.
For the purposes at hand, it is not necessary to
consider the exact mechanisms involved. The important
point is that Hume seems to hold that all of the mind's
beliefs concerning matters of fact are caused by some
version of causal inference, perhaps occasionally assisted
by resemblance or contiguity. Or does he? Actually,
there is another process that causes belief, but it is
explained by the same principle that explains causal infer-
ence. Causal inference is so ubiquitous because the
transition based on the relation of causation is customary
or habitual. It is because of custom or habit that the
mind believes that the future resembles the past. But,
this is not the only effect of custom..
. . . custom, to which I attribute
all belief and reasoning, may
operate on the mind after two
several ways. (T. 115)
He proceeds to describe what occurs when the mind is engaged
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in cnusnl inference. The other effect of custom is described
as follows:
But let us next suppose, that a
mere idea alone, without any of
this curious and almost artifi-
cial preparation [observed con-
stant conjunction, etc.] should
frequently make its appearance
in the mind, this idea must, by
degrees acquire a facility and
force; and both by its firm hold
and easy introduction distinguish
itself from any new and unusual
idea. (T. 116)
What Hume is talking about is, of course, education
which I have discussed before. The important point here
is that this is the only way, aside from causal inference,
that custom can "invigorate" an idea and engender belief.
Given Hume's definition of belief and these basic
tenets of his psychological theory, it is possible to see
that Hume has in fact discussed all the various kinds of
belief concerning matters of fact. Beliefs that arise from
education are the result of custom; those of fools and
madmen result from physiological or psychological distur-
bances; credulity and all the kinds of unphilosophical
probability are all founded, to some extent, on causal
inference, but they get an unfortunate "assist" from re-
semblance. Finally, of course, there is causal inference,
memory, and sensation.
The point of all this is that a pattern emerges from
CHAPTER I I
As noted previously, much of Hume's discussion in
Part (iii) is devoted to providing a psychological explana-
tion of the causes of the mind's beliefs concerning matters
of fact. However, he does not begin with a discussion of
belief. Rather, the opening two sections are concerned
with what occurs when the mind is engaged in reasoning.
The reason for this move will become apparent as
I proceed.
What does Hume think reasoning is? It is not until
the beginning of Section 2 that he gets around to propos-
ing something like a definition of reasoning. He says.
All kinds of reasoning consist in
nothing but a comparison and a
discovery of those relations, constant
or inconstant, which two or more
objects bear to each other. (T.73)
Implicit in Hume's definition here and in the surrounding
discussion is the notion that all reasoning issues in
some judgment or other. This judgment may not be believed,
as is the case when the reasoning is hypothetical, but the




Since, as the above quotation indicates, the discovery
of relations is essential to all reasoning, Hume opens
Part (iii) with a discussion of all the relations; they
have been exhaustively enumerated in Part (i) Section 5.
The importance of the judgment that terminates a bit of
reasoning is recognized at the beginning of Section 1; Hume
opens this section with an epistemological distinction
based on such judgments. Some relations depend entirely
on the ideas, and the relation is present as long as the
ideas remain the same. The discovery of these relations
result in judgments that constitute knowledge in the strict
sense because their denials are inconceivable and absurd.
The relations in question are resemblance, contrariety,
degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and
number
.
In Section 2 he discusses the other three relations
( viz . identity, relations of time and place, and causation),
which may be present or absent even though the ideas remain
the same. Some instances of reasoning terminate in judg-
ments about such relations; these may be false without
being absurd or self-contradictory.
The discussion thusfar presupposes that the ideas
that constitute a bit of reasoning are given. We might
well ask, 'Can the reasoning process generate (i.e. cause)
these ideas?' If so, then the mind will suppose or believe
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that the objects of these ideas exist. The reason for
this is that Hume holds that existential judgments are
identical to the occurrence of the idea whose object is
the subject of such judgments (see Trea t ise , p. 97n)
.
This has significant consequences. For, now the
question becomes, 'Can reasoning carry the mind beyond
what is present to the senses and inform it of existences,
and objects with which it is not sensuously acquainted?'
Hume's answer is an emphatic 'Yes', but only if the
objects of the constituents of a bit of reasoning are
believed to be causally connected. I shall investigate why
he held this below. A more immediate problem is this:
While it is clear that, to judge that an object exists is
just to have an idea of that object, what about judgments
that something occurs? Things that are causally related
will often be something other than mere physical objects.
Hume recognizes this in his discussion of relations in
Part (i) Section 5. There he speaks of actions or motions
of objects as causally connected. Let us call them
'occurrences'. As I shall show below, they are not what
we might call events because unlike events, occurrences
can recur at different times.
What are we to make of judgments that an occurrence
occurs? According to Hume's way of individuating percep-
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tions, any change in the object of a perception means a
change in perception. Thus such a judgment cannot be the
mere occurrence of a perception. Nonetheless, there seems
to be an important similarity between such judgments and
judgments that an object exists. Accordingly, it seems
reasonable to suggest that a judgment that an occurrence
occurs is a series of perceptions, the objects of which
constitute the occurrence. Judgments that an object
exists or that an occurrence occurs can both be approp-
^i^tely termed existential judgments' to distinguish
them from relational and predicative judgments.
The picture of the termini of instances of reasoning
is more complicated than it was a few pages back. Reason-
ing can issue in a relational judgment or an existential
judgment. In the case where reasoning issues in a rela-
tional judgment, the penultimate step will be an existential
judgment of one kind or the other. In cases where reason-
ing issues in an existential judgment, the mind will be
disposed to judge that some relation (s) obtain among the
objects of the constituents of a bit of reasoning.
However, not all existential judgments are termini
of instances of reasoning. Hume's claim is that such
judgments have this status only if they are the result of
the process of causal inference. What about relational
judgments? Hume's definition of reasoni.ng seems to
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indicate that all relational judgments are the product of
reasoning. Suppose, however, that I arbitrarily judge
that the horse is next to the barn by comparing my ideas
of the horse and of the barn. If these ideas are not
brought about by causal inference, then the existential
Presuppositions upon which my relational judgment rests
are not the result of reasoning. It is not obvious that
Hume could hold that, in such a case, the relational judg-
ment is the result of reasoning. He might be able to cover
himself by saying that, in such cases, as long as the
mind supposes that the existential presuppositions are
merely hypothetical, the relational judgment is the re-
sult of reasoning. That is, if the mind does not believe
that the process by which the ideas arise (say, the
operation of mere caprice) actually informs it of
existences and objects, the subsequent relational judg-
ment could count as an instance of reasoning because a
relation has been discovered. On the other hand, if the
relational judgment has existential presuppositions that
do not arise from causal inference and if these existential
presuppositions are believed, it seems unreasonable to
say that such a judgment is the result of reasoning be-
cause it logically depends on a belief that is not the
result of reasoning. Hume's definition of reasoning would
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have to be amended to take this into account.
The process that most interests Hume is reasoning
that results in belief both in the existence of the ob-
jects of ideas and the relations they bear. Let us call
all such reasoning 'empirical reasoning' to distinguish
it from the discovery of relations among objects, the
ideas of which result from other causes such as the
reveries of the fancy.
Before considering Hume's arguments for the claim
that only the relation of causation can be made use of in
reasoning to carry the mind beyond what is present to the
senses, it would be helpful to ponder the epistemological
significance of saying that a particular belief is caused
by empirical reasoning. Though Hume devotes a great deal
of attention to the psychological description of what
happens when the mind is engaged in empirical reasoning,
he does not explicitly consider the epistemological sig-
nificance of saying that a belief is the result of empiri-
cal reasoning.
Clearly, Hume does not mean to say that all beliefs
concerning matters of fact are caused by empirical reason-
ing. As I have shown in the previous chapter, there are
other sources of belief besides empirical reasoning (e.g.
education, disturbances of the animal spirits, etc.). It
is also clear that empirical reasoning docs not (invariably)
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cause true belief. This should be obvious for the follow-
ing reason: all empirical reasoning is causal reasoning.
In causal reasoning, the mind observes a constant con-
junction of objects or occurrences; upon the appearance of
one of these to the senses or the memory, the mind infers
the existence or occurrence of the other; it also believes
or is disposed to believe that there is a causal connect-
ion between the two. However, one or both of these beliefs
can be mistaken. The observed constant conjunction might
only have been coincidental; alternatively, the object
might exist (or the occurrence occur) in that particular
case, but there may not be any causal connection. Thus,
empirical reasoning does not produce all true beliefs con-
cerning matters of fact. What sorts of beliefs does it
produce?
Since Hume thinks that the only kind of empirical
reasoning is causal reasoning, let us consider what he
thinks causal reasoning produces. He says,
Tis only caus ation which produces
such a connection, as to give us
assurance from the existence or
action of one object, that t'was
follow'd or preceded by any other
existence or action. (T. 73-74)
The key word here is 'assurance'. Upon reflection,
it should be clear that it is an epistemic rather than a
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psychological term. Hume is not hero arguing that the
mind passes from a perception to an idea only when their
objects are believed to be causally connected. Such a
claim would clearly contradict his view that there are
other natural relations ( resemblance and contiguity)
,
which are responsible for the association of ideas in the
mind. Nor is he making the sweeping psychological claim
about the causes of belief, for the reasons cited above.
Ihe assurance that Hume is talking about here is the
assurance of warranted or j ust i f ied belief. Thus, his
claim in the above quotation is that a justified belief
(concerning matters of fact) is produced by a transition
from a perception to an idea only when causal connec-
tions are supposed among the objects of the perceptions.
Let us call all such empirical judgments that arise from a
transition from a perception to an idea 'mediate judgments'
to distinguish them from the immediate judgments that attend
the operation of the memory and the senses. Hume can then
be interpreted as making the following claim:
(1) A mediate empirical judgment is justified only
if it is caused by causal reasoning.
This is logically equivalent to:
(la) All mediate empirical judgments that are justi-
fied are caused by causal reasoning.
This, in turn, is logically equivalent to:
(lb) All mediate empirical judgments that are not
caused by causal reasoning are unjustified.
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(lb), of course, is very similar to (*) of Chapter I
(cf. p. 47). The difference is that Hume has an argument
for the contrapositive of (lb) in Section 2, whereas in
the sections discussed in Chapter I he offers no argu-
ment for (*). Obviously, if his argument in Section 2
works, this is an acceptable procedure. It is to this
argument that I shall now turn.
The way that Hume sets up his argument for (lb) is
somewhat peculiar. He supposes that there are only three
kinds of relations that are candidates for the foundation
of empirical reasoning identity, relations of time and
space, and causation. He argues that the first two will
not do and claims that causation will. This procedure
seems unwarranted; why could not the mind be informed of
existences and objects with which it is not sensuously
acquainted by say, the relation of resemblance? Hume does
not even consider this question. Fortunately, I shall be
able to show that the same arguments that rule out iden-
tity and spatial and temporal relations as foundations for
empirical reasoning rule out all other relations as well.
It is now possible to consider the question, 'Why is
causal reasoning the only kind of empirical reasoning?
'
One might expect Hume to appeal to some requirement that a
relation must satisfy in order that it be suitable for
empirical reasoning. After a fashion, this is what he docs.
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However, the requirement, as I shall show, is extraor-
dinarily complex, and Hume only hints at what it is.
Hume s strategy is to argue that neither relations of
time or space nor the relation of identity can be made
use of in empirical reasoning unless some causal connections
are presupposed. He then states, without argument, that
causation can be so used. Thus, the key to the question
asked in the preceding paragraph will lie in his essential-
ly negative arguments about these other kinds of relations.
The first of these arguments goes as follows:
nor can the other two relations ever
be made use of in reasoning, except so
far as they either affect or are affected
by it [causation] . There is nothing in
any objects to persuade us that they are
either always remote or always contiguous;
and when from experience and observation
we discover, that their relation is in
this particular invariable, we always
conclude that there is some secret cause,
which separates or unites them. The
same reasoning extends to identity . . .
(T. 74)
The case of this argument is thoroughly psychological.
He is concerned to describe what in fact occurs in the
mind. However, the process that he is describing is the
process of empirical rea soning . That is, it may happen
that an idea whose object is believed to bo spatially
contiguous to the object of some other perception gets in-
troduced into the mind, even though there is no "secret
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cause presupposed. Nonetheless, in such cases what has
occurred is not an instance of empirical reasoning; rather,
it is a mere association of ideas.
As the above quotation indicates, in all genuine
cases of empirical reasoning, a relation that the mind
believes to obtain among the objects of perceptions must be,
in some sense, invariable. Although some spatial or
temporal relations are invariable with respect to some
objects^, this is not the case with all spatial and tem-
poral relations among objects. And, as Hume makes clear,
when a spatial or temporal relation between some particular
objects is believed to be invariable, some causal connect-
ion (s) is always presupposed.
Of the four kinds of relations under consideration,
tis only causation that always has the requisite invaria-
bility. The obvious question to ask at this point is,
'Under what conditions is a relation or kind of relation
always invariable?' This concept of an always invariable
relation is of crucial importance to Hume's view of the
nature of empirical reasoning because, as the above quota-
tion makes clear, it is only when at least one relation
believed to obtain among the objects of the perceptions is
always invariable that empirical reasoning occurs.
^Unless otherv/ise indicated, I shall use the term 'object'
in the sense of 'object of perception.'
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Hume never explains this notion, except by way of
examples. We do know that spatial and temporal relations
and the relation of identity are not always invariable and
that causation is. A careful examination of Hume's argu-
ments concerning these relations should provide the answer
to the question asked in the preceding paragraph.
The reason that spatial relations are not always
invariable is, quite simply, that there are some objects
that are say
, next to each other at a given time which are
not next to each other at all times. Thus, when one of
these objects makes its appearance to the senses, the mind
cannot conclude that the other object exists and is next to
the first.
What about temporal relations? There is every indi-
cation that Hume intends the argument quoted on pace 61
to apply to both spatial and temporal relations. There is
no separate argument concerning temporal relations in this
section; in addition, Hume elsewhere uses the terms 'remote'
and 'contiguous' to denote temporal as well as spatial re-
].ations. If the things that are temporarily related are
(non-recurrent) events, this argument would not show that
temporal relations are not always invariable. If event a
is precedent to event b during a given time interval t,
then during any time interval in which a and b occur, the
former wii.l be precedent to the latter, since the only time
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period in which they occur is t.
Accordingly, I have suggested that what are temporally
related are occurrences, which can recur at different
times. For example, the occurrence of Jones' driving to
work along a certain route may recur five days a week. On
this view of what it is that is temporally related, Hume's
argument guoted on page 61 makes sense. If Jones' driving
to work on Monday precedes Smith's driving to work on
Monday, then there is no assurance that Jones' driving to
work will always occur prior to Smith's driving to work
unless certain causal connections are presupposed.
In general, then, Hume's argument seems to be that
there are some objects that bear a spatial or temporal
relation to each other at a given time, and yet they are
not so related at all other times that they exist or occur.
Obviously, by implication, Hume does not think that this is
true of the relation of causation. If two occurrences are
causally connected at a given time, then at any time that
the one occurs, the other will occur, and they will be
causally connected. It is for this reason that causation
gives
. . , us assurance from the existence or
action of one object, that 'twas follow'd or
preceded by any other existence or action.
(T. 73-74)
It is not altogether clear how Hume might individuate
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occurrences, i.e. those things that bear temporal and causal
relations to each other. On the one hand, they cannot be
individuated too finely or his argument will not show that
temporal relations are not always invariable. On the other
hand, if occurrences are individuated too coarsely, then
causation will not be always invariable. At this time I
am not sure just how Hume could individuate occurrences.
Nonetheless, it is clear from his arguments in this section
that these requirements must be met.
Returning now to the notion of an always invariable
relation, the above considerations suggest the following
definition :
: Relation R is always invariable if and only if
(m) (n) (t) [Rmn,t -> ( (t^) [ (3C) (Cm, t^) ->
(3D) (Dn,t^ & Rmn,tM] & (t^) [ {9G) {Gn,t^) ->
(3F) (Fm,t^ & Rmn,t2) ] )
]
Where m and n range over objects of perceptions
(physical objects, occurrences). C, D
,
^F , and G
range over properties and t, t'^ and t"^ range over
time intervals.
All that says is that if two objects of perceptions
bear an always invariable relation to each other at a given
time, then if at any other time one of the objects exists
or recurs, then the other will exist or recur and bear the
same relation to its counterpart. It is easy to see that
spatial and temporal relations are not always invariable.
The relation of causation, on the other hand, satisfied
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Ihe problem with is that the relation of identity
also satisfies the definition. If two objects are in fact
identical at a given time, then they are always identical.
Identity, however, is not an always invariable relation,
according to Hume. While may express a necessary con-
dition for an always invariable relation, it does not ex-
press a sufficient condition as well.
Hume's argument for the claim that identity lacks the
requisite invariability should provide a clue as to how
can be improved. Immediately following the above
quoted passage he says.
We readily suppose that an object may con-
tinue individually the same tho ' several
times absent from and present to the senses;
and ascribe to it an identity notwithstanding
the interruption of the perception, . . . But
this conclusion beyond the impression of our
senses can be founded only on the connexion
of cause and effect nor can we otherwise
have any security, that the object is not
changed upon us, however much the new object
may resemble that which was formerly present
to the senses. (T. 74)
His argument here seems to be that the mind cannot
suppose that two objects that resemble each other are in
fact identical unless some causal argument can be given.
Hume says (in the passage omitted by the ellipses) that
this argument is to the effect that, were I to keep my eye
or hand upon the object, it would have conveyed an invari-
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able and interrupted impression. This is not to say that
the imagination cannot make such a transition without
this kind of argument; nothing is more free than that facul-
ty. Rather, Hume implies that, under such conditions,
''^hat occurs is not an instance of empirical reasoning.
Thus his claim is that the mind cannot infer simpliciter
that two resembling objects of perceptions bear the rela-
tion of identity to each other.
There is, I think, another way that the mind could
"operate" by means of the relation of identity. Subse-
quent to its having a memory idea of an object, it could
suppose that that object presently exists at a certain
place and in a certain manner. In this way the relation of
identity could lead to an existential belief. However,
just as in the other case, this transition could not be
said to be an instance of reasoning unless certain causal
connections were presupposed.
The failure of the relation of identity to be suitable
for empirical reasoning (i.e. to be always invariable)
suggests that, for a relation to be always invariable, it
must be the case that if any two objects bear the relation
in question to each other at a given time, then, not only
do they always bear that relation to each other, but, in
addition, any other objects that resemble the first two
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bear the relation in question to each other.
How is resemblance to be understood here? The obvious
move is to say that objects can resemble each other in
various respects. This, in turn, can be understood in
terms of shared properties. Thus, to say that two objects
resemble each other with respect to beinq red is to say
that each object has the property of being red .
^
The failure of the relation of identity to be always
invariable in spite of some resemblance between the ob-
jects suggests the following amended version of :
D
2
: Relation R is always invariable if and only if
(i) (m) (n) (t) jRmn,t^ ( (t^) [ (5C) (Cm, t^) -> (5D)
(Dn,t^ & Rmn,tl)] & ( t^ ) [ (3G) (Gn , t^ -> C3F)
(Fm , t"^ & Rmn , t^ ) ] ) ]
AND
(ii) (A) (B) (x) (y) (t^) [(Ax,t^ & By,t^ & Rxy,t^)^
(z)(w)(t^)[(Az,t^ & Bw, t Rzw, t^ ] ]
where A,B,C,D,F, and G range over properties,
m,n,x,y,z, and w range over objects of perceptions
(physical objects, occurrences), and t,t^,t^,t^,
and t^ range over time intervals.
Although the relation of identity satisfies the first
condition, it fails to satisfy the second condition.
Hence, it is not an always invariable relation. And, of
^For a detailed argument to show that this is a reasonable
interpretation of Hume, see my paper, "The Epistemological
status of Moral Judgments in Hume's Treatise " , unpublished,
pps . 14-16.
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course, this is what Hume says.
The problem with D2 is that causation also fails to
satisfy the definition. If 'a' and 'B' are instantiated by
two arbitrarily chosen properties that two causally con-
nected things happen to have, it is easy to find two other
things that also have those properties but are not causally
connected. Many counterexamples of this sort can be found.
Obviously
, the problem lies with the resemblance con-
dition; it is too weak. To see how to suitably strengthen
it, it will be helpful to take a closer intuitive look at
the notion of an always invariable relation.
This notion is purely metaphysical in that whether or
not a relation is always invariable will be independent of
what the mind believes about it. However, Hume has intro-
duced this concept for essentially epistemological purposes.
If the mind (correctly) believes that two things bear an
always invariable relation to each other, then the mind can
correctly infer, upon the appearance of an object or occur-
rence that resembles, iui the appropriate respect, one of
the previously observed pair, that another object exists or
an occurrence occurs--an object or occurrence that approp-
riately resembles the other member of the pair. The ob-
vious question is, 'What constitutes the appropriate sort of
resemblance?
'
For the properties that determine the resemblance to
70
be of any significance for the epistemological purpose of
warranting inferences, each property must empirically
determine that there is another thing which has the other
appropriate property and bears the relation in question to
the first thing. Since these inferences are empirical, a
thing's having the appropriate property need not logically
guarantee that something else exists which has the approp-
riate property and bears the relation in question to the
former object or occurrence. Rather, the guarantee need
only be "as a matter of fact" or empirical.
These considerations suggest tv;o changes that need
to be made in condition (ii) of : First, another
condition (or conditions) needs to be added to the ante-
cedent to insure that the properties which determine the
resemblance are "appropriate". Secondly, the consequent
must be altered to reflect the epistemological purposes
that an always invariable relations serves. D3 accomplishes
both of these tasks:
D3 : Relation R is always invariable if and only if
(i) (m) (n) (t) [Rmn, t ( (t^) [ (3C) (Cm, t^l-^
(3 D) (Dn,tl & Rmn,tl)] & ( t^ ) [ (^G) ( Gn , t^
(
3 F)
(Fm , t^ & Rmn , t^ ) ] )
]
AND
(ii) (A) (B) (x) (y) (t^) [ [ (Ax,t^ & By,t^ & Rxy,t^) &
[(x's being A empirically guarantee s that y is B
and that x bears R to y) & (y's being B empir-
ically guarantees that x is A £md that x bears
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Rpq, t-^^) ) ] ]
(-7. ,t| (3w) (Bw,t^J- &
(Bq,tt2_^ (3p) (Ap,t^2 ^
wliGiTG A, B, C, D, F, 3nd G irsnqG ovgjt propGrtiGS,
in, n, X, y, z, w, q, and p rangG ovGr objGcts of
pGrcGption^ (jl^iysical ^^jocts, occurroncGs)
, and
t,t ,t
, t ,t , and rangG ovGr tiruG intGrvals.
O
Of coursG, D is not VGry holpful unlGSs tho undorlinod
GxprGssions can bo mado cloar. It is to that task that I
shall now turn. For thG sakG of simplicity, lot us consider
only the first clause in which this expression occurs. The
explication of this clause will apply, mutatis mutandis,
to the second clause.
The property A must be the kind of property that, if
some X were to have it at any time, then it would determine
that some y has the property B and bears the relation in
question to it at that time. This can be more perspicu-
ously expressed as follows:
D 3 q
:
x's being A empirically guarantees that y is B and
that X bears R to y=df
(t^) [Ax,t^-^ (By,t'^ & Rxy,t^)]
where the symbol ' ' stands for the subjunctive con-
ditional .
The use of the subjunctive conditional here is unavoid-
able; Hume clearly has it in mind when he describes the
special cases of the relation of identity that are suitable
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for inference (cf. Treaty, p. 74). it is irrelevant whe-
ther or not X happens to bo A at a given time. The impor-
tant point is that, were x to be A at a given time, it
wo^d be the case that Y is B and that x bears R to y . Of
course, there are a number of well-known problems with sub-
junctive conditionals. In particular, there is no general
account of under what conditions they are true. Nonetheless,
there are many such conditional statements that are clearly
true and many others that are clearly false. For the pur-
poses at hand, this is sufficient. Of course, a similar
definition can be given for the other clause of D
3
that con-
tains the expression 'empirically guarantees'.
Definition D 3 , suitably clarified, does indeed rule
out the relation of identity as an always invariable rela-
tion. ^ For causation, the two kinds of cases that ruled it
^For a counterexample for the relation of identity, let 'A'
and 'B' be instantiated by properties that a given object
would have at any time that it exists. The following sub-
stitutions seem to do the trick:
A= is bald or not bald
B= is identical to David Hume
x= David Hume
y= David Hume
If we suppose that God always loves all sentient creatures
and that all and only men always have souls, we can gener-
ate another, less trivial counterexample:
A- is loved by God
B= has a soul
x= David Hume
y= David }Iuine
Hume would, no doubt, disapprove of this easel
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out for will not create problems for D3.
Nonetheless, D3~D3^ is not quite good enough. Consider
the following schema for a counterexample:'^ Suppose that
there are two individuals, call them a and b, which are
such that, for any time whatever, if a were to be A then b
would be B and a and b are causally connected. However,
suppose that this is merely "accidental" in the following
sense: There is some other (logically independent) property
P such that, were a to be A at any time, it would be P at
that time and it is in virtue of a's being P (and not in
virtue of a's being A) that b is B and that a and b are
causally connected. In such a case, the property A may aptly
be called a "rider". However, other things that have the
property A are not causally connected to things that have
the property B. Similar considerations apply, mutatis
mutandis
, to the property B. Thus, under such circumstances,
the antecedent is true and the consequence is false. Thus,
^3~^3a fails.
The problem here is not a minor one; it concerns the
circumstances under which a property will determine an
always invariable relation. How are we to specify, in a
general way, the kind of thing that objects must be in order
^Suggested by Prof. Ed Gettier
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that they be invariably related? This specification must
be done in such a way that is neutral with respect to
causation. Otherwise, it would beg the question at issue,
viz. What is distinctive about causation that makes it,
and it alone, suitable for empirical reasoning?'
The solution to this problem would seem to lie in
strengthening the definition of 'empirically guarantees' to
meet the challenge of the schema for a counterexample
given above. It is necessary to insure that the property
A (as well as the property B) is not a mere "rider". The
best v/ay to accomplish this is to require that there be
no logically independent property P upon which A can
"ride". That is, there must be no other property P such
that, if anything were to have it at any time, then there
would be something else that has the property B and is
causally connected to the first thing. This can be more
perspicuously stated as follows:
03
)3 : x's being A emp irically guarantees that y is B and
that X bears R to y=,^f
(1) (t^) [Ax,t^-v^ (By, t^ & Rxy,t^)]
AND
(2) ~ (3P) (t^) [ (Ax, t^-^Px, t^) & <Mi) (Ai,t^
& ~Pi,t 6 ) & 0(i) ( ~Aj,t^ & Pj,t^)
& (r) (t'7) [Pr,t'^-v^ (3s')(Bs,t ^ & Rrs,t')])]
(where the ranges of the variables follow the
pattern of D 3 )
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Similarly, the same treatment can be rendered for B:
^3b' = y's being B empirically guarantees that x is A and
that X bears R to y=^£
(1) (t^) [By,t^^(Ax,t^ & Rxy,t^)]
AND
(2) ~ (3Q) (t^) [ (By , t^-^Qy , t^) &0(k)(Bk,t5 &
~Qk,ty) & <>( 1 ) ( -Bl,t^ & Ql,t9) & (v)
(tlO) [Qv, tlO (3 u) (Au,t^0 ^ Ruv,t^0)]]
(where the ranges of the variables follow the pattern
of d3)
This completes the definition of an always invariable
relation. The relation of identity is not always invariable







' ) • Causation, on the other hand, satisfies
both conditions.
Admittedly, this definition is extraordinarily com-
plex. And, it would be unreasonable to suppose that Hume
had all of these conditions in mind when he wrote the passage
under discussion. However, as I've tried to show, he is
nonetheless committed to something very much like D 3 -D 3 t,D 3 ]^ , .
This definition also provides the following insights about
the notion of an always invariable relation and Hume's
reasoning concerning it.
1. Contrary to what Hume says (cf. the last two lines
of the quotation on p.61) , it is not the "same reasoning
which shows that identity, as well as relations of space and
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time, is not always invariable. The key difference between
causation and spatial and temporal relations (embodied in
condition (i) of D3) is that those things that are causally
connected at a given time are, whenever they occur, causally
connected. Such is not always the case with things that
bear spatial and temporal relations. On the other hand, the
key difference between causation and identity lies in the
fact that occurrences that are distinct from, but appropria-
tely resemble, two causally connected occurrences are causally
connected. Such is not always the case with identity. The
rather long antecedent of condition (ii) of D3 makes ex-
plicit just v;hat sort of resemblance this must be. This
antecedent also tells us something about the nature of the
kind of thing that objects must be in order that they be
always invariably related.
2 . This definition also tells us something about the
process of empirical reasoning in the following sense: If
the mind knows that two things bear an always invariable
relation to one another, then if one of the occurrences
presents itself to the senses or memory, then the mind can
infer that the other occurrence occurs and boars the rela-
tion in question to its correlate. In addition, if the mind
knows that two occurrences boar an always invariable rela-
tion to one another, and that it is in virtue of their
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having certain properties that this is so, then it can con-
clude, upon the appearance of something that has one of these
properties, that there is some other occurrence which has
the other property and bears the relation in question to
the former. That is, this definition explains how empiri-
cal reasoning is possible. Of course, there still remain
the problems of how the mind reidentifies occurrences or
recognizes that something is of the appropriate kind and on
what grounds this is done. All that has been solved here
is the metaphysical problem of the nature of a relation
that is suitable for empirical reasoning.
3. Finally, this definition allows us to do something
that Hume did not do but should have done. Throughout the
passage under discussion, Hume speaks of only four rela-
tions or kinds of relations that are candidates for being
always invariable: spatial relations, temporal relations,
identity, and causation. The force of his reasoning in
these passages is exclusionary in that he tries to show how
only one of these relations is suitable for reasoning, viz.
causation. Notable for their absence are the other rela-
tions: proportion in quantity or number, degrees of quali-
ty, contrariety, and resemblance. Hume nowhere says why
such relations are unsuitable for empirical reasoning. He
might have thought that, since judgments about these rela-
tions constitute knowledge and are, therefore, incorrigible.
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and since no empirical judgment is incorrigible, none of
these relations are even candidates for being the basis of
empirical reasoning. However, the end products of a bit
of empirical reasoning are not alv/ays judgments that some
relation obtains. Indeed, the kind of empirical reasoning
that has been discussed here issues in a judgment that
something exists or occurs. Thus, a question that we can
put to Hume is, 'Why cannot the mind infer, upon the appear-
ance of something to the senses, that something else exists
or occurs which (say) resembles the first thing?' Indeed,
Hume thinks that this cannot be done (witness his discus-
sion of credulity--cf
.
pps . 20-23 above) . However, nowhere
does he provide an argument to show that resemblance is
not an always invariable relation. On the basis of the
above definition, it is easy to see that resemblance is not
an always invariable relation; it fails to meet condition (i)
.
If two objects resemble each other in some respect at a
given time, there is no guarantee that they will always
resemble each other in that respect. What about the other
relations?
a. Proportion i n quantity or number : Clearly
this relation is not always invariable. If the number of
Indians is greater than the number of cavalrymen at the Battle
of the Little Big Horn, one cannot conclude that the number
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of Indians will always be greater than the number of cavalry-
men in a given battle. This (kind of) relation fails to
meet condition (i).
Degrees of quality : Clearly this relation is
not always invariable. If the Sun is brighter than Alpha
Centauri at a given time, there is no guarantee (without
some causal reasoning anyway) that it will always be
that way (the latter may become a nova) . This kind of re-
lation also fails to meet condition (i) .
c. Contrariety : I must confess that I find
Hume's few remarks on this so-called relation quite puzzling.
He emphasizes that the only things that can bear this rela-
tion are existence and non-existence. If there is such a
relation (and it is not obvious that there is) it is
difficult to see how it could even be a candidate for the
basis for empirical reasoning. Thus Hume is vindicated;
only the relation of causation is always invariable.
**********
It is now possible to draw together the threads of the
major argument of this chapter. Hume has claimed that only
transitions based on the relation of causation can produce
assurance (justified belief)
.
His argument for this claim
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is that only the relation of causation always has the
requisite invariability. I have tried to make explicit
Hume s notion of this invariability and to show how the
fact of that invariability makes empirical reasoning possible.
This is independent of what the mind happens to believe
about any of the relations themselves. (It is interesting
to note that Hume claims in the section on the probability
of causes that the Vulgar sometimes falsely suppose that
causes do not always produce the same effects.)
Within the context of Hume's psychological theory and
his exhaustive enumeration of the seven philosophical rela-
tions, only the relation of causation has the requisite in-
variability to render empirical reasoning possible. There-
fore, (la) on p. 59 (and its logical equivalent (lb)) have
been established.
Nonetheless, we might well ask, 'Can the mind ever
know, or at least have justified belief, that any causal
connection obtain?' To answer this question, it will be
helpful to consider a closely related question, 'What of the
converse of (lb)?' That is, what are we to make of the
following claim in the context of Hume's philosophy:
(2) All instances of causal reasoning cause justified
belief
.
Though the discussion thusfar strongly suggests that
Hume does indeed subscribe to (2), it is consistent
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with the argument of these two chapters that Hume correct-
ly holds that (2) is false. It would, however, be very dif-
ficult to explain why Hume would deny (2) and yet affirm
the proposition that all (mediate) empirical judgments not
caused by causal inference are unjustified. That Hume
denied (2) is, I think, a rather widespread view. In the
next chapter I shall show two things:
a. Nothing that Hume says in his discussion of the
epistemological status of causal beliefs shows that (2)
is false.
b. Nothing that Hume says in the relevant passages
shows that Hume bel ieved that (2) is false.
In Chapter IV I shall show that Hume believed that (2)
is true.
CHAPTER III
In this chapter and the next I shall argue that Hume
that all beliefs caused by causal inference are
justified. Perhaps at this point it would be helpful to
give a preliminary characterization of the notion of justi-
fication that I have in mind. It is the rather standard
notion of epistemic appraisal common in philosophical
writings of at least the present era. Though, of course,
there is considerable variation in the meaning that
philosophers have ascribed to the term 'justification' and
its cognates, there are a number of common features in this
connection. The concept is not merely the psychological
one of "having conviction". This concept is logically in-
dependent of the concept of truth in the following sense:
It is possible that someone is justified in believing some-
thing that is in fact false. It is also possible that some-
one believes something that is true but is not justified in
so believing. Furthermore, it is possible that someone is
mistaken in his belief that he is justified in believing
something
.
These features are quite obvious in light of common
phi losophica] usage. However, they are worth noting for the
following reason: A significant majority of commentators
on Hume (and other philosophers who are acquainted with his
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work) believe that Hume held that no opinion concerning
matters of fact is justified, in the aforementioned sense
of the term. If the argument of these two chapters is
sound, then these philosophers are seriously mistaken about
some fundamental aspects of Hume's philosophy.
Ihe most prevalent view is that Hume was a radical
sceptic about most of our claims to knowledge. In one sense
it would be foolish to deny this. No serious reading of
Book I Part (iv) (especially Sections 1, 2, and 7) can survive
any other interpretation. I have no quarrel with a radical-
ly sceptical interpretation of Hume at that juncture.
On the other hand, I shall argue that there is no such
radical scepticism in Part (iii) of Book I . At one point
in the process that Hume calls causal inference, the mind
comes to believe that the future resembles the past in some
significant respect or respects. The place where I differ
with the majority of Hume's commentators is on Hume's view
of the epistemic warrant of that belief (or process by
which that belief arises) . Quite simply, their view is
that Hume held that there is rm epistemic warrant, whereas
my view is that Hume holds that there is an epistemic
warrant for that procedure.
The focus of this debate is on Hume's argument of
Section 6 Part (iii). In this argument Hume is supposed to
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have posed the so-called Problem of Induction. As the pre-
ceding paragraph suggests the received opinion has it that
Hume was highly sceptical about the mind's claims to know-
ledge about the future (or, more generally, about the
unobserved). If the received opinion is correct, then on
Hume's view, scientific method is epistemically no better
off than enthusiasm and superstition. And, David Hume would
be among those for whom this claim, if true, would be very
bad news
, because one of Hume ' s primary purposes in the
Treatise is to construct a Science of Man. Thus, this
argument is of considerable internal significance because,
if my opponents are correct, Hume appears to have cut the
ground out from under what he took to be one of his most
important pro j ects-- the construction of a Science of Man.
The other feature of this argument that makes it worthy
of serious consideration is that it is philosophically
interesting in its own right. Though there is considerable
disagreement about what this argument is intended to estab-
lish and what it does establish, there is no disagreement
about the fact that it is of considerable epistemological
significance. Thus, for historical and philosophical pur-
poses, it is important to consider this argument in great
detail and with considerable care and precision.
Instead of passing on immediately to a consideration of
Hume's (epistemic) appraisal or evaluation of inductive
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procedures, I shall first show that his account of the causes
of beliefs arrived at through causal inference requires that
the mind infers that the future resembles the past in certain
respects (or, more generally, that what is unobserved ap-
P^^^P^istely resembles what is observed) . Though causal
inference is a complex process involving a number of
steps, I will, for analytical purposes, not discuss Hume's
epistemic appraisal of other elements of the process (e.g.
the operation of the miemory) . Thus, my first task will be
to show, quite simply, that beliefs arrived at through
causal inference require that the mind makes inductions.
This can be done quite quickly and easily by pointing to
the appropriate psychological descriptions of the process of
causal inference that Hume offers.
So as not to beg any questions against a small minority
of commentators, I shall next consider and reject the view
that Hume offers no epistemiic appraisal of inductive pro-
cedures, and, as a consequence, of beliefs caused by causal
inference
.
Finally, I shall be in a position to consider the
question of Hume's appraisal of inductive procedures. I
shall proceed by way of a critical evaluation of my oppo-
nent's arguments on this question. Unfortunately, many of
these philosophers think that the assertion that Hume was
a sceptic (in some strong and interesting sense) about
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induction is too obvious to require argument. Often all
that one can find is a quotation from Section 6 of Part (iii)
or from the corresponding passages from the Enquiries or
the Abstract .
Fortunately, one of my opponents has thought that
this interpretive claim and Hume's argument for scepticism
are not altogether obvious. D.C. Stove, in his monograph.
Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism
, goes to great
lengths to establish the following:
(i) The exact nature of the Inductive Sceptic's claim
(ii) A rational reconstruction of Hume's argument for
Inductive Scepticism.
In a rather oblique way, he also argues for the interpretive
claim that Hume was such a sceptic.
I shall agree in large measure with his assessment of
(i) . My representation of Hume's argument will agree, in
many respects, with Stove's version.^ However, I shall
show that Hume's argument establishes and is only intended
to establish a weaker and less controversial position than
Stove and others have attributed to Hume--what Stove calls
Inductive Fallibilism. To do this, I shall show that
^My debt to Stove's monograph is too obvious and pervasive
to require detailed citation. Though, as I shall argue,
he is seriously mistaken about Hume's views on induction,




Stove's argument for the interpretive claim is unsound and
the passages quoted by those who think that Hume's scepti-
cism is obvious admit of another, non-sceptical interpreta-
tion .
I fear, however, that no interpretation of a handful
of passages can be completely conclusive. In many cases (and
in this one in particular) it is very difficult to discover
a philosopher's intentions when his words can be read in
two incompatible ways. Though I think that my reading of
the relevant passages is correct, I admit that the evidence
is not completely conclusive. To establish my case conclu-
sively
, I shall resort to more powerful interpretive and
philosophical arguments. In Chapter IV I will show that a
sceptical interpretation of Hume at this point cannot account
for much of what he later says; I will also show that my
interpretation best explains what is going on in the rele-
vant parts of Book I of the Treatise.
**********
When we last left Hume, he had discovered that, of all
the philosophical relations, only causation is suitable
for empirical reasoning. Immediately thereafter he proceeds
to analyze the idea of causation with a view to discovering
its "components". He quickly establishes that temporal
priority and spatial contiguity are necessary conditions
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for a causal connection (at least as regards physical
objects and events) . However, these conditions are not
joiiitly sufficient; there is necessary connection to be
taken into account. He quickly concludes that there is no
impression (of sensation) of necessary connection. Instead
of giving up his principle "No Idea Without a Precedent
Impression" he declines to "beat about the neighboring
fields", presumably to force his quarry into the open.
This eventually leads him to a careful consideration of the
exact psychological processes involved in causal inference.
In particular, he sets out to answer the following question
in Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Part (iii)
:
Why [do] we conclude that such particu-
lar causes have such particular effects
and why [do] v/e form an inference from one
to another? (T. 82)
The 'why' here is ambiguous. It might appear to be a
psychological 'why', in which case the question would read,
'What process causes us to conclude . . . ?' However, the
question might be an epistemological one, viz .
,
'On what
grounds can we conclude . . . ? ' or 'What is our warrant
for concluding . . . ?' Perhaps he has in mind or will
provide answers to both questions.
Nonetheless, whether or not he answers the epistemo-
logical question, it is clear that he answers the psycholo-
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gical question of how we are caused to believe that a cause
or effect has occurred when only one event is present to
the senses. in Section 4 he argues that all causal reason-
ing (if it is to result in belief and not be merely hypo-
thetical) is grounded in an impression, or at least a
memory idea. In Section 5 he discusses the difference
between memory ideas and those of the imagination. Finally,
in Section 6 he describes what occurs in the mind when it is
engaged in causal inference. He says.
The nature of the experience is this. We
remember to have had frequent instances of
the existence of one species of objects;
and also remember that the individuals of
another species of objects have existed in
a regular order of contiguity and succession
with regard to them ... We likewise call
to mind their constant conjunction in all past
instances. Without any further ceremony, we
call the one the cause and the other the effect,
and infer the existence of the one from that
of the other. ... in all cases, wherein
we reason concerning them, there is only one
perceiv'd or remembered, and the other is sup-
ply 'd in conformity with our past experience.
(T. 87)
Thus it is clear that Hume answers the psychological
question. It is also clear that causal inference requires
that the mind believe that the unobserved resembles the ob-
served in some significant respect. It seems in accord with
ordinary usage, then, to say that all causal inferences
involve inductive inference. What is Hume's epistemic
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appraisal of such inferences?
There have been three kinds of responses to this
question:
(1) Hume offers no appraisal of the epistemic
warrant of beliefs arrived at via
inductive inferences.
(2) Hume held that there is no epistemic warrant
for such beliefs.
(3) Hume held that such beliefs do not have the
highest possible measure of epistemic
warrant. However, among these beliefs,
some are epis temically better off than
others
.
In the remainder of this chapter I shall argue that (1)
and (2) are false and that the first part of (3) is true.
In Chapter IV I shall defend the second part of (3)
.
Interpretation I : The first interpretation supposes that
Hume had no views about the epistemic warrant of inductive
inferences. His only concern was to describe the operations
of the human mind. Since he was merely doing psychology, he
had no interest in the epistemic evaluation of such infer-
ences. To serious students of Hume, this view might appear
to be too preposterous to consider seriously. Yet, it has
been proposed by two philosophers of note (though one holds
the view with diffidence)
.
In an article entitled "Some Misunderstandings of
Hume", T.E. Jessop says.
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That he uses the law of causal associa-
tion [i.e. causal inference] to explain
the ideas of causality [i.e., necessary
connection] v/ould be a glaring petitio
principii if his enquiry were an epis-
temological one. His inquiry is psychologi-
cal; and there is plainly no impropriety
whatever in the search for the idea of
causality, and also . . . for the cause
our belief in specific causal connections.^
Professor Passmore, in his book Hume's I ntentions, some-
times expresses a similar view.
^
There are a number of problems with this view.
1. It makes Hume out to be a mere psychologist who
no evaluation (from an epistemic point of view)
of men's beliefs. As John Lenz has pointed out^
, this
ignores Hume ' s famous conclusion of the Enquiries in which
he condemns all but mathematical and experiential reason-
ing to the flames. Psychologists qua psychologists do not
make such harsh critical judgments of men's beliefs (ex-
cepting perhaps for the beliefs of other psychologists)
.
2T.E. Jessop, "Some Misunderstandings of Hume" reprinted
in Hume: A Collection of Crit ical Essays, ed. by
V.C. Chappell (Notre Dame, Indiana , 1966) , pps
.
48-49. In light of Jessop's view on this matter
and others, one might conclude, to paraphrase
Nelson Goodman, that this article is an instance
of the topic rather than a treatment of it.
3John A. Passmore, Hume's Intentions (Cambridge, 1952),
pps. 12, 41.
^John W. Lenz, "Hume's Defence of Causal Inference", reprinted




2. Such a view is at wide variance with certain key
passages of the Treatise
, especially in the section under
discussion. There Hume says.
Thus, not only our reason fails us in the
discovery of the ultimate connection of
causes and effects, but even after exper-
ience has inform'd us of their constant
con j unction
, tis impossible for us to
satisfy ourselves by our reason why we
should extend ourselves beyond those par-
ticular instances which have fallen under
our observation. (T. 91)
If Jessop is correct, then this is merely a psychological
claim with no epistemic import. Whatever its psychological
content, it is surely some sort of evaluation of our beliefs
or of the process by which we arrived at them.
3. Most importantly, if Jessop were to admit that
Hume had philosophical— and in particular epistemic--aims
with respect to some of our beliefs (e.g. the belief in
the existence of the soul) there would remain the question
of the justification of our beliefs concerning matters of
fact. If Hume had no explicit or implicit views on this, he
could be convicted of a gross philosophical oversight. Under
any reasonable construal of the Principle of Charity in the
interpretation of a major philosophical figure, such an in-
terpretation can be rejected out of hand.
Interpretation II:
The second interpretation supposes that Hume did offer
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an cpistemic evaluation of inductive inference. Those who
argue for this position hold in common the view that Hume’s
appraisal was highly sceptical--a shocking assessment of
the pretensions to knowledge of both the Vulgar and the Wise.
Where various commentators who adopt this general line
diverge is on the consequences (if any) of this view for
Hume. What exactly is this assessment on their view?
Their answer is that Hume held that there is no epistemic
warrant (in any standard sense^) for inductive inferences.
They are all unreasonable or unjustified.
We might well ask what argument Hume offers for this
rather startling claim. The answer is, of course, the
famous argument of Section 6 Part (iii) of the Treatise .
Ostensibly, he offers a similar argument for the same
claim in the Enquiries . In some respects, the Enquiries
version of this argument appears to be more strongly
sceptical than the Treatise version. However, in light of
the obvious similarities between the two, it would be
prima facie unreasonable to suppose that Hume was arguing
for a completely different conclusion in the Enquiries .
^One of these commentators, F.C. Baylie, holds that Hume
eventually does find an epistemic warrant for inductive
inferences, but because it involves "extending" the
customary notion of justification beyond what is usually
taken to be its bounds, it is helpful for the purposes




Consequently, it is encumbent upon me to show that my
interpretation of Hume's argument best accounts for what
he says in the E^nquir ies as well. In the Appendix to
this chapter I do just that.
I- Identification and Preliminary Interpretation of
Hume ' s Argument
Hume is concerned to discover the foundations (in
some sense) of the mind's transition from an impression
or memory idea to an idea of its usual concomitant (i.e.
an idea of the cause or effect of the object of the im-
pression or memory idea). He says,
. . . the next question is, 'Whether
experience produces the idea by means
of the understanding or of the imagina-
tion; whether we are determined by
reason to make the transition or by
a certain association or relation of
perceptions. If reason determin'd us,
it would proceed upon that principle,
that instances of which we have had no
expe r ience must resemble those of V7hich
we~~have had experience and that the
course of nature continues always
uniformly the same. (emphasis Hume's)
(T.
In this passage Hume clearly
trying to discover whether or not
the transition under discussion.
indicates that he is
reason will determine
A transition from beliefs
about what is or has been observed to a belief about what
is not observed is the hallmark of inductive inference.
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Hume does not use the expression ’inductive inference’ or
Its cognates (his most common term is ’probable argument’),
but there can be no doubt that the transition of which he
speaks is some variety of inductive inference.
In particular, Hume’s discussion is about one specific
kind of inductive inference-- the kind Stove calls ’predictive-
inductive inferences.’ These are inferences which have as
their conclusion a claim about a particular event or object.
To use an example of Hume’s, such an inference would have
among the premises the claim that all flames that have been
observed in the past are hot and the claim that this is a
flame. The conclusion of such an inference is the assertion
that this flame is hot. There are other kinds of inductive
inferences (e.g. the one whose conclusion is that all flames
are hot), and there can be no doubt that Hume’s argument
should and does apply to all of these. Nonetheless, the
focus of the present argument is on those inferences whose
conclusions are singular.
It is a consequence of Hume’s psychological theory that
all predictive-inductive inferences are causal inferences. As
Hume later discovers, the constant conjunction of two kinds
of objects in past experience brings about an idea of the
one when the other is present to the senses or the memory;
in addition, the past constant conjunction is responsible
for an impression of necessi tation that is the origin of the
idea of necessary connection. Thus the mind believes that
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the object of the idea, which is the conclusion of the
inference, is causally connected to the object of the ori-
ginal impression or memory idea, which initiates the
predictive-inductive inference. Nowhere does Hume say that
the mind believes that the connection is always one of
proximate causation. As he makes clear in his discussion of
the "probability of causes" (Part (iii) Section 12), one
may believe that there are intermediate causes and effects
of which one is unaware.
What does the passage quoted on page 94 say about
predictive-inductive inferences? This question is of capital
importance for reasons that will become apparent as I pro-
ceed. It is worth dealing with this question with consider-
able care. Hume seems to say that if the mind makes the
transition on the basis of some argument (is determined by
reason)
, then it presupposes that the future will appropriately
resemble the past. Let us call the underlined passage in
the preceding quotation the Resemblance Thesis (RT) . Of
course, as Hume states it, RT is very vague. For the present,
anyway, it can be left that way because our concern is not
with its content, but, rather, with its function in Hume's
argument. Thus, it is safe to say that Hume believes the
following
:
(1) All predictive-inductive inferences presuppose
the Resemblance Thesis (RT)
.
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What sense can be assigned to 'presuppose' here? Stove
has offered the following interpretation of Hume's sense of
' presuppose ' :
Co Sometimes when we say of an argument from p
to q, that it presupposes r, our meaning is
as follows: that, as it stands, the argu-
ment from p to q is not valid, and that, in
order to turn it into a valid argument it
would be necessary to add to its premises
the proposition r.
The core idea of this proposal is that the addition of the
presuppositum to an invalid argument turns it into a valid
argument. As I shall argue later, this is basically what
Hume had in mind. However, as Stove states it, this pro-
posal cannot be correct. For any invalid argument from p
to q there is no proposition r that is neces sary to turn it
into a valid argument. Rather, there are a number of prop-
ositions any one of which would be sufficient to make the
argument valid. However, among those propositions, there
is at least one which could not reasonably be construed to
be a presuppositum of such an argument, viz . a contradiction.
It must be at least possible that the presuppositum is true;
otherwise, it is not even possible that the valid "counter-
part" argument is sound. These considerations suggest the
^Stove, D.C. Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism ,
(Oxford, 1973), p. 43.
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following amended version of Stove's construal:
argument 'p^ . . . , therefore q' presupposes
r ^ and only if
'Pl • • • Pn? therefore q' is invalid.
(ii) 'p^ . . . p^ & r, therefore q' is valid,
(iii) r is not self-contradictory
Note that this construal does not require that r will be
unique. However, this is not problematic. Hume's statement
of what is presupposed by predictive-inductive inferences
(cf. p. 94 above) — the "Uniformity of Nature" is quite am-
biguous. There may be a related sense of presupposition
that does guarantee uniqueness, but there does not appear to
be any suggestion of it in Hume. If this is a correct in-
terpretation of Hume, the three conditions of CQ'--the
invalidity of the original argument, the validity of the
subsequent argument, and the possibility that the presup-
positum is true--are the most that one can legitimately
extract from Hume's discussion here.
This construal of Hume's sense of presuppose is intui-
tively plausible, and there are good interpretive arguments
for it. Before considering these arguments, I should like
to consider three other interpretations of the notion of
presupposition that Hume relies on in this passage. The first
two have never been explicitly considered before; the third
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was offered by D. Goldstick in his article entitled "Hume’s
Circularity' Charge Against Inductive Reasoning".
1. ^n^£ual_J.; Hume's concern in this passage is strictly
psychological. He is trying to show that the mind must
have a certain belief (v^.
, RT) in order that it be dis-
posed or determined to make the transition in question. Thus,
presuppose' in Hume's sense, can be defined as follows:
Cj^ S's argument: 'p therefore q' presupposes r iff
S would not make the transition from his bell^
p to his belief q unless S believed (or were
disposed to believe’^) r.
Thus, the presupposition in question is a psychological one
that all of us as a matter of fact have, since we all make
such transitions.
Objection : Whatever the truth of this psychological claim
s-a-vis the Resemblance Thesis and predictive-inductive
inference, the main problem with this construal of Hume's
sense of 'presuppose' is that the question of the epistemic
warrant remains untouched, if Hume's aims are strictly psy-
chological as this construal requires. And, in particular,
we could ask Hume for the justification of the empirical
claim that he is making in the passage under discussion.
7 Since, for Hume, belief is occurrent rather than dispo-
sitional, it is appropriate to speak of a disposition
to believe here.
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Recall (see quotation p. 94) that Hume is intent on discover-
ing whether or not reason determines the mind to make the
transition involved in a certain kind of inference. This
may appear to be a psychological question-- ' Is Reason the
faculty that makes this transition or is it some other
faculty?' Whatever psychological content this has, there is
surely an epistemological element here. Analogously, if
someone asked whether the mind's "deductive faculty" makes
the transition involved in an instance of modus ponens and
if he answered affirmatively, we would be entitled to draw
a non-psychological conclusion--the theorist believes that
modus ponens is valid. Hume is notorious for framing non-
psychological questions in psychological terms. This seems
to be as clear a case of this tendency as one can find.
There can be little doubt that Hume's claims here have some
non-psychological import that is not expressed in .
Therefore, Cj can be rejected.
2. Construal 2 : On this interpretation, Hume is concerned
with the epistemic warrant of the conclusion. What Hume is
saying is that the belief arrived at is unjustified unless
the presuppostium is true , i.e.
0-2 S's argument; 'p, therefore q' presupposes r iff
Unless r is true, S's belief q on the basis
of his belief p is unjustified.
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Here the question of the epistemic warrant of the belief that
q is dealt with. Thus the problem of Construal 1 does not
arise in connection with this construal. Applying this
definition to the passage in question, Hume is interpreted
as saying that, unless RT is true, a given predictive-
inductive inference results in an unjustified belief.
Objections : There are two major problems with this construal,
one interpretive and one philosophical.
a) If this interpretation were correct, we should
expect to find in this section a discussion of whether or not
RT is true. However, Hume does not discuss the truth of
RT. That matter is an open question for him in the Treatise.
Though he does discuss what sorts of arguments may be
offered for it, he does not affirm or deny RT . It is true
that he does appear to affirm RT in the second to last para-
graph of Essay V of the Enquiries . Nonetheless, if this were
the sense of 'presuppose' that he had in mind in the passages
from the Treatise under discussion (as well as the correlative
passages in the Enquirie s and the Abstract) , he would have
discussed the truth of RT at that juncture.
b) A more telling objection is that D
2 ,
instantiated
in a manner appropriate to the passage in question, attributes
an obviously false claim to Hume. If we say that inductive
inference presuppose RT in this sense, then the truth value
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of RT will determine whether or not the mind's belief in a
particular inductively arrived at conclusion is justified.
If RT IS true, then regardless of a person's beliefs about
RT (even if that person has no beliefs about RT)
, the con-
clusion of an inductive argument will be justified. How-
ever, any adequate account of justification makes it relative
to other beliefs (or justified beliefs) that a person holds,
unless, perhaps, the belief in question is self-certifying,
which is obviously not an issue here. Thus, this interpre-
tation fails.
3. Construal 3 : This interpretation avoids the pitfalls
of the second construal in that there is some textual support
for it and it does not commit Hume to any obviously intenable
positions. D. Goldstick, in response to Stove's interpre-
tation, has offered the following interpretation of Hume's
sense of 'presuppose':
C 3 S's argument: 'p, therefore q' presupposes r iff
it would be impossible to bo justified in believing
q on the basis of an inference from p unless it were
to be possible independently to be justified in
believing r .
^
On this construal, the passage in question would be inter-
O





preted as follows: All predictive-inductive inferences
presuppose RT in that it would be impossible to be justified
in believing the conclusion of a predictive-inductive
inference (on the basis of that inference) unless it were
possible independently to be justified in believing the
Resemblance Thesis.
Objection s : Problems with this interpretation arise when we
try to get clear about Goldstick's sense of 'justified'. He
clearly does not mean that the presuppositum and the prem-
ises of an argument must logically imply the conclusion.
Otherwise, collapses into Stove's view (i.e. C^) . In
addition, he explicitly denies that this is his view. He
tries to make clear this sense of 'presuppose' by way of
examples. Let us consider one of his examples. Suppose that
I infer, from the observation that the street is wet, that
it rained recently. (Never mind that this example of
Goldstick's is not a predictive-inductive one. It is in-
ductive, and the point remains the same if the example is
changed.) Such an inference is said to presuppose that a
sprinkler truck had not just passed through the area in that
one is or can be justified independently in believing that
a sprinkler truck has not passed through the area recently.
The significance of the modal operators in Goldstick s
construal is unclear. His construal makes perfectly good
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sense without them; if i were to observe that my street is
wet, I would conclude that it had rained recently. That
argument might be said to presuppose that no sprinkler truck
had passed through the area recently in that I actually have
good reason to believe that no one operates such a truck in
I lorence, Massachusetts (even though I may not explicitly
consider this presuppositum) . So, the presuppositum is a
justified belief for me it is a well-grounded suppressed
{-iremise
.
To say, on the other hand, that it is possible for me
to be justified in believing this presuppositum might mean
the following. (Assume that I do not in fact have any reason
to believe the aforementioned presuppositum) : The empirical
facts are such that if I were to check a certain independent
and generally reliable source, I would be told that there
are no sprinkler trucks in town. Of course, another generally
reliable source could in fact lead me astray. However, if
the course of nature is such that there is ^ sanctioned and
independent way for me to acquire this belief, then it would
be impossible (in this sense) for me to be justified in be-
lieving the presuppositum, and as a consequence of this con-
strual, it would be impossible to be justified in believing
i] on the basis of p. Admittedly, this is an odd sense of
'presuppose'. Either interpretation of Goldstick's construal.
10 5
however, is unhelpful.
To see this, consider how things stand with respect to
the Resemblance Thesis. Suppose, contrary to fact, that RT
were somehow "available"—perhaps by the benevolence of the
Divine Artif icer--for predict ive- induct ive inference (i.e.
the mind is or could be independently justified in believing
RT)
.
How would RT, coupled with the premises of a pre-
dictive-inductive inference, justify one's belief in the con-
clusion? As noted previously, it could not be on the basis
of a deductively valid argument. The above example of
Goldstick's suggests that RT and the premises of the argu-
ment would inductively warrant the conclusion. But, so
Goldstick would argue, RT is not available; thus the belief
in the conclusion is not justified. However, if inductive
procedures can produce justified belief, why consider RT
at all? Hume's concern is with the warrant of particular
inductive inferences. There seems to be no point in dis-
cussing RT unless he thinks it necessary to logically guarantee
the conclusion of an argument. Goldstick might reply that
the sense in which RT, if available, would justify a pre-
dictive-inductive conclusion involves neither deduction nor
induction (broadly construed) . Of course, in that case, the
example of his cited above is particularly inappropriate.
The problem now is to specify the sense of 'justification'
in such a way that, RT, if available, would (together with
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the premises of a predictive-inductive inference) justify
the conclusion. Perhaps there is an appropriate sense here,
but Goldstick does not say what it is. The upshot is that
C3 fails because the intention of any construal is to make
more clear what is unclear . seems to be a case of ex-
plaining the obscure by the more obscure.
Are there any other construals of Hume's sense of
presuppose' in this passage? Stove considers and rejects
one other, somewhat bizarre construal. There may be other
construals of Hume's sense, but I am unaware of them. More
importantly, there are positive, and indeed conclusive argu-
ments for something very much like Stove's interpretation
(i.e. C^,). Stove himself advances two arguments for this
interpretive claim, but they are embedded in his particular
representation of the rest of Hume's argument. Both are
designed to show that the rest of Hume's argument makes a
great deal of sense if his interpretation of this key passage
is correct. Though my representation of Hume's argument
is somewhat different. Stove's arguments have the same
benefits for my representation. Nonetheless, I think that
there is another argument for Stove's construal that he
does not explicitly offer. It is to this argument that I
shall now turn.
The centerpiece of Hume's argument in this section is
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the Resemblance Thesis. He is at great pains to establish
that RT is somehow "unavailable" for predictive-inductive
inference. We might speculate for a moment about what would
happen if, p^r impossible
, RT somehow became available.
What would we then have?
Upon reflection, there can be no doubt that what we
would have is a deductively valid argument . Thus far RT
has been left unspecified. How might it be specified so as
to be of some value in an argument? Consider the following
inductive argument:
(1) Flame^^ is (observed to be) hot
.
(2) Flame2 is (observed to be) hot
(3) Flame
2
is (observed to be) hot
(k) Flamej^ is ( observed to be) hot
(k+1) This is a flame
.
.
• . (k+2) This is hot. (where (k+1) but not (k+2) is an
observation statement)
We can specify a Minimal Resemblance Thesis for this argument
as :
(MRT) If (1) & (2) & ... & (k+1) , then (k+2)
.
This just says that if all observed flames have been ob-
served to be hot and this is a flame, then this is hot--
Nature is Uniform with respect to Flamo]^ through this flame
being hot. It is minimal in that it is the weakest version
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of RT that requires the use of all the other premises in
the predictive-inductive inference to make it valid. The
important feature of this argument is that Promises (1)
through (MRT) en^ (k+2). Thus, if this inductive argu-
ment "proceeds upon the principle" of MRT, then it can be
transformed into a deductively valid argument. Of course,
a stronger version of RT might also suffice to generate a
valid argument.
Suppose, however, that RT did not entail, together with
the other premises of a predictive- inductive argument, the
conclusion. What might RT look like? Well, Goldstick, in
the previously cited article, proposes a very, very weak
version of RT that does not provide the premise of an entail'
ment
:
In any particular respect, it is more
probable than not, other things being
equal, that, the course of nature will
continue at least approximately the
same as in the past.^
It may be doubted whether this is precise enough to be any-
thing but trivially true, or perhaps "lacking in cognitive
content", but supposing that this is not the case, what could
this version of RT do for an inductive argument? The only
^Ibid
. , p. 260
.
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thing that it might do would be to render the argument in-
duct ively stronger (though perhaps not a great deal)
A more precise version of RT makes this clearer. Let
us consider, as Goldstick suggests, a very general probabil-
istic statement of the Resemblance Thesis:
PRT: For any empirical properties A and B,
P (An instance of B will occur/An instance of A
has been observed to occur and instances of
A and instances of B have been observed to be
conjoined k times) > .75
Of course, PRT may well be false but for logical purposes
that is irrelevant. Instantiating in a manner appropriate
to the predictive-inductive inference about the flame, the
following more specific version of PRT can be deduced:
PRT'
:
P(This is hot/ This is a flame and k flames
have been observed to be hot) > .75
It is clear that the argument on page 107 is inductive-
ly stronger with PRT' than it is without that premise (though
perhaps not a great deal stronger) . Nonetheless, the argu-
ment is still not deductively valid. Yet if, at this point,
inductively strong arguments are acceptable, there is no
point in considering any version of RT; many arguments are
inductively strong without it.
Of course, one may, by means of the probability calcu-
lus and a suitable rule of detachment, be £\ble to get a
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singular probability statement such as P(This flame is hot)
.75. That, however, is not the conclusion of a predictive-
inductive inference. For Hume, the conclusion of a predictive
inductive inference from an obser_yed uniformity is a
statement such as 'This flame is hot'. in summary, then,
given that Hume is in some way concerned with the warrant of
predictive-inductiv e inferences, the only decisive role that
RT can play here is to transform such inferences into deduc-
tively valid arguments.
Perhaps there are other modes of justification; C.S.
Pierce has called our attention to another fonn of inference--
what he calls abductive inference; there may well be others.
Nonetheless, since the "Epistemological Turn" was inaugurated
by Descartes, philosophers of the modern era have searched
for a certainty that can only be provided by deductive in-
ference or intuition. Though as scientists (and even,
perhaps, as philosophers) they might be willing to counte-
nance inductive inferences as producing justified belief, it
is reasonably clear that there were no other options. Thus,
it is reasonable to believe that Hume intended that, were RT
to be available as a premise, (contrary to fact)
, it would
render a predict ive- inductive inference deductively valid.
Thus, not just any version of RT will do; together with
the other premises, it must be strong enough to entail the
conclusion. Let the expression 'RT(V)
'
stand for any such
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version of the Resemblance Thesis. Therefore, by adding
RT(V) to the premises of a predictive-inductive inference,
it will be transformed into what, may be aptly termed a
deductively valid counterpart inference. Consequently,
Premise (1) of Hume's argument (see p. 97) can be inter-
preted as follows:
(la) All predi c t ive — indue t ive inferences are
invalid and all deductively valid counter-
part inferences have RT(V) as a premise.
Is Premise (la) true? Hume offers no argument for
it, but it would be helpful to consider what kind of argu-
ment he might have offered. The first part of (la) is
obviously true because, as it occurs in the mind, a
predictive-inductive inference is invalid. The second part
is not so obvious. Why is it that the premises that trans-
forms a predictive-inductive inference into a deductively
valid counterpart inference a statement about the Uniformity
of Nature (i.e. a version of RT)
?
The non-ampliative nature of valid arguments guarantees
that RT(V) will be some statement about the Uniformity of
Nature, though perhaps in a very limited sense. The premises
of a non-ampliative (valid) inference are often said to
"contain" implicitly the conclusion. Since some of the
premises of a deductively valid counterpart argument
comprise a statement of an observed regularity and since the
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conclusion of such an argument extends that regularity to
something that is unobserved, it seems fair to say that the
key premise, which "validates" that transition, is a state-
ment about a resemblance between the observed and the un-
observed and hence is a version of RT.
It has been necessary to go to what might appear to be
inordinate lengths to establish (la) as a clear and correct
interpretation of Hume's claim in the passage under discus-
sion. However, it has very significant consequences for the
interpretation of the conclusion of Hume's argument. The
interpretation of the rest of his argument is fairly straight-
forward. This way of interpreting the first premise will
determine that there are only two possible ways to read the
conclusion; one reading is highly sceptical, and the other
is not. I shall show that the former is untenable and that
the latter is correct. Now, for the rest of Hume's argument.
Immediately following the passage quoted on page 94
Hume says.
In order therefore to clear up this
matter, let us consider all the argu-
ments, upon which such a proposition
can be founded; and as these must be
derived from either knowledge or
probability let us cast our eye on
each of these degrees of evidence
and see whether they afford any just
conclusion of this nature. (T. 89)
It is clear that the question with which Hume is here con
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cerned is whether or not RT (V) can be established . That
IS, he wants to know whether or not RT(V) can appear as
the conclusion of a rationally acceptable argument having
rationally acceptable premises. Put more simply, is there
a good argument for RT(V)? Hume says that if there is such
an argument, it is a demonstration or what he calls "a
probable argument". Thus, Premise (2) of Hume's argument
can be expressed as follows:
(2) If RT(V) can be established, then it can be
established by a demonstration or by a
"probable argument".
It is not obvious what Hume means by a "probable argu-
ment in this context. However, since this notion reappears
shortly in Hume's argument, a discussion of what he means
by this expression can be profitably postponed.
Hume's third premise and his argument for it are quite
straightforward. He says.
. . . there can be no demonstrative argu-
ments prove , that those instances , of
which we have had no experience, resemble
those , of which we have had experience.
We can at least conceive a change in the
course of nature; which sufficiently proves,
that such a change is not absolutely im-
possible. (T. 89)
It is clear from this passage that Hume asserts and argues
for the following proposition:
(3) RT(V) cannot be established by demonstration.
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This prenuse is obviously true and uncontroversial
once it is understood what Hume means by a demonstration. A
demonstration is not just any valid argument. Otherwise,
Hume's claim that there is no demonstrative argument for
RT(V) is obviously false (to take a trivial counterexample,
consider the valid argument 'RT(V) therefore RT(V)').
Rather, a demonstrative argument is a valid argument all of
whose premises are necessary truths. Since no set of propo-
sitions, all of whose members are necessary truths, implies
a contingent truth, and since the denial of RT(V) is con-
ceivable (i.e. RT(V) is a contingent truth), there can be
no demonstrative argument for RT(V).
Hume next wants to argue that any argument from exper-
ience for RT(V) will be circular. He says,
. . . probability is founded on the
presumption of a resemblance between
those objects of which we have had
experience, and those, of which we have
had none; and therefore tis impossible
this presumption can arise from proba-
bility. (T. 89)
What does Hume mean by a "probability" (probable argument)
here? As a first step, it is fairly clear that the cate-
gories of demonstrative arguments and probable arguments are
mutually exclusive. Thus, a probable argument will have
some contingent premises, viz . some statements about exper-
ience. Are all probable arguments invalid? The answer
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here must be 'No' if, as Premise 2 implies, Hume's classi-
fication of arguments as demonstrative or probable is coll-
ectively exhaustive. If having at least one contingent
premise is a sufficient condition for an argument to be
probable in Hume's sense, then obviously there are valid
probable arguments (consider, for example, deductively
valid counterpart inferences). Because the word 'probable'
has connotations that make it seem incongruous to speak of
valid probable arguments, let us henceforth refer to such
arguments by means of a more neutral term-- ' arguments from
experience '
.
Nov;, in the above-quoted passage, Hume argues that
there are no non-circular arguments from experience for RT(V).
However, he must mean by this that there are no non-circular
(deductively) valid arguments from experience. This is clear
in light of the fact that if an invalid argument from ex-
perience could be used to establish (RT(V)
,
the entire argu-
ment under consideration would be rendered superfluous. The
reason for this is that the predictive-inductive inference
is, as it occurs in the mind, invalid. The whole point of
considering whether or not RT(V) can be used as a premise is
to see whether a predictive- inductive inference can be con-
verted into a deductively valid inference.
If there is a deductively valid argument from experience
for RT(V)
,
what would it look like? Hume leaves little doubt
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about this mattor. Hg says.
The only connexion or relation of objects,
which can lead us beyond the immediate
impressions of our memory and senses, is
that of cause and effect; and that because
tis the only one on which we can found a
just inference from one object to another.
The idea of cause and effect is derived
from exper ience , which informs us, that
such particular objects, in all past
instances have been constantly conjoined
with each other; And as an object similar
to one is immediately present in its
impression, we thence presume on the
existence of one similar to its usual
attendant
. (T . 89-90)
As the last two sentences make clear, an argument from
experience for RT(V) will be just like a predictive-
inductive inference except for tv;o things:
1) It must be valid for reasons cited previously.
2) Its conclusion (RT(V)) will not be statement
(prediction) about a particular object or event. However,
RT(V) will have some predictive import (see pps . 111-
112 ) .
In light of these considerations it is possible to
interpret more clearly Premise (2) (and, subsequently.
Premise ( 4 ) )
.
(2') If RT(V) can be established, then it can be
established by a demonstration or by a
deductively valid argument from experience.
But, as Hume argues in the passage quoted on page 114,
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(4) Any deductively valid argument from
experience for RT(V) is circular.
nis reason for this is that any valid argument from
experience has RT(V) as a premise. However, the expression
'RT(V)
'
(as well as the expressions that Hume uses, e.g.
[there is] a resemblance betwixt those objects of which we
have had experience and those of which we have none") is
ambiguous. There are many non-equivalent Resemblance Theses
that could turn invalid arguments from experience into valid
ones. In particular, consider the argument on page 108.
MRT makes it valid. There could be an argument from ex-
perience whose conclusion is MRT but which fails to have
MRT as a premise. One of its premises might be that all
flames are hot. Thus, strictly speaking. Premise (4) is
false
.
Nonetheless, it seems pretty clear that Hume is onto
something here. Consider arguments from past experience for
MRT. No statements about past experience will entail MRT
;
otherwise, such statements would entail the predictive
conclusion (k+2)
.
However, a valid but non-circular argu-
ment from experience for MRT would have to have implicit
in its premises a supposition of an even greater uniformity
than is implied by MRT. And, as Nelson Goodman has pointed
out, that is an odd and expensive way to justify a conclu-
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Sion about a particular object.
All this suggests the following: A non-circular valid
argument for MRT (or, for that matter, for any rt(V))
either begs the question or gets involved in an infinite
regress (by supposing an even greater regularity than is
stated in MRT) . This way of viewing matters receives con-
firmation from Hume’s subsequent discussion of a counter
argument that an opponent might offer.
It may, perhaps, be sai(d, that after
experience of the constant conjunction
of certain objects, we reason in the
following manner: Such an object is
always found to produce another. Tis
impossible that it could have this
effect if it were not endowed with a
power of production. The power
necessarily implies the effect; and
therefore there is a just foundation
for drawing a conclusion from the
existence of one object to that of its
usual attendant. (T. 90)
However, Hume replies that since the power itself is not
present to the senses (otherwise one could directly (and
validly) infer the existence of one object from the other)
,
the existence of the power in one of the members of the past
observed conjunction does not imply its existence in the
present case.
Shou'd it be said, that we have ex-
perience, that the same pov/er con-
tinues united with the same object,
and that like objects are endowed
with like powers, I wou'd renew my
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question, why from this experience we
conc l usion beyond those past
ins t a nces
, of which have"'had e^e7-
i^ence? if you answer this question in
the same manner as the preceding your
answer gives still occasion to a new
question of the same kind
, even in
inf ini turn ; which clearly proves, that
the foregoing reasoning has no just
foundation. (T. 91)
Hume s argument here is a good one; he says, in effect,
that the kind of argument for (som.e version of) RT (V) either
begs the question or involves an infinite regress. It is
difficult to prove that any non-circular valid argument for
any version of RT (V) will be question begging or involve an
regress, partly because it is difficult to state
precisely just what a question-begging argument is. One can
adopt a favorite tactic of Hume's in this connection: Faced
with the task of "proving a negative", one can issue a
challenge to a prospective critic to produce a non-circular
valid argument from experience for RT(V) that does not beg
the question or involve an infinite regress. Having
silenced potential critics in this manner, we can, with
reasonable assurance, restate the fourth premise as follows:
(4') Any deductively valid argument from
experience for RT(V) is circular, question-
begging, or involves an infinite regress.
10The use of this tactic here was suggested to me by
Prof. Robert Paul Wolff.
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The next two steps of Hume's argument are so obvious
that Hume did not and need not have stated them:
(5) If (4) is true, then RT(V) cannot be established
by a deductively valid argument from experience.
••.(6) RT(V) cannot be established by a deductively
valid argument from experience.
Premises (3) and (6) obviously entail:
•••(7) RT(V) cannot be established.
The whole point of the discussion of whether or not
RT(V) can be established is to see if invalid predictive-
inductive inferences can be "cured" of their invalidity by
t>sing transformed into acceptable deductively valid counter-
part inferences. The epistemological motivation for this
inquiry is not far to seek : VJhatever Hume ' s ultimate views
are on the epistemic warrantabil ity of certain kinds of
invalid inferences, because of the obvious and intimate rela-
tion between validity and certainty, valid arguments are,
all else equal, epistemically better than their invalid
counterparts. But, if the premise that effects the transfor-
mation from an invalid argument to its deductively valid
counterpart (e.g. RT(V)) cannot be suitably supported, then
for epistemological purposes, the invalid argument cannot be
"cured" of its invalidity. If, as seems likely, Hume reasoned
in something like this fashion, then the following obvious
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and uncontroversial premise can be attributed to him:
(8) If RT(V) cannot bo established, then
all pred ic t ive — indue t ive inferences
are incurably invalid.
Premises (7) and (8) obviously imply:
. . (9) All predictive-inductive inferences are incurably
invalid
.
A final word about Premises (2) and (8)
:
Hume's
unwillingness to use invalid arguments to establish RT(V)
cannot be taken as evidence that he believed that invalid
arguments are epistemically worthless. The reason for this
is that if the use of invalid arguments were to be allowed
this context
, the entire argument under discussion
would be rendered superfluous.
What epistemological conclusion does Hume draw from
this argument? This is a difficult and epistemologically
significant question. One way to interpret Hume's conclu-
sion is to see him as taking a profoundly sceptical attitude
towards predictive-inductive inferences--they are epistemi-
cally worthless. The other way to interpret Hume's con-
clusion is to see him as holding that the conclusion of no
predictive-inductive inference is or can be rendered
certain relative to the premises of that inference. In the
remainder of this chapter I shall lay out and evaluate
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these two options.
II. The Interpretation of Hume's Conclusion
What, then is Hume's final conclusion? As noted
previously, shortly after the above-quoted passage, he
considers and rejects a counter argument. This argument
is designed to show that inductive inferences can be made
deductively valid by introducing the notion of a power;
powers are responsible for a cause having the effect that
it does. He shows that this argument either begs the
question or involves an infinite regress. After disposing
of his opponent in this manner, he states his final conclu-
sion :
Thus not only our reason fails in the
discovery of the ultimate connexion
of causes and effects, but even after
experience has informed us of their
constant conjunction , tis impossible
for us to satisfy ourselves by our
reason, why we should extend that
experience beyond those particular
instances which have fallen under
our observation. We suppose, but are
never able to prove, that there must
be a resemblance betwixt those
objects, of which we have had experience
and those which lie beyond the reach of
our discovery. (emphasis Hume's)
(T. 91-92)




(11) Reason cannot determine the mind to make
predictive-inductive inferences.
It is clear that (11) does not follow from (1) through
(9)
. However, (9) together with a premise not explicitly
stated by Hume, (call it (10)), entails (11). The missing
premise is:
(10) Reason cannot determine the mind to make incurably
valid inferences.
How is Hume's conclusion (and step (10)) to be inter-
preted? It would be a mistake to think that this matter
could be settled by a textual examination of Hume's use of
the term 'reason' as a substantive. This way of talking
makes Hume appear to be a faculty psychologist. His use of
faculty psychology terminology is obscure and often incon-
sistent.^^ More importantly, as the development of his
psychological theory makes clear, Hume was not a faculty
psychologist. His principal explanatory device, the
association of ideas, supersedes the appeal to various
"faculties", a device frequently used by psychologists
before Hume. Thus, the interpretation of Hume's conclusion
will depend not on his use of the word 'reason' as a sub-
For example, compare his use of 'the understanding and
the imagination' on pages 88 and 267. Reason is some-
times the "faculty" that discovers relations among ideas
(p. 157); sometimes it is that from which causal infer-
ence springs (p. 321); sometimes, indifferently, both
(p. 124).
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stantive elsewhere in the Treatise ; rather, it will depend
on internal features of the present argument, direct clues
about what he took his conclusion to be, and the systematic
impact of various alternative interpretations on the rest
of Hume's philosophy.
What, then, are the alternatives? D.C. Stove thinks
that there is really only one. In speaking of this passage,
he says.
After all, [this] is that famous
sceptical conclusion which Hume came
to about inductive inferences, or
rather, about the only 'species' of
inductive inference which he discussed
both clearly and at length. (If [this]
is not Hume's inductive scepticism,
there is no inductive scepticism any-
where in Hume.)
I therefore suggest, as the interim
translation of [Hume's conclusion]
:
'All predictive-inductive inferences
are unreasonable.' This captures
the non-psychological , evaluative,
and the unfavorable meaning of Hume's
conclusion.
As Stove readily admits, this interpretation is
terribly unclear as it stands. I shall discuss below how
he makes it more precise. Nonetheless, there is one thing
that is clear about this interpretation. It is an epistemic
appraisal of predict ive- induct ive inferences that is highly




unfavorable. if Hume was a radical sceptic about inductive
procedures, then he surely would assent to Stove's inter-
pretive claim. The vagueness of Stove's interpretation
here has the salutary consequence that most commentators
who adopt a sceptical interpretation of Hume would assent
to it
.
For my purposes three minor changes in Stove's inter-
pretation are warranted. To preserve terminological uni-
formity, I shall replace 'unreasonable' by 'unjustified'.
Secondly, as Chapter I shows, Hume thought that the cause
of a belief can determine its epistemological status. This
should be reflected in his conclusion here. Thirdly,
Hume's conclusion is not an assessment simpliciter of
beliefs arrived at via predictive-inductive inferences.
His epistemic appraisal of such beliefs is of significance
in light of the fact that there are no acceptable deductively
valid counterpart inferences with the same conclusion.
This too should be reflected in the conclusion of Hume's
argument. The following interpretation of Stove's conclu-
sion reflects these changes:
(11a) All beliefs that are caused by predictive-
inductive inferences are (and must remain)
unjustified
.
Statement (11a) is clearly a sceptical assessment of predic-
tive-inductive inference. This interpretation of (11)
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requires that (10) be interpreted as follows:
(10a) All beliefs that are caused by





One might wonder why someone would believe (10a)
.
Well, most philosophers believe that logical relations
between premises and conclusions determine, in some sense,
epistemic relations between premises and conclusions.
What would best explain (from a logico-epistemic point of
view) someone's adherence to (10) is the following
epistemological principle:
Principle P: All beliefs caused by invalid argu-
ments are unjustified.
^ (11a) accurately represents Hume's conclusion and if,
as seems reasonable, (10a) best explains how he got to (11a)
from (9)
,
then it is reasonable to believe that Hume sub-
scribed to Principle P. This claim receives confirmation
from the fact that Stove, who is the most sophisticated
defender of (something like) (11a) as the correct interpre-
tation of Hume, attributes a version of Principle P to
1 O
Hume. D.S. Miller also attributes something like
Principle P to Hume.^^
^^ Ibid.
, p. 54
l^Dickinson S. Miller, "Hume's Deathblow to Deductivism"
Jou rnal of Philosophy , 1949, p. 745.
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Curiously, Miller argues that the entire argument of
Hume's that is under consideration here is an elaborate,
but wholly unintended reduc t io ad absurdem of Principle P.
That is, since Hume's final conclusion is something like
(11a), which, according to Miller is obviously(?) absurd,
the guestionable principle on which it rests (viz.
,
Principle P) is mistaken. What did not occur to Miller
was the possibility that Hume never subscribed to either
the sceptical conclusion or the (equally implausible)
Principle P!
However, if (11a) is the correct interpretation of
Hume , then the above is undoubtedly a correct represen-
tation of his reasoning. But, is (11a) the correct inter-
pretation of Hume's conclusion?
There is, I think, another way to understand Hume's
reasoning. Hume could be asserting that, since all
predictive-inductive inferences are incurably invalid, the
conclusion of no predictive-inductive inference is or can
be rendered certain relative to its premises. This, too,
is an epistemic appraisal of beliefs arrived at via
predictive-inductive inferences. Thus, (10) and (11) could
be interpreted as follows:
(10b) No conclusion of an incurably invalid in-
ference is (or can be rendered) certain relative
to its premises.
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(11b) No conclusion of a predictive-inductive
inference is (or can bo rendered) certain
relative to its premises.
As was the case with Stove's interpretation, it would
be helpful to consider why someone would believe the
suppressed premise (i.e. step 10b)). what would best ex-
plain someone's adherence to (10b) is the following epis-
temic principle:
Principle Q: The conclusion of no valid inference is
certain relative to its premises.
If (11b) accurately represents Hume's conclusions and if,
as seems reasonable, (10b) best explains how he got from
(9) to (11b) , then it is reasonable to believe that Hume
subscribed to Principle Q.
Both (11a) and (11b) are epistemic appraisals of
beliefs arrived at via predictive-inductive inferences.
Though both are somev/hat unclear (a problem that will be
remedied shortly) , there is no other obviously distinct
way to understand Hume's reasoning here. In order to see
which of the above is the correct way to interpret Hume,
it is important to clarify the epistemic notions employed
in these competing interpretations. Since, as Premises
(8) and (9) imply, no deductively valid counterpart in-
ference is rationally acceptable, we can confine our
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attention to Hume’s appraisal of beliefs arrived at via
predictive-inductive inferences: such inferences are, by
definition, invalid.
One way to get a handle on Hume's epistemic evaluation
of beliefs arrived at by predictive-inductive inference
is to see how he would answer the following question:
What degree of belief in the conclusion of a predictive-
inductive inference would a full and entire belief in the
premises cause in a completely rational inferrer, whose
belief in the conclusion was influenced only by his
belief in the premises of that inference?' Admittedly, from
a philosophical point of view, this might not be a terribly
helpful way to proceed because it might not be possible to
specify the completely rational inferrer in a way that does
presuppose what he would do in the circumstances under
consideration.^^ The present problem, however, is an in-
terpretative one, and this question seems to be a felicitous
way to ask Hume for his epistemic appraisal of inductive
inference for two reasons:
(i) It appears to be an empirical, psychological
question but is not in fact such a question.
Hume asks and answers many such questions in
the course of the Treatise.
15This difficulty was pointed out to me by G. Lynn Stephens
in conversation.
130
(ii) A key concept hore-that of degree of belief— isa familiar one for Hume. Mis account of beliefrequires that there be degrees of it, and he de-velops in Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Part (iii)the psychology of this in great detail.
Thus It seems reasonable to say that Hume's epistemic
appraisal of inductive inference can be understood in terms
of an answer to the above question. What do such answers
look like? Stove suggests that what is called for here
is an assessment of the conclusiveness of arguments. The
conclusiveness of an argument is the measure of the degree
of belief that the completely rational infeirer has in the
conclusion of that argument, given that he has a full and
entire belief in the premises and given that his degree of
belief in the conclusion is influenced only by the premises
Stove claims that this notion of the conclusiveness of an
argument is a magnitude. He makes this clear when he says.
Some arguments, it is evident, have
this property in the highest possible
degree. A completely rational inferrer,
that is to say, if he knew the premises
and were influenced by nothing else,
would have in the conclusion the same
degree of belief as he has in the premiss.
All valid arguments, for example, have the
highest possible degree of conclusive-
ness. It is equally evident that some
other arguments do not have the highest
possible degree of conclusiveness. A
completely rational inferrer who knew the
premiss of such an argument would have
not the same but at most a lower degree
of belief in its conclusion. No invalid
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arguments, for example, are of the
highest degree of conclusiveness
.
these assertions . . . suffice to
' *
establish that conclusiveness is a
property of arguments which is a
magnitude at least in the minimal
sense that some arguments have it in
the highest possible degree and others
do not.-^o
It is clear that Stove wants to understand the degree
of conclusiveness of an argument as a measure of the
epistemic warrant of the conclusion of an argument relative
to Its premises. That is, the premises of an argument pro-
vide a measure of rational justification for the conclusion
(exactly what that measure is for various arguments can be
left open at this point).
The concept of conclusiveness is an objective one;
the measure is independent of what the mind happens to
believe it to be. Consequently, the mind can be mistaken
about this measure, and it can correctly believe that the
conclusion of a given argument has a certain measure of
epistemic warrant (relative to the premises) for the wrong
reasons (e.g. by making a number of errors in reasoning that
cancel each other out)
.
^^Donald C. Stove, op. c it . , p. 9
1 7One might wonder what Stove would say about the degree of
conclusiveness of a circular (and hence valid) "counter-
part inference". According to the above quotation, ho
would say it has the highest possible degree of conclu-
siveness. Though this might appear odd. Stove could say
that, since the establishment of RT(V) is so problematic,
this argument could be rejected on other grounds.
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It IS not clear to me at this time what the conditions
are for the degree of conclusivenoss to be a measure of a
given individual's epistemic warrant. It can at least bo
said that if someone knows what the degree of conclusiveness
IS, then it (the degree of conclusiveness) measures his
or her epistemic warrant.
To further explain or clarify this notion of the
conclusiveness of an argument, Stove claims that assessments
of conclusiveness are or can be expressed by statements of
Logical Probability, in Carnap’s sense. Any philosopher
who IS concerned with arguments makes assessments of their
conclusiveness. Since, on this view, such assessments can
be expressed by statements of Logical Probability, such
statements can be attributed to any such philosopher, in-
cluding Hume.
Thus, Stove identified statements assessing the con-
clusiveness of arguments with statements of Logical
Probability. One should be sceptical of this claim for
the following reasons: It is clear that the degree of
conclusiveness of an argument is an epistemic concept (a
measure of epistemic warrant) . Validity and invalidity,
however, are logical relations. Thus, Stove's assertion
that all valid arguments have the highest possible degree
of conclusiveness and his assertion that all invalid argu-
ments have less than the highest possible degree of conclu-
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siveness are substantive epistemic principles. Even if
they are necessary truths, they are not trivial identity
claims. For Carnap, Logical Probability is a logical con-
cept which is to be understood (roughly) as degree of
entailment. Stove s identification of a logical concept.
Logical Probability, and an epistemic concept, degree of
conclusiveness, needs some sort of an argument, which he
does not provide. Furthermore, Carnap, towards the end of
his life, came to distinguish the relevant epistemic and
logical concepts. In a very recent article he said.
The former [i.e. epistemic] concepts
are quasi-psychological ; they are
assigned to an imaginary subject X
supposed to be equipped with perfect
rationality and an unfailing memory;
the logical concepts, in contrast, have
nothing to do with observers and
agents, whether natural or con-
structed, real or imaginary.
The exact relation between the logical and epistemic
concepts is in some dispute; fortunately, for the purposes
at hand, this dispute need not be resolved. Stove and I
can rightly agree on the following points about the inter-
pretation of Hume's conclusion:
^^Rudolph Carnap, "Inductive Logic and Rational Decisions" in
Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability , ed . by




(a) His conclusion contains an epistemic assessmentor predictive-inductive inferences.
(b) His conclusion does not follow from step (9) ofhis argument (i.e. his claim that all such in-
ferences are incurably invalid)
.
(c) The suppressed premise, which, together with (9)
,
entails (11) rests on an epistemic principle
which states that the invalidity of an inference
IS a sufficient condition for its conclusion
having the epistemic property (relative to the
premises) that Hume assigns it.
(d) In the passage under discussion (the last para-
graph on page 88 to the top of page 92 in
Selby-Bigge)
, Hume offers no argument for the
unstated epistemic principle.
To resolve the dispute about Hume's epistemic assessment of
predictive-inductive inferences, it is unnecessary to bring
in the technical apparatus associated with modern inductive
logic
.
Stove has two major purposes in his monograph; he
wants to give a clear statement of Hume's (alleged) argu-
ment for a form of scepticism, and he wants to show that
this version of scepticism is false. His heavy reliance on
Logical Probability is really only essential for the second
task, which is of no concern for the present debate. Thus,
I think that Stove's interpretation can be fairly stated and
evaluated in terms of the concept of conclusiveness. Though
this concept is not as clear as it might be, it is not
hopelessly obscure. As I shall presently show, a number of
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distinct forms of scepticism can be represented in terms
of it
.
What exactly is the version of scepticism that Stove
attributes to Hume? The sceptic does not deny that the
mind's degree of actual belief in the conclusion of a
predictive-inductive inference can be increased as a result
of the appropriate sort of experience. Nor does he deny
that the mind does in fact make predictions. His substan-
tive claim about predictive-inductive inference is three-
fold :
(i) All predictive-inductive inferences have less
than the highest possible degree of conclusive—
ness
.
(ii) All predict ive— inductive inferences with the same
conclusion have the same degree of conclusiveness.
(iii) The degree of conclusiveness of all predictive-
inductive inferences with the same conclusion
(call it 'c') is the same as the degree of conclu—
siveness of that argument (whose conclusion is
c) which has only a tautological premise.
19Though conclusiveness is an epistemic property of arguments
and the two interpretations of Hume's conclusion (as
well as the suppressed epistemic principle) are state-
ments about beliefs , the relation between the two is
fairly obvious; (i) means the same as:
(i') The measure of epistemic warrant of any belief, which
is the conclusion of a predictive-inductive
inference, relative to the premises of that inference
is less than the highest possible.
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A word of explanation is needed about the relation
between (ii) and (iii). Consider the following three
inferences
:
A. (1) Flame^ is hot. B (1*) This is a flame
(2) Flame2 is hot. Therefore
,
• (2') This is hot.
(n) Flame^ is hot.
(n + 1) This is a flame.
Therefore
,
(n+2) This is hot.
Suppose that someone assents to Statement (ii) above.
That is, he asserts that Inference A has the same degree
of conclusiveness as Inference B. If he were to deny (iii)
,
(1") p or not p
Therefore
,
(3") This is hot.
Statement (ii) means the same things as:
(ii) The measure of epistemic warrant of any belief, which
is the conclusion of a predictive-inductive in-
ference, relative to the premises of that inference
is the same as the measure of epistemic warrant of
that belief relative to the premises of any other
predictive-inductive inference which has that belief
as a conclusion.
Statement (iii) can be similarly transformed.
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he would have to say that the degree of conclusiveness of
Inference B is greater than or less than that of Inference
C. It would be arbitrary to say that the degree of con-
clusiveness of Inference B is greater than that of C for
the following reason: The observational data that transforms
Inference B into Inference A has no effect on the degree
of conclusiveness of Inference A. The observational data
that transforms Inference C into Inference B does have such
offset. Bearing in mind that Inference B really does
exclude all other data, this is clearly arbitrary. Similar
considerations apply if the sceptic says that the degree of
conclusiveness of Inference C is greater than that of B.
Thus, if someone assents to Statement (ii) , he should assent
to Statement (iii) as well.
Statements (ii) and (iii) proclaim the irrelevance of
experience from an epistemological point of view, for the
purposes of prediction. In particular. Statement (iii)
asserts that all predictive-inductive inferences have the same
measure of epistemic warrantability as what is, in effect,
a groundless belief. Clearly, then, this is a form of scep-
ticism about predictive-inductive inferences. Statement (iii)
is the way that Stove understands (11); thus, it serves as
a clarification of (Ha).
Though Statements (ii) and (iii) are clearJ.y sufficient
conditions for scepticism about predictive-inductive infer-
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ences, are they necessary conditions as well?20
Suppose a sceptic were to assert that (ii) is false
but that his scepticism can still be maintained. lie might
argue for this as follows: it is true that predictive-
inductive arguments have different degrees of conclusive-
ness. As a consequence, it is true that a completely
rational inferrer would have varying degrees of belief in
the conclusion of a predictive-inductive argument, de-
pending on what the premises were. However, no predictive-
inductive argument is conclusive enough to provide knowledge .
Only arguments with the highest possible degree of conclu-
siveness can do that.
Thus the sceptic might say that the degree of conclu-
siveness of all predictive-inductive inferences is just
insufficient. One might well ask, "Insufficient for what?"
If he says that the degree of conclusiveness is insufficient
for knowledge, in Hume's sense, Hume might well be such a
sceptic because his conception of knowledge is highly re-
strictive and idiosyncratic, at least by present standards.
Knowledge, for Hume, is characterized by certainty. This
certainty is absolute, if the belief is intuited or demon-
strated (i.e. validly inferred from intuitive truths). If
p n^^This question was
conversation
.
suggested to me by G. Lynn Stephens in
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Hume is here arguing that predictive-inductive inferences
never yield knowledge, then he is denying that there is any
Illative certainty that can be achieved by this kind of
inference. To say that predict ive- inductive inferences
never yield relative certainty is consistent with the view
that some predictive-inductive inferences are sufficiently
conclusive to produce justified belief in the sense outlined
on page 82. Of course, it is also consistent with the
deeper and more radical scepticism that Stove attributes to
him. However, if stove were to admit that this is what Hume
was up to here, it would be disastrous for his interpretation.
For, as he rightly admits, if Hume is not here arguing for
the radical scepticism of Statements (ii) and (iii)
, then
nowhere (in Part (iii)) does he argue for it.
There is another form of scepticism about predictive-
inductive inferences that is consistent with the denial of
(ii) and (iii) . A sceptic could claim that, though different
predictive— inductive inferences have different degrees of
conclusiveness, none of them has a degree of conclusiveness
sufficiently high for it to produce justified belief. The
reason for this is not that justified belief requires cer-
tainty. Rather, in order that a belief be justified (i.e.
merits rational acceptance) , the argument that caused it
must have a degree of conclusiveness which is, while not
the highest possible, higher than that of any predictive-
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inductive inference. Thus, no predictive-inductive in-
ference has a degree of conclusiveness sufficiently high
to produce justified belief— a level necessary for empirical
science to be rationally acceptable.
Another way of looking at this form of scepticism is
' 2
1
this : Someone could grant that different predictive-induc-
tive inferences have differing measures of epistemic warrant,
but these measures are more appropriately called degrees of
worthlessness rather than degrees of conclusiveness. Thus,
though some such arguments are less worthless than others,
none has a sufficiently high measure of warrant to merit
rational acceptance. Rational acceptance requires a higher
measure of warrant than any such argument can have. It
cannot be the case, however, that the requisite measure of
warrant is the highest possible. Otherwise this form of
scepticism would collapse into the form outlined on pages
137 and 138.
This is a really strange form of scepticism, but it is
not worth considering in more detail here for two reasons:
First, there is no suggestion anywhere in Hume's writings
that he made the rather subtle distinctions that this view
requires. If Hume was a sceptic about inductive inference,
it was because he held that no such inference has the highest
^^This way of looking at this form of scepticism was suggested
to mo by Prof. Bruce Aune.
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possible measure of epistemic warrant or because he held
that such inferences have, in effect, no measure of epistemic
warrant at all. In addition, no commentator that I am aware
of ever attributed this form of scepticism to Hume (see
Bibliography)
. Secondly, this is not a very interesting
form of scepticism in the present context for the following
reason: Since this kind of sceptic admits that some induc-
tive inferences are "epistemically better off" than others,
he can, in principle, distinguish between scientific method
and enthusiasm. From the point of view of an interpretation
of Hume s scepticism, it is this distinction which is at
stake. On Stove's interpretation, Hume has cut the epistemic
ground out from under natural science in the argument under
consideration. If (as seems unlikely) Hume held the form
of scepticism outlined in the last page and one half, he
would be able to find epistemic grounds for preferring
scientific method. This is the crux of the interpretive
issue
.
The results of this discussion may be summarized as
follows: Adherence to (i) , (ii)
,
and (iii) is a sufficient
condition for scepticism about predictive- inductive inferences.
Thus, if Hume would assent to these propositions (and Stove
claims that he does)
,
then he was a sceptic about predictive-
inductive inferences. Tliis is a very strong form of scepticism
on this view, experience can provide no epistemic warrant for
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a conclusion arrived at by predictive-inductive inference.
The most important consequence of this view is that empirical
science cannot have any epistemic ground in experience.
Certainly this is a shocking assessment of the mind's pre-
tensions to empirical knowledge.
There is, however, another form of scepticism about
predictive-inductive inference that does not entail this
shocking assessment of science. Of the three statements
listed on pages 135 and 136, a sceptic may assert only (i).
He would then say that the degree of epistemic warrant
necessary for knowledge (in his sense of the term) is the
highest possible; since no predictive— inductive inference
hss this degree of conclusiveness, no predictive— inductive
inference can produce knowledge. He may hold that some
predictive-inductive inferences do have a sufficiently high
degree of conclusiveness for well-grounded opinion. Such a
sceptic could also consistently deny this and subscribe
to Stove's more extreme (interpretive) claim, or he may sub-
scribe to the more mitigated scepticism outlined on pages
140 and 141. The important point is that this form of
scepticism is consistent with there being a rational ground
for empirical science.
The importance of this for the interpretation of Hume's
conclusion is this: If Stove is correct, Hume's conclusion
can be understood in terms of Statement (iii) (or perhaps
143
(ii) and (iii). This is a truly shocking assessment of the
foundations of empirical science because a fundamental form
of inference (predictive-inductive inference) provides no
epistemic warrant for its conclusions. On the other hand,
if I am correct, Hume is really only arguing for (i), which,
given his requirements for knowledge, entails that predictive-
inductive inferences can never yield knowledge. On this
interpretation, the question of the more radical form of
scepticism expressed by Statements (ii) and (iii) is
raised in Part (iii) Section 6. This does not
show that Hume denied (ii) and (iii) (that I will show in the
next chapter)
.
The significance of this latter view for Humean scholar-
ship is that most commentators believe that Stove's viev;
either is what Hume explicitly intended to establish or what
his position, if true, does establish. The following quo-
tations provide evidence for this (probability or likelihood
is here understood as an epistemic concept)
:
A.H. Basson: Some have tried to save the situation by
admitting that all scientific inference
is probable inference. But Hume's scep-
tical attack applies with equal force to
probable inference.
N. Kemp Smith: Can we not, however, argue that while
experience yields no certainty as to the
future, it may yet instruct us as to what
is 3. i kely to happen in the future? But




K. Popper: In other words Hume points out that weget involved in an infinite regress if
we appeal to experience in order to
justify any conclusion concerning unob-
served instances—even more probable
conclusions . . .
G. von Wright: It deserves mention that David Hume, who
was the first to see that general synthe-
tical propositions cannot be proved a priori
also clearly apprehended that this result
of the impossibility of foretelling the
future cannot be 'evaded' or 'minimised'
by reference to probability . 22
— ^ ou the Term 'Justification' : Hum.e doesn't use
this term or its cognates very often or with much precision.
It does not have an entry in Selby-Bigge ' s Analytical Index.
I have given a rough characterization of the sense that I
assign to the term (cf. p. 82) and some options on how it
instates to the technical concept of degree of conclusiveness.
It might be objected that these concepts are quite
modern and thus foreign to Hume. His conception of epistemic
warrant is an all or nothing affair. That is, Hume believes
that an argument's having less than the highest possible
degree of conclusiveness is tantam.ount to saying that it is
unjustified. Thus, it is mistaken and inappropriate to
represent Hume as either affirming or denying (even implicitly)
Statements (ii) and (iii). There are four things that strongly
22Quoted in Donald C. Stove, op. cit . p. 129.
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suggest that this is false.
First, in the Enquiries version of Hume's argument
there is some direct and indirect evidence that Hume did not
have this conception of epistemic warrant. The evidence will
be discussed in the Appendix. Secondly, there is some clear
evidence in the Treatise (though not in the argument under
discussion) that Hume did not have this rather narrow view
of justification. This evidence will be discussed in Chapter
IV. Thirdly, in the Appendix to Chapter IV, I try to show
that the conception of epistemic warrant employed here and
the kind of mitigated scepticism that I attribute to Hume
has clear and obvious roots in the ancient Greek scepticism
of Carneades and the Academics (a form of scepticism with
which Hume was undoubtedly familiar) . Finally, there are
some general considerations pertaining to the Modern Era
that make it clear that this is not problematical to discuss
Hume's appraisal of inductive inference in terms of the
concepts of conclusiveness as here delineated. It is to
these considerations that I shall now turn.
The concept of degree of conclusiveness that I have
employed here is only a comparative concept and not a metrical
one. Stove and I only attribute to Hume statements of
comparative equality or comparative inequality. It probably
would be inappropriate to attribute to Hume more precise
metrical assessments of conclusiveness.
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More importantly, l think that the idea of there being
a measure of epistemic warrant that is less than that of
certainty is not at all foreign to philosophers of the Modern
Era. For example, Descartes, at the end of the Sixth Medi-
tation, finds that God does not deceive him most of the time
about the evidence of his senses and that he need not, from
an epistemological point of view, continue to doubt even
though he may be mistaken in a given instance. Locke admits
that, besides intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, there
is sensitive knowledge (or the existence of things without




Most significant, however, is the fact that Hume himself
at least recognizes that some philosophers think that there
can be varying degrees of epistemic warrant. A clear state-
ment of this can be found in the opening paragraphs of
Part (iii) Section 11. In addition, he at least recognizes
that some philosophers think that the conclusion of an argu-
ment can be less than certain relative to its premises and
still result in justified belief. After discussing probable
arguments based on frequent, but not constant, conjunction,
he says.
All these kinds of probability are
received by philosophers, and allowed
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to be reasonable foundations of
belief and opinion. (T. 143)
Hume may not have thought that this is true. It is
clear, however, that he was aware of this option. in light
of these considerations it is obvious that the concept of the
degree of conclusiveness of an argument and the concept of
justification employed here are not inappropriate to a dis-
cussion of Hume. The radical scepticismi that stove attributes
to Hume states, in effect, that no opinion (concerning the
unobserved) is more (epistemically) probable than it is
prior to or independently of any experience. To say that
experience is of no epistemic value whatever is to deny that
experience can serve to rationally ground empirical science.
This interpretation accurately characterizes, in large
measure, the epistemological dead end to which Hume is
alleged to have led philosophy of the modern era.
Let us call this version of scepticism "Strong Inductive
Scepticism". What textual arguments are there for this as
an interpretation of Hume? I have been able to find only
two. I should now like to consider these arguments and show
why they are defective.
A. Hume and Strong Inductive Scepticism:
An Ostensive Argument
This argument which attributes (11a) (and hence, ii)
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and (iii) to Hume is called 'ostensive' because it consists
of pointing to certain passages in the Treatise where Hume
clearly asserts something very much like (11a) (or perhaps
even (ii) ) . Two such passages are commonly cited. One
has been previously quoted (cf. page 123). The other appears
in Section 12 of Part (iii) . The entire passage is itali-
cized by Hume:
. . . there is nothing in any object
considered in itself, which can afford
us a reason for drawing a conclusion
beyond it; and, That even after the
observation of the frequent or constant
conjunction of objects, we have no reason
to draw any inference concerning any
object beyond those of which we have had
experience; (T. 139)
Objections : Do these passages give conclusive evidence that
Hume believed (11a)? Does Hume actually assert (11a) in
either passage? I submit that an affirmative answer to
either of these questions is not at all obvious. That is,
I shall show that Hume's adherence to (11a) cannot be estab-
lished merely by pointing to these passages.
The reason for this is that these passages admit of
another interpretation that is distinct from and does not
imply (11a) . There is one thing that my opponents and I can
agree on: These passages prove some (epistemic) assessment
of predictive-inductive inferences. They state something
about the degree of conclusiveness of such inferences. The
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key to the interpretation of the passage quoted immediately
above is how Hume's expression 'no reason' is understood.
As is obvious to any reader of the Treatise
, Hume does not
use the word reason' univocally. If we read this use of
the expression as "no logically conclusive reason", Hume is
still making an assessment of predictive-inductive inferences.
However, he is not saying that we are no more justified in
believing the conclusion of such an inference after the
appropriate experience than we were prior to or independently
of such experience. Rather, what he is saying is that we have
no (logical) guarantee, even after the appropriate experience,
for the conclusion. His epistemic assessment of inductive
inferences is that they all have less than the highest
possible degree of conclusiveness. That is, Hume is here
asserting only (11b) (or (i)), viz. that all predictive-
inductive inferences have less than the highest possible
degree of conclusiveness.
A close reading of the other passage makes this more
plausible still. He makes two claims in this passage. They
both can be read to support (11b) rather than (11a) as the
correct interpretation of Hume's conclusion.
Thus, not only does our reason fail us
in the discovery of the ultimate
connexion of causes and effects, but
e^v^n ^ft'er experience has informed us
of their constant conjunction , 'tis
impossible l^or us to satisfy our-
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selves by our reason, why we
should extend that experience
beyond those particular instances
which have fallen under our obser-
vation. (emphases Hume) (T. 91)
If reason is here understood as the "faculty" that discovers
relations among ideas (including, presumably, the relation
of validity)
, then Hume is here asserting that past experience
does not provide any absolutely conclusive grounds for a
conclusion about the future.
We suppose, but are never able to prove, that
there must be a resemblance between those
objects of which we have had experience and
those which lie beyond the reach of our
discovery. (emphases added) (T. 92)
Here he says that we as a matter of fact believe the
Resemblance Thesis--our belief in RT provides a psychological
explanation for our making the transition involved in inductive
inference--but it is unavailable from the point of view of
reason, i.e. the Resemblance Thesis cannot be used to give
the highest possible degree of assurance in the conclusion.
This interpretation of Hume's conclusion as (11b)
rather than (11a) has some obvious advantages: Both Stove
and I agree that there is a suppressed premise in Hume's
argument here, viz . , (10); it rests on a principle which
states that the invalidity of an inference is a sufficient
condition for its causing a belief that has a certain epistemic
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property either being unjustified or being less than certain
relative to the premises which caused the belief. We can
also agree that, in the passage under discussion, Hume pro-
vides no argument for this epistemic principle.
However, the Strongly Sceptical Interpretation has the
rather awkward consequence of attributing a claim to Hume
that is, on the face of it, wildly implausible, viz., what
Stove calls "Deductivism"--the thesis that all beliefs caused
by invalid arguments are unjustified. Even if the causal
formulation of the Deductivist Thesis is altered, the problem
remains. From an interpretive point of view, it is bad
business to attribute to a major figure such as Hume an
apparently implausible statement, which (as Stove rightly
admits) Hume never states or argues for . Stove's claim that
Hume asserts (11a) and is thus committed to (10a) and hence
Principle P is of no avail here because it is Hume's alleged
sucscription to (11a) which is at stake.
Furthermore, if one can assume (as seems reasonable) that
other philosophers believed that inferences from frequent, but
not constant, conjunction are invalid, then Hume is here
assuming a philosophically significant claim that other
philosophers deny (at least implicitly) because these other
philosophers believe that such inferences produce justified
belief (see quotation on pages 146 and 147). As Stove readily
admits, nowhere in the Treatise does Hume argue for Deductivism.
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Surely, however, were he to go against the received opinion,
ho would somewhere argue for the key principle. He has,
after all, produced an elaborate argument for one of the
premises, viz . , (9)
.
The same kind of difficulty does not afflict my inter-
pretation for the following reasons: The principle on which
the suppressed premise rests (that no invalid argument renders
Its conclusion certain relative to its premises) is pretty
obviously true. Since in an invalid argument it is always
logically possible that the premises are true and the conclu-
sion false, given that one is correct in believing the premises
It IS always possible (except perhaps when the conclusion is
a "psychological report") that one is mistaken in believing
the conclusion. Hence, there can be no relative certainty.
Moreover, as I shall show shortly, it is fairly clear that
Hume believed Principle Q and indeed argued for it, though
not in the passage under discussion.
Though considerations adduced in the past few pages
probably do not suffice to establish (11b) as the correct
and (11a) as an incorrect interpretation of Hume's conclusion,
they clearly do establish that some argument is needed to
pin (11a) on Hume. Merely pointing to certain passages is
not enough.
Is there any genuine interpretive argument to establish
(11a) rather than (11b) as Hume's conclusion? Stove (and.
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as far as I can tell, only Stove) offers such an argument.
I should now like to examine Stove's argument. i shall
show that it is defective by showing that the strategy of
this argument actually establishes (11b) and not (11a) as
Hume's conclusion.
and Strong Inductive Scepticism:
The Symmetry Argument
As Stove rightly points out, the argument of Hume's
that has been under consideration thus far is actually part
of a longer argument. The first part of this argument is an
epistemic evaluation of another kind of inductive inference.
This inference is the same as the predictive-inductive
inference except for one important feature— it occurs
prior to or independently of the past constant conjunction.
To see clearly the contrast between the two kinds of
inference, consider the following examples of each kind.
Following Stove, I shall call the kind under discussion the
A Priori Inductive Inference.
A Priori Inductive Inference Predictive-Inductive Inference
(1) This is a flame. (!') This is a flame.
Therefore, (2') All flames that have
been observed in the
(2) This is hot. past have been ob-
served to be hot.
Therefore
,
(3') This flame is hot.
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What Hume's assessment of the a priori inductive in-
ference has to do with (11) is this: Stove argues that there
IS a symmetry between Hume's epistemic assessment of the con-
clusiveness of the a priori inductive inference and his
evaluation of predictive-inductive inferences. Stove alleges
that Hume claims that the observation that (e.g.) something
IS a flame renders the conclusion that it is hot no more
warranted than such a conclusion is independently of any
experience whatever.
For the purposes of the present discussion let us
adopt the following abbreviations:
(1) 'Con(H/E-| & . . . & E ) = 'The degree of conclusive-
ness of the argument
whose premises are E]^
... Ej^ and, whose conclu-
sion IS H.





Stove attributes the following assessment of the conclusive-
ness of the a priori inductive inference to Hume:
(*) Con (This is hot/This is a flame) = Con (This is
hot/t
)
Obviously, Hume's conclusion is more general than this par-
ticular statement. Generalizing from (*), Hume's conclusion
can bo represented as follows:
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( ) For any a prior
i
inductive inference from Ei to II:
Con(H/Ej^) = Con(H/t) where t is some tautology.
This comparative equality, then, is Hume's epistemic assess-
ment of the conclusiveness of a priori inductive inferences.
If this is Hume's epistemic appraisal of the a priori
inductive inference, and if he makes the same assessment of
the predictive-inductive inference (i.e. if Stove is granted
the Symmetry Thesis)
, then Hume subscribes to the following
assessment of the conclusiveness of predictive-inductive
inferences
:
(***) For any predictive-inductive inference from Ej_ . . .
Ew to H: Con (H/Ei...E^) = Con (H/t)where
t is some tautology.
This, of course, is Statement (iii) (see page 135, which is
our way of understanding (12a). Hume is a Strong Inductive
Sceptic after all.
It is unproblematic to grant Stove the following two
claims
:
1. Hume does make some epistemic assessment of the
degree of conclusiveness of a priori inductive
inferences in the passage under discussion.
2. The epistemic assessment that he makes of predictive-
inductive inferences is the same as his assessment
of the a priori one. The Symmetry Thesis explains
15G
why Humo s conclusions always have the character of
a one-two punch. This is vividly illustrated in the
quotation on page 148.
Granting Stove these two points does not suffice for his
conclusion. He needs to establish that Hume's epistemic
appraisal of ^ prior
i
inductive inferences is (**) or
something very much like it.
What does Hume actually say: In the following passage
Hume offers his epistemic assessment of a priori inductive
inferences
:
Tis easy to observe that in tracing this
relation, the inference we draw from cause
to effect, is not deriv'd merely from a
survey of these particular objects, and
from, such a penetration into their
essences as may discover the dependence
of one upon the other. There is no object,
which implies the existence of any other
if we consider these objects in themselves,
and never look beyond the ideas which we
form of them. Such an inference wou '
d
amount to knowledge and wou ' d imply the
absolute contradiction and impossibility
of conceiving anything different. But
as all distinct ideas are separable, tis
evident that there can be no impossibility
of that kind. (T. 86-87)
From the observation that something is a flame, the
mind cannot conclude (from that alone) that it is hot. Is
Hume saying here that such an observation does not raise
the initial rational credibility of the conclusion one bit?
I think not. Suppose, per impossible , that the mind could
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make the inference on the basis of just that observation.
What kind of inference would it be? From the third to last
sentence of the above quotation, the answer is obvious: The
inference would be deductively valid. Thus, Hume is arguing
in the above passage that the a priori inductive inference
is not deductively valid.
The epistemological significance of this is quite clear
from the second to last sentence of this passage--No A Priori
Inductive Inference Y ields Knowledge. This means that the
conclusion of no a priori inductive inference is certain
relative to its premise. My interpretation relies heavily
on there being such a thing as relative certainty for Hume.
This passage clearly indicates that there is such a thing.
It might be thought that knowledge, for Hume, can only be
achieved by intuition or demonstration (that is, by a valid
inference from intuited truths). However, if Hume were
intent on establishing that no a priori inductive inference
yields knowledge, in this sense, all he would have to point
out is that the conclusion of such an inference, since it is
factual, is conceivably false. That is not what he is
saying here. He is saying that the mind can imagine that the
premise is true and the conclusion is false in an a priori
inductive inference. Thus, no such inference is valid and
no such inference produces knowledge in the sense of rela-
tive certainty.
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In this passage Hume seems to recognize clearly the truth
of Principle Q and the kind of epistemological argument that
establishes it. Principle Q, then, is not really suppressed;
it turns up earlier in Hume's argument--before he considers
predictive-inductive inferences.
Returning now to the Symmetry Argument, Hume's epistemic
conclusion about a pr ior
i
inductive inference can be expressed
as follows
:
(+) For any a priori inductive inference from to H:
Con(H/E^) is less than the highest possible degree
of conclusiveness.
Statement (+) is an epistemic assessment of the conclu-
siveness of a priori inductive inferences. Given the
Symmetry Thesis, Hume makes the same assessment of the con-
clusiveness of predictive-inductive inferences, viz.





Con(H/E. ... E-) is less than the highest possible
degree of conclusiveness.
Statement (++) , of course, is (i) (see p. 134) which is our
way of understanding (11b) . Thus the Symmetry Argument
established not Stove's interpretation, but mine. Hume may
well have been inclined to believe that a priori inductive
inferences are unreasonable. However, that is not what he
says in the quotation on page 156. Nonetheless, it is just
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this that Hume must have said of Stove's Symmetry Argument
is to work.
The available evidence, then, suggests that Hume was
intent on establishing (lib) rather than (11a) as his con-
clusion. Step (11) is an epistemic assessment of the con-
clusiveness of predictive-inductive inferences. It is not,
however, the highly sceptical conclusion that most commenta-
tors think that Hume drew.
I do not think that these considerations shov; that a
highly sceptical interpretation of Hume is completely unten-
able. There are three sorts of objections that my opponents
could offer here:
(i) When Hume states his conclusion, both in the Treatise
and the Enquiries
, he certainly appears to be stating
a highly sceptical position. No systematic explana-
tion for why this is merely an appearance has yet been
offered
.
(ii) It can be granted that (11b) is an epistemic assess-
ment (and an important one) of predictive-inductive
inferences. Nonetheless, if (11b) is all that Hume
was interested in establishing, then his view is
seriously incomplete
.
On this interpretation Hume
has nothing to say about the sceptic's position. Do
predictive-inductive arguments produce justified
IGO
belief? On the interpretation offered here, Hume is
really silent on this very important question. The
failure to address this question is a gross oversight,
which ought to cause us to reject this interpretation
I
on the grounds of the Principle of Charity.
I
(ii.i) A related problem is this: On this view, Hume came
^
very close to but failed to discover "Hume's Problem".
Hume was astute enough to see this very serious prob-
lem about the justification of induction. His failure
here is like being late for one's own funeral. It is
preposterous to believe that Hume failed to discover
' one of the most important epistemological problems,
j
a discovery for which he is almost universally credited.




It seems fair to say that these objections, if successful,
would be quite telling. In the next chapter I shall show
that they can all bo defeated.
I
However, my opponents are also in an uncomfortable posi-
)
!
tion. If Hume thought that predictive-inductive inferences
I
;
produce unjustified belief, by what rUjht does he continue to
I
I
develop his psychological theory, since this obviously re-
I
quires that he make inductions?
I
I






Jurists, when speaking of rights and
claims, distinguish in a legal action
the question of right (quid juris) from
the question of fact (quid f^cti) ; and
they demand that both be proved. Proof
of the former, which has to state the
right or the legal claim, they entitle
the deduction . Many empirical concepts
are employed without question from
anyone . .
If Hume was a sceptic, he would say that we have no right to
make inductions, though as a matter of psychological necessity
we do make them. But, one might ask, by what right does he
make this latter psychological claim? If he were a genuine
sceptic, then, after writing this passage, he should have
packed his bags and left the French countryside for Scotland.
In fact, however, he stayed, and he stayed to develop the
psychological theory in intricate detail. If we cannot con-
vict him of believing a contradiction, we should at least be
able to condemn him for being epistemically immoral. However,
independent evidence overwhelmingly establishes both Hume's
acuity and his probity.
Matters are not this bleak, say Hume's commentators.
Hume does provide a deduction (in the aforementioned sense)
for inductive inference. In fact, herein lies the great
^^Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (trans. by Norman
Kemp Smith (New York, 1929), p. 120.
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positive contribution of his sceptical philosophy.
I shall discuss these and other matters in Chapter IV
The objections sketched above will be met, and I will show
that my opponents force Hume into positions that are phil-
osophically and interpretively untenable.
CHAPTER I V
In the last chapter I argued that Hume's argument of
Part (iii) Section 6 establishes and is only intended to
establish that all predictive-inductive inferences have less
than the highest possible degree of conclusiveness. This
can be regarded as a form of scepticism about such inferences
for the following reasons: On an organic level, our behavior
does not match that of the completely rational inferrer.
There is no felt difference between the mind's conviction
that (e.g.) the sun will rise tomorrow and the conviction
that arises from a valid argument. Though Hume does not
really provide a psychological account of the conviction
that arises from a valid argument (except to say that the
sees the necessary connection)
, he does provide a
psychological explanation for why the mind has such a high
degree of belief in the conclusion of a predictive-inductive
inference; the past experience of the observed constant con-
junction makes the transition from the present impression
proceed quite smoothly; this is explained as the effect of
custom or habit. The origin of the force and vivacity of
the subsequent idea (which is the conclusion of the inference)
is the impression or memory idea which initiates a given




Whatever the defects of this explanation from the
standpoint of psychological theory, Hume is surely correct
in maintaining that a predictive-inductive inference with
suitably impressive credentials does produce a felt certainty
in the conclusion. To assert that, from the point of view of
reason, this is not the case can rightly be viewed as a form
of scepticism. The history of scientific thought shows that
this natural attitude occasionally permeates science as well.
Confidence in Newtonian theory reached this level in the
18th and early 19th century.^
However, from the standpoint of 20th century epistemo-
logy, this is, by itself, a quite modest form of scepticism
(sometimes called Inductive Fallibilism) . The more radical
and perhaps more interesting form of scepticism is that
which denies that past experience can provide any grounds
(i.e. epistemic warrant) for beliefs about the unobserved.
Thus, from our point of view, the question 'Was Hume a
sceptic about induction?' is really a question about Hume's
adherence to Statements (ii) and (iii) of the previous chapter
^For a full discussion of this and a good explanation of the
non-tr iviality of what I take to be Hume's conclusion in
Section 6 see D.C. Stove's Probability and Hume's Inductive
Scepticism (Oxford, 1973), Chapter 7.
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(cf. p.136). It is in this sense that I shall use the term
'scepticism' and its cognates with respect to induction.
It IS important to remind the speaker of a caveat
entered at the beginning of the last chapter. I do not deny
that Hume was a radical sceptic about all of the mind's
fundamental claims to empirical knowledge by the end of
Book I of the Treatise . My view is that he did not reach
this sceptical conclusion with respect to arguments from
experience until Part (iv) . Later in this chapter I shall
show just how and where Hume did reach a sceptical conclusion
about causal inference. The importance of this is that it
shows that Hume did not adopt this view in light of any
arguments advanced in Part (iii) (and, in particular, in
Section 6 of Part (iii)).
My argument is designed to establish that Part (iii)
of Book I (together with the support machinery of Parts (i)
and (ii) ) contains a causal theory of the justification of
empirical belief.
In the last chapter I argued that Hume was not arguing
for scepticism in Part (iii) Section 6. The contrary view,
however, has taken deep root. From T.H. Green's General In -
troduction to Hume's 'Treatise ' (1874) through Norman Kemp
Smith's The Philosophy of David Hume (1940) to D.C. Stove's
Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism (1973), modern
commentators, both sympathetic and otherwise, have agreed
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that Hume hold that prior experience provides no grounds for
beliefs about the future. The great contribution of Stove's
monograph has been to show just what this claim means.
Of course, there have been dissenters from the Green-
Kemp Smith-Stove line of interpretation; indeed, as Hume's
reputation has reached unprecedented heights in the 1960 's
and 70 s these voices have become more numerous. ^ What has
been lacking in this quarter, however, is a systematic
appraisal of Hume's philosophy in light of a non-sceptical
interpretation of his views on induction in Part (iii) . in
this chapter I shall show that Hume denies the sceptic's
claim in Part (iii), and I shall show that this interpre-
tation can account for some important things that a sceptical
interpretation cannot. I will have then established that
Hume held at the end of Part (iii) that, among those beliefs
caused by other beliefs, a belief is justified if and only
if it is caused by causal inference.
'^Three examples of this trend are:
(i) Frank N. Harpley, "Hume's Probabilism" Australasian
Journal of Ph i losophy , 1971, pps . 146-151
.
(ii) Thomas Beauchamp, and Thomas Mappes "Is Hume Really
a Sceptic About Induction?" /American Philosophical
Quarterly , 1975, pps. 119-129^!
(iii) Donald C. Stove, "Hume, Probability, and Induction"
Phi losophical Review , 1965, pps. 160-177.
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My interpretation of Hume, like all interpretations, is
something of an empirical hypothesis. As such, it is con-
ceivably false, no matter how much evidence is brought to
bear. The issue between me and my opponents is not what
Hume should have said; indeed. Stove argues quite persuasively
that the form of scepticism under discussion is false.
Rather, it concerns what Hume actually said. An interpretation
is required because what he said is not unambiguous.
In effect, much of the argument in this chapter is
directed back to Section 6 of Part (iii). i will show that
much of what Hume goes on to do in the rest of the Treatise
makes a good deal, of sense if and only if Hume's argument
there is understood in the way that I 've suggested in Chapter
III. These benefits do not accrue to my opponents' inter-
pretation of that argument.
I shall begin by showing that there is an apparent
inconsistency of considerable importance in Part (iii) . I
will then argue that only a non-scept ical interpretation of
Hume can adequately resolve this difficulty.
An Interpretive Problem: Hume's Sympathy with the Wise
In Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Part (iii) Hume greatly
elaborates his psychological theory of inference. In Sections
11 and 12 he explains what happens when the mind makes infer-
ences from frequent but not constant conjunction. At the
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beginning of Section 13 he says,
All these kinds of probability are
receiv'd by philosophers and allowed
to be reasonable foundations of
belief and opinion. But there are
others, that are deriv'd from the same
principles tho ' they have not the good fortuneto obtain the same sanction. (T. 143)
It might be thought that Hume took this to be merely an
empirical claim about the beliefs of certain philosophers.
Two facts make this highly unlikely: A common literary
device of the 18th century is to attribute to practitioners
in one's field a position which you yourself hold. Hume
uses this device on a number of occasions (see especially
his remarks on innate ideas) . More importantly, it is
reasonably clear from the general tenor of these sections
that Hume agrees, in some sense, with these sentiments.
One way of explaining these sentiments is to say that
Hume believed that all (and, if my argument of Chapter I is
correct, only) those beliefs caused by causal inference are
justified. This option is not, of course, open to my oppon-
ents.
Suppose that a 20th century cosmogonist writes a long
treatise on the origins of the universe. Early in the book
he offers a series of devastating arguments and impressive
observational evidence to show that the Steady State Theory
of the origin of the universe is mistaken. It would be quite
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surprising to find that, later in his book, he explains
various phenomena by an appeal to the creation of hydrogen
atoms Gx nihil o.
Obviously, the situation is not exactly analogous in
Hume o Zyeatise . There is, however, one important similarity:
If Hume was a sceptic about induction and if he argued for
It in Part (iii) Section 6, then it is surprising and more
than a little puzzling that throughout Part (iii) he appears
to approve of causal (and hence inductive) inferences. From
an epistemological point of view, this approval seems un-
warranted and in direct conflict with his official (allegedly)
sceptical position.
There are numerous passages in Sections 11 through 14
where Hume states his approval of such inferences. One of
the clearest and most impressive expression of these senti-
ments, however, is found in the Enquiries:
Tho ' Experience be our only Guide in
reasoning concerning Matters of Fact;
it must be acknowledged, that this
Guide is not altogether infallible,
but in some Cases is apt to lead
us into Errors and Mistakes. One,
who, in our Climate, should expect
better Weather in any Week of June than
in one of December, would reason
justly and conformable to Experience;
but tis certain, that he may happen,
in the Event to find himself mistaken
. . . . A wise Man, therefore, pro-
portions his belief to the Evidence.
In such Conclusions as are founded
upon an infallible Experience he
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expects the Event with the last Degree
of Assurance and regards his past
Experience as a full Proof of the
future Existence of that Event. In
other Cases, he proceeds with more
Caution; He weighs the opposite
Experiments: He considers which Side
is supported by the greatest Number of
Experiments: To that Side he inclines
with Doubt and Hesitation; and when at
last he fixes his Judgment, the evidence
exceeds not what we properly call
Probabili ty .... a hundred uniform
Experiments with only one contradictory
one, does reasonably beget a pretty
strong Degree of Assurance.^
This is one of the clearest statements of the position
that I've attributed to Hume. On the basis of this passage
it is pretty clear that Hume subscribes to the following
claim
:
3David Hume, An Enqu iry Concerning Human Understanding, ed
.
by Ernest ^.~Mossner (N.Y., 1963), pps . 109-110.
Though in general I have eschewed the Enquiries, the use I
make of it here is not really out of character. The essay
from which this passage is taken is "On Miracles". This
was originally slated for the Treatise but was dropped at
the last minute to avoid offending Bishop Butler, whose
favor Hume avidly sought. Furthermore, it is clear that
Hume took this essay quite seriously. Mossner quotes the
following description of the excision of that essay from a
letter of Hume's to a friend:
"I am at present castrating my Work, that is
cutting off its noble Parts, that is, en-
deavoring it shall give as little Offence as
possible; before which I could not pretend to
put it into the Drs hand." (p. x)
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(a) Past experience provides (varying degrees of)episteiaic warrant for beliefs about: the future(or, more generally, about the unobserved)
.
How can a sceptical interpretation account for this and
expressions of similar sentiments by Hume?
However, the defenders of a sceptical interpretation
can ask how this passage can be squared with such apparently
sceptical passages as the following:
That there is nothing in any object,
consider'd in itself, which can afford
us a reason for drawing a conclusion
beyond it; and. That even after the
frequent or constant conjunction of
objects we have no reason to drav/ any
inference concerning any object beyond
those of which we have had experience.
(T. 139) (entire passage italicized
by Hume)
In this passage Hume appears to be committed to the follow-
ing :
(b) Past experience provides no epistemic warrant
for beliefs about the future (or, more generally,
the unobserved)
.
There are three moves that a commentator can make here :
^
(1) He can say that Hume believes both (a) and (b)
and has thus contradicted himself.





IlG can say that Hume really believes only (b)and can try to reinterpret or explain awaynis apparent commitment to (a)






^me s position self-contradictory. A
number of commentators have adopted the first alternative.
This would explain why Hume appears to be highly sceptical
of causal inference at some places and why he apparently
embraces it at others. Often supporters of this line point
to other aspects of Hume's philosophy where he (appears to)
contradict himself. Examples of Hume's cavalier attitude
towards consistency that are commonly cited include:
(i) The No Impression without a Precedent Impression
Principle" and the idea of the missing shade of blue in
Book I Part (i) Section 1.
(ii) The denial of the existence of an impression of the
self in Part (iv) of Book I and of the affirmation of the
existence of such an impression (to explain the mechanism of
sympathy) in Books II and III.
(iii) The obviously non-equivalent definitions of belief
offered in various places in the Treatise.
Commentators who adopt this line usually go on to argue
that these inconsistencies reveal something of great importance
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about Hume’s philosophy: for example, in the case of (i)
they claim that this shows the inadequacy of a (the?) basic
Empiricist Principle. Thus, though Hume has contradicted
himself, he makes a great contribution to philosophy.
In the context of the present dilemma, Terence Penelhum
seems to adopt Option (1). m his recent book, H_uj^, he
says,
Ev0n when inculcating his sceptical
doubts about induction .... Hume
frequently confuses us by talking as
though he accepts the very beliefs
that he is questioning. This is
especially true when he is describing
in detail those psychological mechan-
isms whereby nature, in spite of the
absence of justifying reasons, per-
suades us into accepting them: he
seems unable to hold fast to the con-
tention that nature is consolidating
an unjustified belief, and talks as
though it is a justified one. This
sometimes leads commentators to question
whether he is a sceptic at all. [ .'
]
That there is an inconsistency in Hume's
procedure cannot be doubted ! i ] in
his epochmaking attacks on metaphysics
and religion Hume takes for granted
the very standards of scientific
reasoning that he has cast sceptical
doubts upon in his analysis of induction.
That there is an inconsistency in his
procedure cannot be "doubted here
either . ^ (emphasis addedl
I









his assertion that Mumo ' s inconsistency "cannot be doubted."
He offers no argument whatever for this. Indeed, not only
do I doubt this (which may not be particularly important or
relevant)
, other commentators have advanced arguments to
show how Hume escapes this apparent inconsistency. Penelhum
does not even consider these arguments, much less show that
they fail.
More importantly, however, I think there are good
reasons to be reluctant to attribute a contradiction to
Hume here. Such an attribution would entail that Hume made
an abrupt and immediate volte-face . After allegedly arguing
that the conclusions of causal inference have no epistemic
warrant, he apparently completely ignores this conclusion
and proceeds to agree with those who think they do. Though
a defender of a "Contradiction Interpretation" might argue
that Hume made this about-face because of his deep faith in
the sciences, this is at best a psychological explanation;
it is uncharitable and philosophically unsatisfying. Abundant
textual evidence, a lack of plausible alternatives, and a good
(quasi-) philosophical explanation for why Hume was led into
such a contradiction may compel acceptance of such an inter-
pretation. It is, however, a "counsel of despair." The
stakes here are enormously high; as the above quotation from
Penelhum indicates, Hume's Science of Man and his attacks on
his rationalist opponents depend on the legitimacy of causal
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inference. A contradiction at this point brings down the
entire edifice of Hume's theory. A "Contradiction Inter-
pretation" should be adopted only when other measures fail.
What, then, of Options (2) and (3)? l shall argue for
Option (3) shortly. Those who adopt Option (2) usually
argue roughly as follows: Hume was a sceptic about induction,
but he did sympathize with the Wise because he later dis-
covered that causal inference is necessary for the purposes
springs from universal and irresistible prin-
ciples of the human mind.”^ While that does not epistemically
warrant inference, it does, nonetheless, (pragmatically)
vindicate causal inference; hence Hume's sympathy with the
Wise. My objection to this way of proceeding will be that
all of the considerations that Hume offers in this connection
are designed to handle difficulties about causal inference
that Hume did not discover until Part (iv) and that the
allegedly sceptical argument in Part (iii) Section 6 is
never the target of these remarks. Admittedly, this does not
This view is defended by F.C. Baylie in his monograph. The
Causes and Evidence of Be l iefs: An Examination of Hume '
s
Procedure (Mt. Hermon, Mass., 193G), Chapter 7.
7This view IS defended by John Lenz in his article, "Hume's
Defence of Causal Inference" Journal of the History of
Ideas, 1958, pps. 559-567.
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prove that Hume did not intend these remarks to apply to an
unresolved dilemma in Part (iii). But if these remarks can
be explained solely in terms of a. response to (new) Problems
that he found with causal inference in Part (iv)
,
a sceptical
interpretation of the araument in Part (iii) Section 6 becomes
very unlikely. In matters such as these, this is the most
that can be hoped for.
B
.
Option (3) : Hume's denial of inductive scepticism . My
position is that the propositions that Hume intended to
express by the passage quoted on page 171 are consistent
with an epistemic approval of the sentiments of the Wise.
In Chapter III (see pps. 148-149) I argued that Hume is
claiming in this and the other offending passage (see quo-
tation on p. 159) that the experience which gives rise to a
predictive-inductive inference cannot bestow upon the conclu-
sion of that inference the highest possible degree of con-
clusiveness .
This, of course, is consistent with a non-sceptical
position on induction. However, as I have pointed out, on
my interpretation, these passages are also consistent with
scepticism about induction. Thus, though by interpreting these
passages in the manner suggested, I have removed the incon-
sistency, I have not accounted for Hume's sympathy with the
Wise by showing that he adhered to Statement (a) above (p.l71)
.
177
Fortunately, that explanation is easily discovered. m
what seems to me to be one of the most important (but
largely ignored) passages of the Treatise
, Hume explicitly
denies Statements (ii) and (iii) (p. 135), and thereby puts
himself squarely in the camp of the non-sceptic about in-
duction. This passage occurs at the beginning of Section 11 .
It is worth quoting in extenso:
Those philosophers, who have divided
human reason into knowledge and
and probability
, and have defin'd
the first to be that evidence, which
arises from the comparison oT ideas
,
are oblig'd to comprehend alT our
arguments from causes or effects under
the general term of probability. But
tho every one be free to use his terms
in whatever sense he pleases; and
accordingly in the precedent part of
this discourse, I have follow'd this
method of expression; 'tis however
certain, that in common discourse we
readily affirm, that many arguments
from causation exceed probability, and
may be receiv'd as a superior kind of
evidence. One wou ' d appear ridiculous,
who wou'd say, that 'tis only probable
the sun will rise to-morrow, or that
all men must dye; tho ' tis plain we have
no further assurance~of~flTese fac^,~
tnhah~'what~eSTperience ^fords . For
tTTi's reason^ ^ twould perhaps be more
convenient, in order at once to
preserve the common signification of words,
and mark the several degrees of evidence,
to distin^ish human reason~inbo~thfee~^
kinds, viz. that from knowledge, from
proofs , aj}d from probabili ties. By
knowledge, I mean the assurance arising
from the comparison of ideas. By
proofs, those arguments, which are
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deriv d from the relation of cause
and effect, and which are entirely
free from doubt and uncertainty. Bv
probability, that evidence, which is
^till attended with uncertainty. Tisthis last species of reasoning, l proceedto examine. (T. 124) (double emphases
added; others are Hume's)
At first glance, this passage appears to be a mere
terminological reshuffling; he is now going to conform him-
self to a more common use of the term 'probable' and its
cognates. Three considerations make clear that something
more is involved:
1. One of the clauses that I emphasized (". . . and mark
the several degrees of evidence"), if understood literally,
shows that the distinction is drawn for epistemological,
as well as terminological, reasons. Though it is conceiv-
able that he merely means to mark what philosophers (mis-
takenly) think are "the several degrees of evidence", there
is no evidence (either explicit or implicit) that this is
what he meant. Admittedly, if this passage has the vast
epistemological significance that I think it does, Hume is
making an extremely important claim in a very off-handed
manner. I shall later explain why this is so.
2. After Hume says that it would appear ridiculous to say
that it is only probable that all men must die or that the
sun will rise tomorrow, he says that "we have no further
assurance of these facts than what experience affords." Note
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that ho does not say that we have no assurance whatever or
that we have no entitlement, even though we have belief. That
is, he does not assert that the distinction is made on
psychological and not epistemological grounds.
1
3. Finally, the distinction between knowledge, proofs, and
;
probabilities is drawn along epistemological and not psycho-
logical lines, though the terms 'certainty' and 'doubt' are
I
not used in their Cartesian senses. The reason for this is
,
that there is no difference in the felt conviction arising
from a comparison of ideas and that arising from proofs .
^
Furthermore, on psychological grounds, the distinction be-
tween proofs and probabilities is sometimes hard to make.
The compulsive gambler who places a large bet on a chance
outcome often feels certain that he will win. In addition,
. the slow-witted or the philosopher whose brain has been
I
I
tortured by sceptical doubts concerning the understanding may
[
feel a genuine uncertainty about some claim about the future
I
' for which he has ample evidence. If the distinctions Hume
I draws here are epistemological, then he here implies that the
I







^Anyone who has tried to explain to students the difference




probability. if he believes this, then he implicitly denies
Statements (li) and (iii) and affirms Statement (a).
That is, he denies the sceptic's claim about induction.
This passage adequately explains Hume's sympathy with
the Wise throughout the middle sections of Part (iii).
Admittedly, Hume's denial of this kind of scepticism is
made in a rather off-handed manner and in the context of a
terminological adjustment. Furthermore, he really offers no
argument for his epistemological distinction between proofs
and probabilities. This suggests that he never took this
version of scepticism seriously— and rightly so! The
version of scepticism expressed by Statements (ii) and (iii)
is truly extravagant, and no practicing rational being ever
actually believed it (though some claim to) . Why, then,
consider it? There are two reasons: First, Hume does say
some things that make it appear that he subscribed to this
view. Secondly, many commentators believe that Hume ex-
plicitly held or was at least committed to holding this
version of scepticism. A subset of this group even maintains
(though in words only) that this position and Hume's argument
for it are sound (see quotations on pp. 143-144).
My interpretation is that Hume assumed that among those
arguments from experience, some are epistcmically better off
than others. This assumption, I think, is present from the
Introduction through the end of Part (iii) of Book I. Hume's
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epistemological aims to that point arc quite modest; the
epistemological consequences of his largely metaphysical
position about necessary connection are troublesome only for
rationalists. His epistemological intentions can be seen as
an attempt to discover the scope and limits of certainty. in
addition, he is trying to systematize a commonly held but
unarticulated theory of the justification of empirical belief,
the bedrock of which is causal inference.
To see why this is the case, it is necessary to go back
to the Introduction to the Treatise and to see what Hume
took his task in the Treatise to be. Earlv in the Intro-
duction he says.
Tis evident that all sciences have a relation,
greater or less, to human nature
Even Mathematics
, Natural Philosophy, and
Natural Rel ig ion are in some measure dependent
on the science of MAM; . . . And as the
science of man is the only solid
foundation for the other sciences so the
only solid foundation we can give to
this science itself must be laid on
experience and observation . (T . xv,xvi)
The tone of this passage is, in one significant respect,
Cartesian. Hume supposes that all the sciences have a
foundation and that a satisfactory account of that founda-
tion will set aright the other sciences. However, just as
Descartes did not try to doubt everything, at the beginning
of the Meditation s
,
Hume did not take experience and observa-
tions as the only solid foundations for the science of man.
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Another thing that was (provisionally) taken for granted was
the legitimacy of scientific inference.
Whatever philosophical aims Hume had in the Treatise, it
is clear that he constructed an elaborate psychological theory
of the operations of the human mind. His philosophical aims
led him to examine the epistemological foundations of
scientific reasoning; however, it is not surprising to find
Hume taking for granted for some time the legitimacy of the
canons of empirical science. For an early example of this,
witness his discussion of the causal connection between
impressions and ideas in Part (i) . His early distinction
between knowledge and probability is based on epistemological
considerations dictated by his categorization of the seven
philosophical relations; the motivating concern is to dis-
cover the extent to which the mind can achieve (epistemic)
certainty. As I have argued previously (pps. 143-145),
failure to find certainty with respect to causal inference
does not, for us or for Hume, entail the epistemological
rejection of that process.
What, then of the argument of Part (iii) Section 6? On
rather narrow, technical grounds I have rejected a sceptical
interpretation of this argument, but I have not shown how
it fits in with the rest of Part (iii) . Early in Chapter III
I made fun of T.E. Jessop's claim that Hume was merely doing
psychology here. While I think it is clear that Hume was not
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merely doing psychology here, there is an important psycho-
logical aspect of this argument that must be taken into
account
.
The case of this crucial argument is thoroughly psy-
chological; in fact, some of the important distinctions Hume
makes are those of a faculty psychology. After showing that
the mind cannot make the transition from an impression (of
the cause or effect) to an idea (of the effect or cause) by
a "penetration into the essence" of the former, he realizes
that the transition is based on past experience. He then
says
,
The next question is. Whether exper-
ience produces the idea by means of the
understanding or by means of the
imagination; whether we are determin'd
by reason to make the transition, or
by a certain association and relation
of perceptions. (T. 88-89)
His use of the word 'reason' here is more than a little
puzzling; if reason is taken in its broadest sense as (in-
differently) the faculty which grasps necessary connections
(including those involved in valid arguments) or as that which
generates "arguments from experience," then the answer to
the above question is obvious and trivial-- that reason de-
termines the transition is true by definition. If 'reason'
is understood in a narrower sense as the faculty which
generates and recognizes v:\lid arguments, the argument that
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follows the above quoted passage makes much more sense. His
discovery that reason does not determine the transition, but
that an association or relation of perceptions is respon-
sible, has obvious epistemological significance.^ However,
It also has significance from a psychological point of view.
Causal inference is a causally determined transition that
is explained without reference to any deliberative mental
process. It is instinctual and non-reflective in a way in
which other cognitive processes are not. Hume is anxious
to show that the most important mental process that is used
to generate a system of empirical beliefs is fundamentally
different from the mind's more "rational" faculties. The
epistemological consequences of this argument insure that
causal inference cannot be reconstructed by such "rational"
faculties
.
Some commentators have claimed that this has vast
philosophical significance. By proceeding in this way, Hume
calls into question the warrant for or the utility of justi-
fying causal inference. The fact that the mind cannot
refrain from making such instinctual transitions provides
the legitimating grounds for causal inference, even though,
fuller discussion of this can be found in Harpley,
op. cit . , p. 218 .
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as the principal argument of Section 6 (allegedly) shows,
there is no epistemic warrant for such transitions.
The problem with this interpretation is that there is
no evidence for it in Section 6 or, indeed, in any of Part
(111); All of the evidence for this ).ind of interpretation
IS found in Part (iv) . m and of itself, this might not
prove too damaging, what is problematic is that Hume ad-
vances these considerations to deal with difficulties that
he found with causal inference in Part (iv) --difficulties
that are independent of anything that he says in Part (iii)
.
I shall shortly establish beyond reasonable doubt that this
is the case.
First, however, I shoul(i like to point out a serious
difficulty that arises in connection with a highly sceptical
interpretation of Hume’s argument of Section 6. If he
really intended to establish that no opinion is more (epis-
temically) probable after the appropriate experience than
It IS prior to any experience, it is breathtaking that in
the second paragraph following his conclusion he makes a
number of emp i r i c a
1
claims about the causes of the union
among ideas. He gives a causal explanation of how the rela-
tion of causation operates. Had he believed that he just
destroyed the epistemological foundations of causal inference,
it is not unreasonable to expect him to have done some "back-
f.illing" to cover himself. Without any epistemic warrant for
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him to proceed, one would expect him to provide some sort
of justification for his deployment of the rest of the psycho-
logical theory; if that did not fit in with the plan of this
part of the Treatise
, one would expect him at least to have
'taken out a loan" with the reader. There is no evidence at
all for this sort of thinking on Hume's part here.
In summary, then, there are some significant psychological
aspects to Hume's argument in Section 6: The non-ref lective
,
instinctual operation of the process of causal inference is
insisted on by Hume; this allows him to explain how peasants,
children and animals construct a system of realities by
which they can regulate their lives. At this stage of his
presentation, the epistemological significance of this is
exhausted by the fact that, since causal inference does not
operate in and through the "faculty of reason" (narrowly
construed)
, no causal inference can have the highest possible
degree of conclusiveness.
C. Option (2): Hume's response to scepticism . Those who
adopt a sceptical interpretation of Part (iii) Section 6
and yet want to avoid attributing a contradiction to Hume deny
that Hume had any epistemic sympathy with the Wise. However,
they maintain, Hume finds a way to vindicate causal inference
and can thereby pragmatically approve of the sentiments of
the Wise. This has the double advantage of removing the
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apparent contradiction and explaining why there appears to
be a contradiction. There is, however, some disagreement
on just what Hume believes provides the vindication. 1
shall discuss a number of possible candidates in this
connection
.
My objection to this procedure, and hence to Option (2),
IS that all of the considerations that Hume advances to
vindicate causal inference are designed to handle problems
with causal inference that do not arise until Part (iv)--
problems that are independent of anything in Part (iii). Let
me emphasize that I recognize that this does not prove
that Hume was not a sceptic in Part (iii). After all, he
could have intended the considerations about to be discussed
to apply to the problems raised in Part (iii). However, if
my argument is correct, there is no evidence that this is
the case.
Hume discovers that the mind cannot avoid making causal
inferences. Causal inference springs from certain universal
i s i st ib le principles of the human mind. He adopts
the 'Ought Implies Can' Principle and concludes that, since
the mind cannot refrain from making causal inferences, it
ought not to refrain from that practice. Given that there
is a distinction between being epistemologically justified
in believing something (conclusions of causal inferences)
and being pragmatically vindicated in engaejing in a practice
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(the practice of making causal inferences), Hume can con-
sistently hold that beliefs produced by causal inferences
are unjustified, but from a pragmatic point of view, it is
permissible to engage in the practice of making such in-
ferences. This explains his sympathy with the Wise.
Undoubtedly, Hume does argue in this fashion in a number
of places. The primary evidence for this interpretation can
be found in two places: at the end of Part (iv) Section 2
and at the beginning of Part (iv) Section 4. At the end of
Part (iv) Section 2 he says.
'Tis impossible upon any system to
defend either our understanding or our
senses; and we but expose them farther
when we endeavor to justify them in
that manner. As the sceptical doubt
arises naturally from a profound and
intense reflection on those subjects,
it always encreases, the farther we
carry our reflections, whether in
opposition or conformity to it. Care-
lessness and inattention alone can
afford us any remedy. For this reason
I rely entirely on them. (T. 218)
The "carelessness and inattention" that Hume recommends
here concern sceptical doubts and not matters of everyday
life, nor perhaps, of science. The mind can question causal
inference but not for very long. Nature reasserts Herself
and it is hopeless--and thus point less-- to resist.
This passage can be found in the last paraoraph of
Part (iv) Section 2. Hume is drawing his final conclusions
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from the arguments of Sections 1 and 2. The first section
IS entitled "Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason". in this
section he presents some sceptical arguments concerning the
operation of the understanding, and in Section 2 he presents
some sceptical arguments concerning the operation of the
senses. The argument in the former section is designed to
show that a reiterated examination of our reasoning faculties
results in the successive diminution of the probability of
any conclusion, whether the original argument is demonstra-
tive or probable. The details of this argument, as well as
its serious difficulties, are of no immediate concern. The
important point is that the difficulty that Hume finds with
causal reasoning in this section is independent of any epis-
temological argument of Part (iii) . Hume's move towards a
vindication of causal inference at the end of Part (iv)
Section 2 is designed to meet the problems raised in Section
1. Fortunately, for us and for Hume, nothing else in Part
(iv) depends on this argument of Section 1. He never refers
to it again.
The other significant evidence for a vindicationist
interpretation of Hume can be found at the beginning of Part
(iv) Section 4, "Of Modern Philosophy". He says.
In order to justify myself, I must
distinguish betwixt the principles
v;hich ^lre permanent, irresistable
and universal; such as the customary
transition from causes to effects and
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effects to causes: And the principles,
'^hich arc changeable, weak, and ir-
regular; . . . The former are the
foundations of all our thoughts and
actions, so that upon their removal
human nature must immediately perish
and go to ruin. . . . For this reason
the former are received by philosophy
(T. 225)
^
The inevitability and apparent utility of causal inference
recommends it to us; for parallel reasons, the changeable,
weak, and irregular principles that afflict the ancient phil
osophers (whom he has just discussed) are not praiseworthy.
Again, however, the problems that force Hume to draw
this distinction are peculiar to Part (iv) . The problem is
this: In Section 3 Hume has criticized the ancient phil-
osophers' distrines of substances, substantial forms, facul-
ties, and occult qualities. In addition, he has offered a
psychological explanation of what led them into these errors
The problem is that the explanatory principle involved in
this account is roughly the same as those used to explain
causal inference (cf. Treatise
, p. 222). Causal inference
appears to be guilty by association, and for this reason
Hume draws the distinction indicated in the passage quoted
above. Nowhere is there any mention of the failure of
"reason" to determine the transition involved in causal
inference
.
It is true that Hume appears to take the universality
and irresistibility of causal inference as a legitimating
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consideration. If he was in fact arguing for a sceptical
position in Part (iii) Section 6, this would give him a way
out. However, this passage admits of another, incompatible
interpretation. He might well have assumed all along^*^ that
causal inference was epistemically warranted; only at this
point is he making explicit what he takes to be the epistemic
grounds for this process.
Admittedly, the evidence here is equivocal and not
overwhelming for my reading of this passage. On the other
hand, it is not conclusive as an attempted vindication, pre-
dicated on an earlier epistemic rejection, either. The main
problem here, as well as elsewhere in Parts (iii) and (iv),
is that nowhere does Hum.e seem haunted by the sceptical
doubts allegedly raised in Part (iii). As anyone who has
read the last Section of Book I can attest, Hume v;as quite
capable of being haunted--indeed , tormented--by sceptical
doubts
.
Another candidate for a legitimating consideration that
vindicates causal inference can be found in the last section
of Part (iv) . The sceptical doubts that have nagged Hume
throughout Part (iv) heat up in this final section. As I
shall show shortly, the proposed justification or vindica-
tion offered at the beginning of Section 4 is rejected. At
^^Hxcept for the argument of Part (iv) Section 1, which he
seems to have subsequently ignored.
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the end of this final section Hume is faced with a serious
problem: He wants to continue to develop his psychological
theory to account for the passions and morals. Important
foundational difficulties, however, appear unresolved. He
wants to find some sort of warrant--or at least an excuse--
for moving on to Books II and III. Towards the very end of
this section he makes the following observation:
Since, therefore, 'tis almost
impossible for the mind of man
to rest, like those of beasts,
in that narrow circle of objects
which are the subject of daily
conversation and action, we ought
only to deliberate concerning the
choice of our guide, and ought to
prefer that which is safest and most
agreeable And in this respect I make
bold to recommend [natural]
philosophy and shall not scruple
to give it the preference to super-
stition of every kind or denomination.
(T. 271)
Inclination and sentiment, in the final analysis, are what
allow Hume to move on.
The reason that Hume was pushed into this rather feeble
justification or vindication lies in Part (iv) Section 7
(approximately five pages before this passage) . He draws
some obvious conclusions from some arguments advanced earlier
in Part (iv), and it is these conclusions that raise the




The problem is that llumo has continued to trace the
causes of some of the more important processes of the mind
(i.e. causal reasoning and the belief in the confined and
distinct existence of matter) . He finds that they both
spring from the imagination. This is problematic because
• . . tho ' these two operations
be equally natural and necessary
in the hurnan mind
,
yet in some
circumstances they are directly
contrary, nor is it possible for
us to reason justly and regularly
from causes and effects, and at
the same time believe the con-
tinued existence of matter. (T. 266)
A footnote in this passage refers back to Part (iv) Section
4 where Hume advances Berkelian arguments to show that both
primary and secondary qualities are mind-dependent. Thus,
the conflict of what Norman Kemp Smith calls the "Natural
Beliefs is Hume's final argument for scepticism. Arising
from the same faculty, these natural and unavoidable beliefs
ultimately conflict. Because of this conflict, the imagina-
tion is not entitled to be the final arbiter on matters of
truth and falsehood. Here again, however, there is no refer-
ence to any arguments of Part (iii) . This is a new and
independent development that has arisen in Part (iv) .
It is clear that Hume believed that this conflict
seriously undermines the legitimacy of causal inference. In
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a striking passage which occurs shortly after he discovers
this difficulty, he briefly falls into the scepticism that
Stove and others attributed to him in Part (iii) Section 6.
The following statement is so clear and unequivocal, it is
a wonder that Hume does not use similar language if he was
in fact arguing for a radical form of scepticism there.
The inten se view of these manifold
contradictions and imperfections in
human reason has so wrought upon me,
and heated my brain, that I am
ready to reject all belief and reason-
ing
, and can look upon no opinion even
as more probable or likely than
another . VJhere am I or what? From
what causes do I derive my existence?
Whose favor shall I court and whose
anger must I dread? (T. 268-269)
(second emphasis added)
It is this deep scepticism, brought on by what Hume
takes to be the conflict of the Natural Beliefs, that he
tries to escape by following the course which is "safest
and most agreeable."
In conclusion, it is clear that every move that Hume
makes to avoid scepticism about causal inference is motiva-
ted by problems that he finds in Part (iv) . No specters of
the argument of Part (iii) Section 6 follow Hume into the
depths of scepticism that he reaches at the close of Book I.
This, coupled with Hume's explicit epistemological dis-
tinctions between proofs and probabilities, strongly supports
the view that, through the end of Part (iii), Hume believed
195
that causal inferences lead to epistemically warranted
belief. If justification is understood as 'having a suffi-
ciently high measure of epistemic warrant', it is clear from
the arguments that I have advanced in Chapters I, III, and
this chapter that Hume held that, among those beliefs that
are caused by other beliefs, such beliefs are justified if
and only if they are caused by causal inference.
Thusfar in this chapter ray concerns have been primarily
interpretive. However, there are large philosophical issues
at stake here. Hume has undoubtedly made a large contribu-
tion to epistemological debates about the mind's knowledge
of what is unobserved. There are a number of relevant ques-
tions in this regard: What challenges does Hume raise,
either explicitly or implicitly, about the mind's claims to
knowledge about the future? Does he offer a satisfactory
resolution of these challenges? In particular, how does all
this relate to the so-called Problem of Induction?
Thusfar I have said little about this problem. There
are three relevant questions in this connection:
(i) What is the Problem of Induction?
(ii) How does or can Hume respond to this problem?
(iii) How satisfactory is this response?
In the next chapter I shall discuss these and other matters.
CHAPTER V
What IS the Problem of Induction? As a first approxima-
tion, we can say that the Problem of Induction is a sceptical
challenge about the mind's claims to knowledge about the
future (or, more generally, about the unobserved) . in the
context of Hume's philosophy, this challenge can be seen as
a question: "From an epistemological point of view, why
approve of causal inference?"
Before discussing answers to this question, it would be
helpful to understand what kinds of considerations motivate
it. There are in fact a variety of reasons why this challenae
can arise. From Hume's point of view at the end of Part (iv)
of Book I, the answer is clear: causal (and hence inductive)
inference cannot be trusted because it conflicts with the
basic and unshakeable (natural) belief in the continued and
distinct existence of bodies. Because of this conflict, Hume
is prepared (at least temporarily) to question the ability of
causal inference to deliver even merely probable opinion, (cf.
quotation p. 194).
Nonetheless, this is not the motivation that has been
historically important for generating the Problem of Induction
Ihe relevant arguments of Part (iv) are parochial and peculiar
to Hume's philosophy. Besides, these arguments may not be as
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Huino thinks they arc.
What is commonly cited as the source of the Problem of
Induction is the argument of Part (iii) Section 6. Now, I
have argued in great detail that Hume did not conclude in
that argument that past experience provides no epistemic
warrant for beliefs about the future. All that he was trying
to establish there is that this warrant cannot be the highest
possible. The Incurable invalidity of such inferences guaran-
tees that.
Pre-analytically, this creates no problems. Not only
is the mind convinced by invalid "arguments from experience"
,
ever so little reflection convinces it of the rationality of
such arguments. Deeper philosophical reflection, however,
appears to reveal that there is a significant epistemological
gap between valid and invalid arguments. Because of the
intimate relationship between certainty and validity, valid
arguments are epistemologically less problematical than in-
valid ones. The warrant for the conclusions of valid argu-
ments is the certainty (relative to the premises) that the
validity of the argument bestows--at least in cases where a
person knows that the argument is valid. Since the conclusion
of no invalid argument can be certain relative to its premises^.
I ignore here arguments whose promises and conclusions are
all "psychological reports".
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IS there, nonetheless a significant epistemological relation
between the promises and conclusion? Put another way, what
is the epistemic warrant for the conclusions of the incurably
invalid arguments from experience that Hume calls "causal in-
ference "
?
Though Hume did not see it as such in Part (iii)
, this
is the Problem of Induction. It is a question, a sceptical
challenge to show that the conclusions of such inferences have
some measure of epistemic warrant. It is not the substantive
philosophical position that there is no such warrant. As a
positive position, scepticism has little to recommend it,: to
the extent that it depends on a Stovean interpretation of
Hume s argument of Part (iii) Section 6, it requires the
dubious Premise (10b) (and Principle P)
, or something similar.
The legacy of Hume's argument in that section is an
implicit challenge to produce a philosophical theory that
epistemically legitimates causal or inductive inference.
Failure here can result in a triumph for scepticism only if
scepticism is construed as a suspension of belief (and not
disbelief) about the legitimacy of such inferences. It is
important in this connection to distinguish between belief
in the conclusions of an inductive inference and belief in
the legitimacy of those conclusions. A sceptical attitude
about the latter may not require a sceptical attitude about
the former. Indeed, Hume argues that the mind cannot refrain
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from believing the conclusions of causal inferences. What-
ever the truth of that claim, it does not preclude a sceptical
attitude about the legitimacy of such inferences.
How can this challenge be met? it is beyond the scope
of this dissertation to discuss all of the soJutions, reso-
lutions, and dissolutions of the Problem of Induction; instead,
I shall focus on those responses that can be legitimately
called "Humean." in various places in Book I of the Treatise
Hume hints at or clearly states a number of positions that
can be viewed as responses to the sceptic's challenge. Some
commentators with philosophical axes to grind have claimed
to find implicit in Hume's work a way to meet this challenge.
A critical evaluation of these proposals seems in order here.
Aside from its intrinsic philosophical interest, such a
discussion is of some value for those interested in the
^^tional recons ti uct ion " of the philosophy of a major histor-
ical figure. The aim of rational reconstruction is to render
a philosopher's views consistent and coherent. This in turn
allows for a more exact appreciation of that figure's con-
tribution to outstanding philosophical debates.
Humean Responses to the Problem of Induction
Let me emphasize at the outset that this discussion is
not strictly historical and interpretive. The Problem of
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Induction is only implicit in Hume's argument of Part (iii)
Section 6. There, and in the rest of Part (iii), he merely
assumes that invalid arguments from experience can provide
some measure of epistemic warrant. The responses that he
offers in Part (iv) are designed to meet scepticism as a
substantive position, the arguments for which occur in Part
(IV). My statement and evaluation of Humean responses to
the implicit challenge of Part (iii) Section 6 do not repre-
sent a recanting of the interpretation offered in Chapters
III and IV. The discussion here is undertaken for philoso-
phical, and not strictly historical or interpretive, reasons.
Faced with the sceptic's challenge about induction,
there are two kinds of responses that can be made:
(i) It can be met head on by constructing and justi-
fying a philosophical theory that shows the
epistemological legitimacy of inductive inference.
or
(ii) It can be met indirectly by showing that inductive
inference can be approved of on other, non-
epistemic grounds . In this way legitimate
philosophical aims that motivate this challenge
can be met, even though the question of the
epistemic legitimacy of such inferences remains
unanswered
.
The second kind of move is not the one adopted by those who
claim to "dissolve" the Problem of Induction. In its crudest
form, the dissolution of the problem is effected by asserting
that it is part of the meaning of the relevant epistemic terms
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that certain kinds of non-doductive inference provides a
measure of epistemic warrant. 2 it asserts that some kinds
of non-deductive inference were epistemically legitimate.
The second option outlined above adopts a quite
different strategy: It avoids the question of the epistemic
legitimacy of certain kinds of non-deductive inference (whose
conclusions are empirical claims) by showing that such
inferences can be approved of on other, non-epistemic (e.g.
pragmatic) grounds. The concept of "vindication" employed
by those who adopt this second option is analogous to the
concept of justification in the following sense: To say that
a kind of inference is justified is to say that it is worthy
of epistemic approval. On this construal
, to say that a
kind of inference is vindicated is to say that it is worthy
of some other kind of approval. If it can be shown that
certain kinds of non-deductive inference can be approved of
on non-epistemic grounds, then legitimate philosophical aims
that motivate a "head-on" approach would be met.
What are these aims? It is reasonably clear that
certain kinds of non-deductive inference form the backbone
of the empirical sciences. It is a legitimate pliilosophical
2 See Chapter 2 of Bryan Skyrms ' Choic e and Chance (Belmont,
Ca, 1966) for a good discussion of this p^Tnt.
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task to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of
empirical science. Also, among characteristically inductive
arguments, some appear to be "better off" than others, and
some merit no approval at all. A good theory should account
for this. Finally, perhaps the most important aim is this:
Pre-analytically
, most philosophers (and certainly Hume)
believe that science and the scientific method alone merit
an approval that, e.g. enthusiasm and superstition do not.
An adequate philosophical theory will show that this broadly
based sentiment is well-grounded. Failure to meet these
aims need not result in the triumph of scepticism as a sub-
stantive position. It would, however, leave the legitimacy
of these pre-systematic beliefs--to say nothing of inductive
inference itself--in serious doubt. And surely that would
be a serious failure of philosophy.
The second option outlined above seeks to satisfy
these aims but on non-epistemic grounds. If this sort of
move is successful, the epistemological questions remain
unanswered; however, this is not too serious or troublesome
because the philosophical aims that motivate the questions
are met. It is in this sense that the sceptic's (epistemic)
challenge can be successfully avoided. It is important to
note that someone who adopts this position need not eschew
a].l epistemic aims. His only concern is to avoid (epistemi-
cally) justifying empirical claims by means of non-deductive
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inferences. 3 There is nothing to prevent him from (epistemi-
cally) justifying non-empirical claims by means of deductively
valid arguments.
The actual motivations for adopting this second option
can be quite varied: A theorist might think that a substan-
i
tive sceptical position is correct and that all beliefs
arrived at via non-deductive inference are epistemically
worthless; he may think that all positive attempts to meet
the challenge head on have failed; for this latter reason
especially, he may think that this sort of move is desirable
I
because he can avoid a rather thorny challenge and still
;
satisfy legitimate and important philosophical desiderata.
j
In the remainder of this chapter I should like to discuss
seven responses to the sceptic's challenge that are "Humean"
j
in character; they are either clearly stated by him or in-
j
spired by things that he says in Book I of the Treatise.
i
I Since Hume adopts a number of positions at different places,
!
' it is not surprising to find such a variety of responses
j
suggested in the Treatise . These responses are naturally
I subsumable under the two broad options outlined above. I
shall first discuss three attempts to avoid the sceptic's
^That there are no acceptable deductive inferences whose
conclusion is an empirical claim is shown by Hume's argu-
ment of Part (iii) Section 6 (see Chapter III).
I
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chnllengo. The first two have been discussed in the secondary
literature, and they were brcifly outlined in Chapter IV
as interpretations of Hume. The third position is apparently
the final one adopted by Hume in Book I (see quotation p.l92).
In light of Its obvious weakness, a brief discussion of it
IS warranted only because this is Hume's final position and
this dissertation concerns Hume's epistemology. These posi-
tions may aptly be termed "pragmatic vindications"—as
opposed to validations— of inductive inference.
It IS important to distinguish this kind of vindication
from that advocated by such writers as Reichenbach and Salmon.
They attempt to show that inductive inference is epistemically
legitimate by showing that if any method of inference is
successful, the one that is in fact employed (i.e. the
straight rule', which tells us to project observed frequen-
cies to the unobserved) is and will be successful. The kind
of vindicationism under consideration is silent on the
question of the epistemic legitimacy of these inferences.
A Pragmati c V indication of Induction:
Legit ima~Fing Consideration I
This view is proposed and argued for as an interpreta-
tion of Mume by F.C. Baylie in his monograph. The Causes and
Evidence of Beliefs: An Examination of Hume's Method . Baylie '
s
view is that Hume originally attempted to distinguish the
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worthy from the unworthy boliots on the basis of their causal
antecedents. Although he does not consider causal intoronoe
as a candidate, ho does consider and (rightly) reject a num-
ber of other candidates (e.g. whether a belief was caused by
an impression of sensation or one of reflection) . Finally,
towards the end of his monograph he offers what ho takes to
be Hume's ultimate position:
The change in Hume's emphasis
is from the causes of a belief
to the consequences of a belief.
Hume appears to point towards a
functional test for the validity of
a belief and away from a test in
terms of its origins. Hume's pro-
cedure indicates that his ultimate
distinction between beliefs is in
terms of their necessity for
rational science and living, . . .
The beliefs which are justified
are those which are necessary,
necessary for the purpose of drawing
inferences from our experience and
for the purpose of a biological
existence. Hume seems to be sug-
gesting a biological justification
for some of our beliefs.^
I take it that what Baylie means by a "biological
justification" is what I have called a pragmatic vindica-
tion. In the case of causal inference, he is saying that
such inferences are necessary for the purposes of living
^Frank C. Baylie, The_ Causes and Evidence of Belief: An




and doing science, and this vindicates the practice of
making them. Baylie does not clearly distinguish the con-
cept of an epistemological justification from that of a
pragmatic vindication. Consequently, it would be worthwhile
to consider what he offers here as a sufficient condition for
the (epistemic) justification of a belief as well. Later in
this chapter I shall do this.
By realizing that causal inference is necessary for
the purposes of living and doing science, the problem of
epistemically jus t i fying such beliefs can be effectively by-
passed. What evolves is something like a doctrine of "as
if . If one acts as if (e.g.) it is virtually certain that
winter will come next year, then, by acting accordingly, it
can be survived. The necessity of such inferences for the
purposes of living vindicates our organic and instinctual
confidence in conclusions reached by these inferences. Thus
there are non-epistemic reasons for approving of causal in-
ferences and disapproving of empirical beliefs arrived at
through other means (e.g. superstition)
.
Let us consider the argument here a little more closely.
It is not clear whether or not Baylie believes that these
purposes are singly sufficient or singly necessary but
jointly sufficient. I shall first consider them separately.
The following seems to be a fair rc})resentat ion of one con-
strual of Baylie 's reasoning:
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Causal inference is necessary for the purposes of living.
Causal inference is vindicated.
It IS unproblematic to grant Baylie Premise (1) . in this
context, our desire to go on living needs no justification
or vindication. Consequently, it seems true to say that if
a process is necessary for that purpose, it is worthy of
approval
.
In order to evaluate Premise (2)
,
however, it is
necessary to get clear about the meaning of this claim.
Certainly not every belief arrived at via causal inference
is necessary for the purposes of living. it must be the
general practice of making such inferences or the tendency
to make such inferences that is necessary for living. Indi-
causal judgments are vindicated because they are in-
stances of that general practice or manifestations of that
general tendency. Thus, it is the "institution" of causal
inference which is necessary for the purposes of living.
It is probably correct to say that causal inferences are
necessary for the purposes of living. If one did not make
such inferences, one might walk off the edge of cliffs, be
suspicious of the ability of bread to nourish the body, etc.
In short, were one to stop making causal inferences, one
would shortly pe.rish. Hume is fond of pointing out just
208
how much we depend on causal inference.
Problems arise when the defender of this position tries
to show that this claim is true. it is a high-level empiri-
cal assertion about the effects of making or not making
causal inferences. its truth is by no means self-evident.
The defender of this view would have to offer an argument
for this premise that merits epistemic approval. Put more
simply, he would have to justify an empirical claim by a
non-deductive argument to show that the argument on page
207 is sound. This task, however, is just what he has sought
to avoid. Thus, it appears that this vindication fails in
its attempt to avoid the j ustificat ion of empirical belief.
Baylie might respond by saying that the empirical argu-
^snt for Premise (2) is designed to and results in a vindi-
cation of that premise. Its vindication legitimates the
premise and thus recommends it to us. The problem with this
response is that it begs the question at issue. That is,
it assumes the truth of the conclusion in order to establish
one of the premises.
With respect to the other condition, a similar argument
emerges
.
(1) If causal inference is necessary for the purposes of
doing science, then it is vindicated.




. (3) Causal inference is vindicated.
It may be that Premise (2) is not an empirical claim
and can be established in some non-circular way by an a
priori argument. Premise (1), however, is problematic. it
says that satisfying a certain aim or purpose legitimates
causal inference. This seems to require that the purpose
(engaging in the practice of doing science) is itself a
legitimate one. The legitimacy of that purpose may be self-
evident, or it may be established by showing that the ful-
filling of that purpose serves some other purpose (s).
These ends may be "ultimate", and, as Mill has argued in
Utilitarianism
, incapable of justification, or their legi-
timacy may be self-evident.
The legitimacy of doing science is not self-evident.
Whether or not we should do science is an "open question"
in that it is possible to understand the question without
knowing the answer. Engaging in the practice of doing science
is not "ultimate" because reasons can be given for doing it.
What are these reasons or purposes? Commonly cited purpo-
ses for doing science are explanation, prediction, and the
practical (e.g. technological) benefits that are derived
from engaging in the practice. Let us grant, for the sake
of argument, that the legitimacy of these purposes is self-
evident or that these ends are ultimate. The following ar-
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gument then emerges for Premise (1)
:
(la) If science vieJds exnl -.nn4-
.
•
j'-L'-j.ut) p anations, predict irmc: -,r-.apractical benefits, then it is vindicated
'
(lb) If science is vindicated, then ifnecessary for the purposes of doi
IS vindicated.
(Ic) Science yields explanations, predict
benefits.
any practice is
ng science, then it
ions and practical
Premises (la), (lb), and (Ic), together with Premise (2),
imply Premise (1) . The argument seems to be a good one, but
a close examination of Premise (Ic) reveals a fatal flaw.
Tacit in Premises (la) and (Ic) is the qualification that
the explanations and predictions are reasonable to believe.
Otnerwise, there is no way to distinguish science from super-
stition; the latter can also offer explanations and pre-
diction. However, since this theorist has sought to avoid
recommending the conclusions of scientific reasoning (i.e.
explanations and predictions) on epistemic grounds, it is
difficult to see how he could appeal to explanation or pre-
diction unless that appeal is parasitic on the practical
benefits of doing science. Beliefs about those facts, if
indeed they are facts, require some (epistemic) justification
in order that Premise (Ic) can be established. It will not
do to say that (Ic) can be vindicated -- that begs the question
at issue. This vindication of causal inference fails to
avoid the epistemic justification of empirical belief and can.
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therefore, be rejected.
j^ragmatic Vindica tion of Induction:
Legit imating Con sTd^ration II
This account can be found in a number of commentaries
on Hume. l suspect that this is the final view of Norman
Kemp Smith in Th^_Pj^osophy of David Hume, though this is
not completely clear. The clearest statement of it can be
found in John Lenz ' article, "Hume's Defence of Causal
Inference". 5 Lenz claims that Hume discovers that the mind
cannot help making causal inferences; such inferences
spring from universal and irresistible principles of human
nature. Since the mind cannot refrain from engaging in
the practice of making causal inferences, it is not the
case that it ought to so refrain. This vindicates the
practice of making causal inferences. Lenz puts the m.atter
this way:
This defense is based on a crucial
characteristic of causal beliefs.
All men, because of their common
human nature, are compelled to
have them. Hume holds, that is,
that it is impossible for men not
to make causal inferences. . . His
r
John Lenz, "Hume's Defence of Causal Inference" in Hume:
A Collection oF Critical Es says, od . by Ver^^.
Chappell (1966, Notre Dame, Indiana), pps.
169-186.
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essential point is that the epis-
temic c]uestion, "Ought wo to
make causal inferences?" is "blocked"
by the unavoidability of our having
to make them. Apparently presupposing
the principle (which he explicitly
adopts in his moral philosophy) that
ought not d.mplies able not to, he
simply argues that inasmuch as we cannot
help but make causal inferences, there
is no point in anyone's saying that we
ought not to.^
The principle that Lenz attributes to Hume is somewhat
ambiguous. It seems to be a form of the "Ought Implies
Can" formula. If so, this principle can be less misleading-
ly expressed as follows:
(1) If the mind ought to refrain from engaging in
practice P, then it is able to refrain from
engaging in practice P.
Instantiating in the appropriate way, the following argu-
ment emerges:
(la) If the mind ought to refrain from making causal infer-
ences, then it is able to refrain from making such
inferences
.
(2) The mind cannot refrain from making causal inferences.
’.(3) It is not the case that the mind ought to refrain
from making causal inferences (i.e. it is permissible
to make causal inferences)
.
In order to evaluate this argument, it is important to
^Ibid., pps. 183,184.
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get clear about the sense of the two key terms: 'ought'
and 'permissible'. It is doubtful that Lenz intends that
these are terms of episte_mj^ appraisal. The whole motiva-
tion for this argument is to avoid (in his words, "to
block ) the question of the epistemic warrant of these
inferences. Besides, it seems that, on this construal.
Principle (1) may indeed be false. It certainly seems
possible that the mind could be compelled to believe pro-
positions which are unjustified (perhaps by the machinations
of a Cartesian demon or even the blind forces of Nature)
Rather, the parenthetical remark in the above quota-
tion suggests that the intended sense of these terms is a
^*^^al one. Ihus the conclusion asserts that it is morally
permissible to make causal inferences. If the bulk of
Hume s psychological theory is granted, it seems to me,
anyway, that this claim is indeed true.
Nevertheless, this conclusion does not, by itself,
satisfy the aim of this approach. It needs to be shown that
the moral permissibility of making such inferences vindi-
cates the mind's making them. This suggests the following
argument
:
(4) If it is morally permissible to make causal iiiferences,




. (5) The practice of making causal inferences is vindicated.
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statement (5) is implied by (4) and (3), and the arqumont
IS valid. Let us consider Promise (4) first. It is by no
means self-evidently true. In order to evaluate it, how-
ever, one must recall what a vindication is and how this
concept can be used here. As noted previously (cf. p.200),
in connection with the philosophical aims of this kind
of project, a vindication of causal inference will have to
provide some grounds for approving of the practice. That
IS, causal inference will have to be shown to be worthy
of approval.
Now, on the face of it, it seems very unlikely that the
fact that causal inference is morally permissible makes it
worthy of approval. Certainly it does not make it worthy
of moral approval (i.e. morally praiseworthy). It is highly
doubtful that its moral permissib.ility makes it worthy of
aesthetic approval . It also does not seem that the moral
permissibility is a sufficient condition fo.r pragmatic
approval. There are many things that are morally permis-
sible yet quite unwise from a practical point of view.
There may be other kinds of approval, but it does not seem
that the moral permissibility of causal inference is a
sufficient condition for any kind of approval . Premise (4),
therefore, is probably false.
It may happen that there are many non-cpistemi c grounds
for approving of causal inference. For example, causal
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inforenco does servo some worthy prudential or pragmatic
aims. However, that this is the case is a contingent tact
that needs to be justified. A vindication of that claim
begs the very question at issue.
This leads to a parallel problem with Premise (2)
This premise states that the mind cannot refrain from
making causal inferences. This is a high-level statement
of psychological theory. Any argument for it must be de-
signed to justify this empirical proposition. Of course,
this is just what the vindicationist wants to avoid. As
was the case with Premise (2) of Baylie’s argument, an
attempt to vindicate this premise would beg the question.
Lenz position, therefore, is ultimately untenable.
Although I cannot demonstrate it, it seems to me that any
attempt to avoid the question of the epistemic justification
causal inference will fail because it will require an em-
claim that needs to be justified at some point in
the argument. Thus, prospects for a non-epistemic vindica-
tion of causal inference appear bleak. Maybe the key
premise could be a synthetic proposition, knowable a priori
.
I am sceptical of this, but it is reasonably clear that
there is no suggestion of that sort of move anyv;hcre in
Hume
.
A Pragmatic Vi ndicat ion of Induction:
Legitimating Consideration ill
21G
This proposal is the one that Ilume fina]]y .
the end of Section 7 (the last section) of Pari
After discovering that the two Natural Beliefs (i
in the continued and distinct existence of bod it.
belief in causal reasoning) ultimately conflict,
moved to make the following observation:
Since, therefore, 'tis almost
impossible for the mind of man
to rest, like those of beasts,
in that narrow circle of objects, wiii^.i
are the subject of daily conversa-
tion and action, we ought only to
deliberate concerning the choice of
our guide, and ought to prefer that
which is safest and most agreeable.
And in this respect I make bold to
recommend [natural] philosophy and
shall not scruple to give it the
preference to superstition of every
kind or denomination. (T. 271)
Shorn of all its trappings, Hume's claim i c-
method of natural philosophy (causal inference)
i
of approval because it is safest and most agree...
i
it is safest and most agreeable is an empirical .
needs an epi stemic justification. Thus, this vu
the same defect that plagued Baylie's and Lenz ' .
In addition, what is most agreeable to Hume may .
is most agreeable to an enthusiast.
The weakness of this view is quite obvious;
an expression of despair than a serious propo.s,,i



















to be Hume's final position.
*****
This completes my discussion of Humean attempts to
avoid the sceptic's challenge to show that beliefs arrived
at via causal (inductive) inference have some measure of
epistemic warrant. I have not been able to discover any
other proposals in the secondary literature that are designed
to avoid the sceptic's challenge. Some theorists, however,
have claimed to find some suggestion in the Treatise of a
to meet this challenge head on. I have been able to
four proposals in this connection. In the remainder
of this chapter, I should like to discuss these proposals.
1. Since Professor Baylie does not sharply distinguish
the concept of a pragmatic vindication from that of
an epistemic justification, it would be useful to con-
sider his criterion as a sufficient condition for the
justification of an empirical belief.
2. Lenz suggests that his criterion was first employed by
Hume as a sufficient condition for the epistemic justi-
fication of a belief; Hume's realization that causal
inference ultimately conflicts with the belief in the
continued and distinct existence of bodies forced him
to the vindication ist position that Lenz attributes to
him. Putting to one side the ali.eged conflict of the
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Natural Beliefs, Lenz ' criterion deserves careful con-
sideration as a sufficient condition for the justifi-
cation of empirical belief.
In a brief but penetrating discussion of Hume and the
Problem of Induction in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast
Nelson Goodman argues that this problem has been largely
misconceived and that Hume's description of the process
of inductive inference is highly relevant to the justi-
fication of that process. By drawing attention to how
deductive inferences are justified, Goodman claims that
there is no special problem with respect to induction.
It is not clear to what extent Goodman thinks that this
accurately characterizes Hume's intentions, but there
can be little doubt that some suggestion of this view
can be found in the Treatise .
finally, I outline what I take to be the correct view
of the matter. My evaluation of Goodman's proposal
will show that he is m.istaken about the justification
of deductive inference. However, the correct account
of the justification of deductive inference will suggest
the way that inductive inference is to be justified. I
shall argue that both ultimately depend on intuition.
That some inductive arguments can be intuited to be
"better than" others (in a yet to be specified sense)
is suggested by Hume's distinction, made v>^ithout argument.
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between proofs and probabilities.
An Epistemic Justification of Induction:
Legitimating Consideratl^^T
Baylie claims that Hume's discovery of the necessity
of causal inference for the purposes of living and doing
science legitimates beliefs arrived at in that manner. Let
us construe this legitimacy as epistemic justification.
Thus one might construe Baylie as asserting that a belief's
being necessary for the purposes of living is a sufficient
condition for its being justified. Some obvious counter-
examples show that this cannot be true and that perhaps
Baylie' s criterion ought to be more charitably construed.
Comrade Ivan Ivanov has been sentenced to the most
wretched labor camp in Stalinist Russia for an indefinite
period of time. In order for him to survive, he must be
firmly convinced that he will eventually be released. He
may not even be aware that his survival depends on this
belief. However, he has no evidence to support this belief.
In fact, he has evidence to the contrary: He was branded
a Trotskyite; he was sentenced "without right of correspon-
dence" (a common and widely known device used when the
Soviets wanted to shoot the prisoner eventually) . Only by
a curious but not uncommon practice of self-deception can
Comrade Ivanov stay alive. In short, ho may have an un-
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system of belief that is necessary for the purposes of
living IS justified. Nonetheless, it would bo easy to
defeat this proposal by reconstruing Comrade Kirov's system
of belief in such a way that causal inference is restricted
to apply to just those areas that do not impinge on the
economic dogma. Attempts to further amend the criterion
(e.g. by requiring that the system of beliefs be the simplest
among competing systems) are problematic because the rationale
for such conditions will either beg the question (by assuming
that systems that meet these conditions are the m.ost reason-
able) or be as difficult to produce as an independent
argument for the conclusion that causal inference alone
merits epistemic approval.
What of the other part of Baylie's criterion? On this
view, the epistemic legitimacy of causal inference is
guaranteed by its necessity for doing science. Does that
justify causal inference? Part of the difficulty involved
in evaluating this criterion is that it is not at all clear
what it means. If it just means that were one not to hold
the belief or kind of belief in question one would not be
able to engage in the practice of doing science, it would
be easy to find counterexamples. In a given Marxist-
Leninist society, one might have to believe some absurd
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political or even scientific doctrine^ in order to practice
science. Such counterexamples, however, seem like -cheap
shots". Besides, they require that the relevant sense of
necessity is causal necessity. Any contingent relation be-
tween causal inference and doing science will be subject
to this kind of difficulty. what if the relation between
causal beliefs and science was a logical one? if the con-
nection IS of this sort, however, it is a little misleading
to speak of causal inference standing in a means/end rela-
tion to science. The argument then seems to be that, since
beliefs arrived at via causal inference are "scientific"
(i.e. since science consists of such beliefs), they are
justified. This argument can be expressed more formally
as follows
:
(1) If causal beliefs are scientific (in the aforementioned
sense), then they are justified.
(2) Causal beliefs are scientific.
.'.(3) Causal beliefs are justified.
Problems with this argument arise when the defender
of this view is pressed to provide an argument for Premise (1)
.
7 Something like this actually happened in the USSR in the
30 's. For some time, Trofim Lysenko's absurd theory of
genetics was de rigeur for Soviet scientists.
I
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The question rnised by Promise (1, is on old (and recalci-
trant) one. Why is science cpistoniically preferable to any
competing system?’' The obvious answer-that scientific
beliefs are roasonable-begs the question at issue. it
seems that a non-question bogging argument for Premise (1)
(or even, for that matter. Premise (2)) would be at least
as difficult as an independent argument for (3). Anyway,
it is reasonably clear that there is no suggestion of any
independent argument for Premise (1) in Hume; Baylie cer-
tainly offers none, and I am aware of no other commentator
who has tried this tacit. However, the principal problem
with this argument is that it does not offer any insight
into the reason why causal inference is worthy of epistemic
approval
.
This also indicates the futility of construing Baylie 's
entire proposal as a pair of singly necessary but jointly
sufficient conditions for the justification of empirical
beliefs. Since the epistemological significance of the
scientific method is as unclear as the epistemological
significance of causal inference, a proposal such as this
does not really advance our understanding of the relevant
issues
.
An Epistem ic Justification of Induction:
LegTFimating Con sidoration I
I
Another proposal tliat has obvious roots in Hume is
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considered by John Lenz (on. c^.
) . Lenz ' interpretive
argument is that Hume discovered that causal inference
springs from universal and irresistible principles of
huirtan nature. Originally, ikime believed that this justified
causal inference, but he later realized that beliefs
arrived at via causal inference conflict with the belief in
the continued and distinct existence of bodies. This
leads him to give up this criterion as a justification of
causal inference; according to Lenz, he does hang on to it
as a sufficient condition for the vindication of causal
beliefs. Qua vindication, this condition has already
been discussed. However, by putting aside the alleged
conflict of the Natural Beliefs and its epistemological
significance (if any)
, it is possible to discuss this cri-
terion as a sufficient condition for the justification of
beliefs arrived at via causal inference. Roughly, the argu-
ment states that, since this form of inference is so fun-
damental and basic to human nature, beliefs arrived at by
this means merit epistemic approval. More formally, this
argument can be expressed as follows:
(1) If causal inference springs from universal and irre-
sistible principles of human nature, then causal beliefs
are justified.
(2) Causal inference springs from universal and irresistible
principles of human nature.
.(3) Causal beliefs are justified.
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At first glance, this argument appears to be open to
an objection that parallels objections raised against the
first two Vindicationist arguments: Premise (2) is a high-
level theoretical assertion of empirical psychology. As
such, It needs an empirical argument, the efficacy of which
presupposes the truth of (3); hence the argument is
quest ion-begging
.
A defender of this view, however, may want to argue
that (2) is not an empirical claim; rather, it is a necessary
truth, knowable a priori . Perhaps there is a Kantian argu-
ment for Premise (2)
.
From a Humean point of view, however,
the above argument clearly begs the question. Hume's argu-
ment for (2) is a complex empirical argument. He appeals
to the association of ideas, the effects of repeated con-
comitant variation, and the effects of resemblance in con-
structing this argument. Thus, to the extent that this
argument is "found in" or "inspired by" Hume, it begs the
question. Nonetheless, for the moment, let us assume that
there is a Kantian argument for Premise (2)
.
What about
Premi se ( 1 )
?
Premise (1) seems suspicious. There is no obvious
relation between the epistemic warrant of causal inference
and the fact that it arises from universal and irresistible
principles of human nature. Following Lenz , one might argue
that, since the mind cannot refrain from making such in-
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forences, it is not the case that it ought to so refrain.
Even if one interprets the 'ought' and 'can' here as
epistemic terms (and the sanction for that is by no means
clear)
, one can only conclude that such inferences are
epistemically permissible , what is needed, however, are
grounds to show that causal inference is worthy of epistemic
ap_prov^. Pushing the analogy a little further, it seems
that a belief may be epistemically permissible (not
unjustified) without being epistemically praiseworthy
(justified)
,
On an intuitive, pre-analytic level, this objection
makes a good deal of sense. Someone such as Hume might
argue that belief in the existence of God is just this kind
of belief--not justified but unavoidable. Even if this
particular example is not correct, there is nothing self-
contradictory about the notion of a belief that is unavoid-
able but not justified.
None of the criteria discussed thusfar has been intended
to be a "legitimating consideration" for deductive inference.
Perhaps a closer examination of the epistemic legitimacy
of deductive inference will shed some light on the problem
of the epistemic legitimacy of inductive inference. The




Logl timatjji^^^onsiderat ion III
In Chapter 3 of F^a.c t, Fiction and Forecast Nelson
Goodman argues that the old Problem of Induction can be
dissolved and that this problem was something of a pseudo-
problem all along. He credits Hume with the basic insight
in this connection; Goodman's position is an elaboration of
this basic insight that he claims is implicit in Hume's
discussion of these issues.
Goodman points out that when Hume is faced with the
problem of the justification of inductive inference, the
latter proceeds to describe how the mind makes such in-
ferences. Others criticize this by pointing out that a
psychological description of the process is irrelevant to
the justification of that process. Goodman believes that
this is seriously mistaken; the description of the process
is relevant to the question of the justification of that
process. To illustrate this, Goodman asks us to consider
how deductive inferences are (to be) justified.
How do we justify a deduction?
Plainly, by showing that it
conforms to the general rules
of deductive inference ....
Moreover, when a deductive
argument has been shown to
conform to the rules of
logical inference, we usually
consider it justified without
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going on to ask what
justifies the rules.
^
As a description of actual practice, this is basically
correct. Obviously, however, this only postpones the
important question of the justification of the rules them-
selves
.
Yet, of course, the rules themselves
must eventually be justified. The
validity of a deduction depends
not upon conformity to any purely
arbitrary rules we may contrive,
but upon conformity to valid rules.
. . . But how is the validity of the
rules to be determined? . . . Prin-
ciples of deductive inferences are
justified by their conformity with
accepted deductive practice. . . .
If a rule yields inacceptable in-
ferences, we drop it as invalid. .
Now, obviously, this procedure appears to be circular,
but Goodman claims that this circle is virtuous and not
vicious. He says.
The point is that rules and
particular inferences alike are
justified by being brought into
agreement with each other. A rule
i s amended if it yie^s an inference
we are unwill ing to accept ; an inference
is r e j ected ^f it violates a rule we
are unwi 1 1 ing to amend. The process








of Dustification is the delicate
one of making mutual adjustments
between rules and accepted
inferences. (emphases are
Goodman ' s)
Goodman says that the same kind of process applies
to inductive inference. Of course, the process of the
justification of inductive inference is much more complex
and formidable because the principles of inductive inference
are in a much sorrier state than their deductive counter-
parts. However, for the purposes of this discussion, we
can assume that these principles will have been worked out
in the Carnapian millenium.
This approach is interestingly different from all
those previously discussed in this chapter in at least one
important respect: The justification of inductive inference
is in principle no different from the justification of de-
ductive inference. In this sense there is no "problem" of
induction per se . Put another way, there is a Problem of
Deduction in the same sense that there is a Problem of
Induction. In principle, there is no significant difference
between the two. The systematic unity that this approach
would bestow on epistemological tlieory is significant and
impressive. Before accepting it, however, a closer scrutiny
10 Ibid., p . 64
230
of it seems called for.
In particular, there seeni to be two
that can be asked of Goodman
:
a) Is the above a correct description ofof deductive inference?




The motivation for Goodman's way of proceeding is clear and
reasonable enough— the logical and epistemological issues
surrounding deductive inference are much better understood
and less in dispute than correlative issues surrounding in-
ductive inference. If the two problems are essentially
the same, a close examination of the relevant aspects of
deductive inference will suggest an answer to our queries
about inductive inference.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Goodman
has accurately characterized the process involved in the
justification of deductive inference. It is reasonably
clear that the process being described here is what Carnap
has called expl ication .
A
brief review of the nature of
Explication has been and is widely employed by philosophers.
I have chosen to state and evaluate Goodman's argument in
terms of this concept as specified by Carnap (see Logical
Foundations of Probability
, Chapter 1) because he has
developed the notion in greater detail and with more pre-
cision than other theorists. Goodman's esoteric and technical
variant--constructional def inition--i s apparently not
applicable here, since he luis made no attempt to apply it to
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that process would 1)g in order here.
An explication involves the replacement of a commonly
employed, but vague or obscure concept (the explicandum) by
a clear and precise one (the explicatum)
. The two concepts
are distinct because they are not co-extensional . Prelimin-
ary to the actual explication, one must provide an informal
clarification and explanation of the nature and functions
of the explicandum. This includes a specification of certain
contexts in which the use of the explicandum is clear and
unproblematic; it also includes a description of the purposes
for which the concept is used. Finally, in this preliminary
stage, one gives rough synonyms for the term that customarily
expresses the explicandum (or perhaps rough characterizations
of meaning)
, which while often as vague as the explicandum,
serve to indicate what concept is under discussion.
If the explicandum cannot be clarified in this pre-
liminary way, then it is not really a candidate for
explication after all because it is too obscure to be of
any value (for Carnap's Scientific Philosophy, anyway.').
Assuming that this task is successfully completed, the next
step is the actual explication wherein the explicatum is
proposed
.
the issue at hand. As will become apparent, the features
of explication upon which my objections depend are common
to the less precise and exacting concepts of explication
that others, including Goodman, employ.
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The justification of an explication is a complex affair;
we need not consider all the details of this task here. The
important thing for present purposes is that there must be
a considerable overlap in the explicandum and the explicatum.
A systematic deviation of the extensions of the concepts is
permissible only if it is theoretically fruitful. In
particular, the explicatum must apply to all, or nearly all,
of the things to which the explicandum clearly and unam-
biguously applies; that is, one must be able to substitute,
verita^, the explicatum for the explicandum in certain
favored (extensional) contexts. These will include, but may
not be limited to, the contexts specified in the preliminary
clarification
.
How does all of this relate to inductive inference?
Presumably, the explicandum is the concept of a strong in-
ductive inference or argument. Since the rules for the appli-
cation of the explicandum are not clear and well-specified,
an explication seems appropriate. One of the interesting
features of Goodman's proposal is that it tells us, in a
general way, how to arrive at the explicatum, viz . by a
mutual adjustment between the rules (such as they are) and
the favored contexts of the explicandum. There are rules
for the correct use of explicandum though they may be few and
ill-specified. They can be discovered by tentative abstrac-
tion from a number of clear and obviously related cases.
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These instructions for producing the explicutum should not
be confused with its justification. Goodman has not justi-
fied a yet-to-be-produced explicatum; he has, however, told
us something about how to construct one. If the explicatum
IS justified, then it will preserve truth value in favored
contexts (with perhaps some systematic deviation) . Though
this is a necessary condition for a successful explication,
it is not a sufficiont ono.
Aside from preserving truth value in favored contexts,
a (justified) explicatum can serve most of the important
purposes for which the explicandum was used; it is also
theoretically fruitful in that it makes possible the con-
struction of a simple yet systematic theory (in this case an
epistemological theory) that can account for a wide range
of phenomena. Admittedly, this description of what consti-
tutes a successful explication is somewhat vague, but it is
serviceable enough for present purposes. The important point
IS that Goodman's description of the v;ay the explicatum is
to be produced is not open to a charge of circularity. The
actual justification of the explicatum can only be completed
when the explicatum is produced (Embarrassingly, it has
yet to be found I) .
Unfortunately, this procedure is open to a deeper and
more fundamental charge of begging the question. Consider
the position of our l^enighted sceptic. Ilis question, which
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will arise at the preliminary clarification stage, is, 'Are
there any strong inductive argument s? ' ^2 He wants to know
If the explicandum has a non-empty extension. it is not
helpful or reassuring to answer this by merely assert-
ing that there are such arguments (i.e. by reciting favored
contexts) . He will need an argument^^ to show that there
are some strong inductive arguments. By the very nature of
his task, one who is in the process of constructing an
explication (which, after all, is what Goodman is up to) is
not meeting this demand. Explications are of value only to
those duplicitous souls who believe that the explicandum
has a non-empty extension. Put another way, explications
are useful and indeed necessary, but (in the face of sceptical
doubts) only when it has been established that the explican-
dum has a non-empty extension.
What might Goodman say about this objection? Goodman
suggests!'^ that a quick appeal to the usage of the explican-
dum would show that this objection is completely spurious.
12The relation of this form of inductive scepticism to the
inductive scepticism considered in Chapter III is by no
means obvious. I shall discuss this relation below.
13
I use 'argument' here in a somewhat loose sense to mean
roughly 'some (rational) considerations'. Indeed, I shall
later argue that one must just "see" that there are some
strong inductive arguments. However, that this is true
needs some discussion and argument.
14
Nelson Goodman, op. c^.
, p. 66.
2 3 5
Let us consider a parallel case to see how this would work.
Suppose someone proposes to explicate the concept Tree. it
has many clear and uncontroversial applications and yet is
fuzzy enough so that an explication could be carried out.
Suppose an explicator is confronted by an "arboreal sceptic"
who IS in doubt about whether or not the concept has a non-
empty extension. I suppose the former would suspect that
this alleged sceptic does not really understand the meaning
of the word 'tree'. Perhaps he believes that the term 'tree'
means the same thing as 'tree within which elves live'.
This is where the preliminary clarification becomes very
important. The explicator gives a rough and perhaps impre-
cise characterization of the mean ing of the term 'tree';
suppose the aboreal sceptic clearly indicates (perhaps by
giving rough synonyms himself) that he is "onto the concept".
Is it still meaningful for him to guestion the non—nullity
of the extension of the concept?
This question is of considerable importance, but I
think there can be no doubt about the answer. It is
meaningful for him to ask the question. The reason for this
is that it is possible and indeed quite easy to give him a
satisfactory reply. VJhat would this reply be? It would not,
as Goodman suggests, be an appeal to the common usage of the
term. T)ie truth of the statements containing the favored
contexts is just what is at issue. Ratlier, the reply would
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be an empirical argument to show that there are trees. One
would show him a tree and demonstrate that what he sees is
not artificial; that he is not hallucinating, etc. (we can
assume that he subscribes to the canons of scientific in-
ference, etc.; otherwise, he would not be an arboreal sceptic.)
Why he would ask such a question is somewhat mysterious
—
perhaps he has lived all his life on the moon, or he is
almost incredibly stupid or suspicious. However, that is of
no moment here. The important point is that an appeal to
common usage is not to the point here (unless one loudly
proclaims and proceeds to demonstrate that the favored
context statements are true ) ; what is necessary is an appeal
to the (non-linguistic) facts.
With regard to the explication of the concept of a
strong inductive argument, a similar situation obtains. It
IS of no value to tell the inductive sceptic how people use
the term 'strong inductive argument'. In addition, merely
producing for him (what one believes to be) a strong inductive
argument is, by itself, unhelpful. One must show (in some
manner) that there are such things.
Of course, there are some disanalogies here, too. No
straightforward empirical argument can establish that there
are strong inductive arguments. Aside from the fact that
such arguments are "on the block" in this discussion, it is
doubtful that this kind of argument would be appropriate
here anyway.
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The fatal flaw in Goodman's argument is that ho pays
too much attention to how people in fact behave. Since the
class of accepted inferences and the class of accepted rules
are fixed by a mutual adjustment process fueled by our pre-
analytic belief, it is ruled out from the start that we could
be seriously mistaken about both. Since the concept of jus-
tification is an objective one, it seems to be an open
question as to whether or not we are seriously mistaken
about what (if any) arguments are inductively strong. This
is where the sceptic offers his challenge; he wants to know
if there are any such arguments. Goodman's failure to answer
this challenge can be correctly characterized as begging
the question against the sceptic.
Even if this objection could be avoided, there is
another problem with this approach. Over a period of time,
the actual criteria for what constitutes a strong inductive
argument could drasticall.y change. What was once a strong
inductive argument may later be a weak one (Note that this
is not merely a claim about what people believe to be a strong
or weak inductive argument.) All that would be required is
a change in word usage and perhaps certain beliefs. Now I
suspect that Goodman would not be too troubled by this. But
he oug)it to bo.
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Pragmatists such as Goodman, Quine and White have argued
against the distinction between contingent and necessary
truths. The concepts of necessary truth and contingent
truths presuppose a clear and sharp distinction which does
not in fact obtain. However, matters are not this simple,
say the Pragmatists. The relevant concept is "give-upability
"
Some beliefs are (and ought to be) more easily given up
than others, though any belief can, in principle, be abandoned
The rules of evidence are not inalterable fixtures of the
world that cannot be revised. The course of nature might
change dramatically; not only would we have to give ud
previously well-founded empirical beliefs, but we may have
up some previously useful (but no longer so) rules
of evidence as well.
While it may be that a dramatic change in the course of
nature would lead to a change in the rules of evidence (this
is not at all obvious)
, one could imagine the relinquishment
of these rules for other than the kind of epistemological
reasons envisioned by Goodman and his colleagues. Consider
the case of the People's Revolutionary Epistemology Brigade.
This is a very powerful group who wants to change the way
that science is done to conform to the goals of the Gang
of Four. By making certain key changes in textbooks and by
encouraging scientists to undergo appropriate "self-
criticism", they are able to alter perceptibly word usage
and scientists' beliefs so that what counts as a strong
inductive argument includes some obviously weak arguments.
The change need not be so fundamental that the fact of
scientific thought is unrecognizably altered; nonetheless,
when senior members of the P.R.E.B. explicate the concept
of a strong inductive argument, many obviously worthless
arguments become sanctioned. Any reason for not adopting
this course (e.g. the subsequent lack of theoretical
simplicity) can be seen as just another belief that ought
to be given, up.
These considerations show that any attempt to explicate
the concept of a strong inductive argument requires, at the
earliest stage, an argument that shows that there are some
strong inductive arguments. This argument will require
something more than or different from mere appeals to people'
beliefs and their usage of the appropriate words.
These objections suggest that perhaps Goodman's
characterization of the justification of deductive inference
is also incorrect. Indeed, I think a case for that can be
made. Goodman says that an argument is judged to be de-
ductively valid if it conforms to a rule that more or less
accurately codifies accepted deductive practice. Again, the
process involved here is clearly one of explication. Indeed,
it could be plausibly argued that Aristotle made the first
attempt to carry out this explication and that Frege (in the
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M£2£iff^c2-ir^) brought it to final fruition.
Now it might be objected that no sceptic can seriously
doubt that there are deductively valid arguments. Thus there
are no steps that need to be taken for the sceptic's benefit
prior to the preliminary clarification of the explicandum.
This in turn would cast doubt on whether or not such doubts
can be seriously maintained about the existence of strong
inductive arguments. This appears to be a significant ob-
jection. If this objection can be successfully met, however,
Goodman's characterization of the justification of deductive
inference can be rejected, and the cloud of suspicion hanging
over the foregoing objection to his account of the justifi-
cation of inductive inference can also be removed. These
tasks are the burden of the fourth view on the epistemic
legitimacy of inductive inference that I shall discuss.
The primary task will be to show that there are independent
arguments that can establish the fact that there are deduc-
tively valid arguments and the fact that there are inductively
strong arguments.
I






I have argued that, during the prelimiiiary clarification
i
I
of a given explicandum, one needs (in the face of sceptical
j
doubts) an independent argument to establisli the fact that
I
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there are things to which the oxplicandum applies. As a
matter of historical fact, fewer sceptical doubts have been
entertained about deductive inference than have been enter-
tained about inductive inference. It would be helpful,
however, to see just how such doubts could be mot.
Let us employ a common tactic used by Quine: let us
look at how deductive logic is learned. What appears to go
on in this process can be seen as a explication; one is con-
fronted with an adolescent or adult of normal intelligence
and reasoning capabilities. The goal is to teach him or her
a system of formal logic that is roughly based on Frege's
Beg^riffschrift
. One starts with an informal explanation
of the concept of a conclusion "following from" some
premises. In addition to giving some examples, one points
out that, when a conclusion follows from the premises, the
truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.
That is, necessarily, if the premises are assumed to be true,
then the conclusion is also true. Suppose that the student
accepts this informal clarification but demurs about the
examples. This is not so far-fetched as it might seem; this
individual may have just completed many years of study in a
progressive school of Education and as a result of some
study of cultural anthropology, he or she may be in some
doubt about whether there are any valid arguments. However,
the student can understand the meaning of the term 'deductively
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valid argument
; he or she is just in doubt about whether
or not there is anything answering to the concept. (The
student need not maintain that there are no such things.)
How does the teacher proceed? Obviously, with great
patience and with every effort to suppress contempt. The
best strategy would seem to be this: The teacher concen-
trates on one example of a valid argument that is as trans-
parent as possible. Many instructors start with instances
of mo^ Pon^ or modus tollens
, but with the deductively
dim-witted, an even simpler example would probably be
better
, e . g .
:
A- (1) This is a ball.
(2) That is a hat.
.*.(3) This is a ball and that is a hat.
The instructor points to this example and asserts, in as
many ways as possible (using terms invoked in the preliminary
clarification) that this is a valid argument. The instructor
will ask the student the following kind of question: "Do
you see that if the premises are true the conclusion must
be true?" One might regard a negative answer here as a good
reason to believe (barring the intrusion of emotional factors
or evidence of drug intoxication, etc.) that the person did
not really understand the concept of validity after all.







The fundamental insight here is that our knowledge of
deductive and inductive relations is on the same footing.
However, what Carnap means by the word 'intuition' is sig-
nificantly different from the sense that I attach to it. I
should now like to clarify these two senses and show that,
on Carnap's construal, this appeal to intuition does not
defeat the sceptic but that my construal shows that scep-
ticism is untenable.
The term intuition' as it is commonly employed in
contemporary philosophy, means roughly the same thing as
'firmly held pre-analytic belief or 'firmly held pre-
systematic belief '.15 on this construal, an important
philosophical task is to sharpen and systematize some
theoretically significant group of intuitions. Explication
Rudolf Carnap, "Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition" in
The Problem of Inductive Logic : Proceedings of the In-
ternational Colloquim In the Philosophy of Science,
ed. by I. Lakatos (North Holland Publishing Co.,
Amsterdam, Holland), p. 265.
^^It may be thought that these synonyms are too weak in that
intuitions are known and not merely believed. However,
while many intuitions may be known, not all of them are.
The reason for this is that the development of a powerful
and systematic philosophical theory, either by means of
analysis or explication, may show us that some intuitions
are just mistaken. We are (and ought to be) willing to
relinquish these intuitions for tlie same reasons that
established scientific theories are given up, viz., a
better theory can take its place.
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and perhaps analysis are the most important tools for accom-
plishing this task. Now, an important feature of explica-
tion is that it allows us to deviate from at least some of
our intuitions in the following sense: An explicatum may
not be (truly) attributable to a thing which, intuitively
(and clearly) the explicandura is (and vice-versa)
. Thus the
explicandum designated by the term 'Pish' is intuitively at-
tributable to whales and dolphins, but the explicatum de-
signated by the term 'Pish' (member of the class Pisces)
is not so attributable. Systematic deviations of this sort
are justified on grounds of theoretical fruitfulness and
simplicitly that the explicatum (and the conceptual network
into which it fits) provides. The point is that the theory
can force us to give up some of our intuitive beliefs as
mistaken. It is for this reason that one can correctly say
that whales really are not fish. If it is objected that
questions of truth and falsehood are not really at stake
here, it is easy to point to other kinds of situations v/hich
we are willing to maintain that some intuitive beliefs are
false (e.g. the Axiom of Specification in Set Theory).
It may happeii that we have intuitive beliefs that lead to
contradiction or imply the denial of beliefs that we are
unwilling to reject (the latter may not be intuitive) . The
pojnt is that, on the basis of custom^u^y ph.ilosophical usage,
an intuitive belief can be mistaken or false.
I;
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On the other eonetrual
, this is logically impossible.
If a given individual intuits a proposition at a given time,
then that proposition is a necessary truth; intuitions are,
in this sense, something akin to Cartesian clear and distinct
Ideas. Such beliefs are the result of an immediate intel-
lectual apprehension of their objects. This appears to be
and IS in fact flaming rationalism.' And, as Carnap might
say, my empiricist friends might here demur. This view does
not require that there is a "faculty" of intuition, any more
than the existence of memories requires a "faculty" of
memory. in fact, as I shall later argue, it is only a
contingent fact that the mind intuits certain truths. The
main arguments against- the existence of intuitions concern
their alleged variability and their irreducibly subjective
character. I shall consider some of these arguments shortly.
First, I should like to show that, on Carnap's construal of
the sense of 'intuition', the sceptic's challenge cannot be
successfully met; I shall later argue that on my construal,
this challenge can be met.
lo avoid confusion, hereafter I shall use the term 'pre-
systematic belief to designate Carnap's construal of the
meaning of the term 'intuition'; the term 'intuition' will
be retained for my sense of the term.
Carnap is really in exactly the same position as Goodman.
The sceptic can claim that he is uncertain and has suspended
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belief about the propositions that the cxplicatior has claimed
are obviously true from a pro-systematic point of view.
Carnap's response to this kind of challenge goes one step
further than Goodman’s: Carnap asserts that he must conclude
that the sceptic is inductively blind. 17 (who is supposing
the existence of faculties here?) The sceptic is excused
from the room, and Carnap continues his lecture for the
benefit of his sighted colleagues. The problem is that
Carnap has not really met the sceptic's challenge.
Actually, there are two forms of scepticism about induction:
The "substantive sceptic" says that there are no strong
inductive arguments. The other kind of sceptic suspends belief
about both this proposition and its denial. The problem with
Carnap's position is that nowhere has he asserted that sub-
stantive scepticism is false . A simple appeal to pre-
1 7Rudolf Carnap, "Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition",
op. cit . , p. 265.
1
8
Professor Heidelberger has suggested to me that Carnap's
appeal to intuition may not be designed to justify in-
ductive beliefs but, rather, to explain how we know. This,
of course, assumes that we ^ know. By reading Carnap in
this manne.r, it is possible to absolve him of the charge of
failing to meet the sceptic's challenge but only because, in
the present article, he was not trying to meet that
challenge. Whether or not he should be read that way here
is not too important. A check of his relevant writings
reveals no other place where he comes as close to addressing




beliefs and word usage fails to show that th
because our pre-systema tic beliefs could bo
i s
false, and the sceptic wants to know whether or not they
are, or he believes that they are in fact false. If it
could be shown that substantive scepticism is false, then not
only would that position be untenable, but the sceptic who
suspends belief would have to retract his sceptical challenge.
As a guiding thread, let us return to the case of the
deductive sceptic. He has a fairly clear idea of what a
deductively valid argument is but is unsure whether or not
there are any valid arguments. After much patient explana-
tion, however, he comes to see that (e.g.) Argument A (p. 242)
is valid. That is, he intuits the proposition that argument
A is valid. By this act of intuition, then, he comes to know
a certain proposition. Since he knov;s that a certain argu-
ment is deductively valid, he can no longer suspend belief





There are five objections to this refutation of this
form of deductive scepticism. One objection is that it has
not been shown that wliat is here called an .intuit.i.on is a
19
In general, if S knows p and p entails q, one cannot con-
clude that S knows q. However, in this case p= Argument A
is valid and q= There are some deductively valid arguments.
The entailment is so obvious and transparent (an instance of
Existential Generalization) that it seems acceptable to say
that S knov;s q hero.
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form of knowledge. 20 Another objection is that it begs the
very question at issue. A related objection is tliis: That
the sceptic goes along here seems to be an empirical claim.
How can one be certain that he will assent to this? The
fourth objection is that it has not been shown that the
sceptic, upon "conversion", has had a genuine intuition and
not merely a psychologically necessitated belief. Finally,
the irreducibly subjective and private nature of what one
claims to be an intuition seems to be a suspicious foundation
for the systematic construction of an objective system of
deductive logic. More specifically, how can one be certain
that what one claims to be an intuition is in fact intuition?
I shall consid.Gir ©ach of thos© in turn.
It has b©©n point©d out to m© that, ©v©n if th© sc©ptic
go©s along her©, it has not been shown that he has come to
kr^ that Argument A is valid. That is, it has not been
shown that what I have called 'intuition' is a form of
knowledge. A satisfactory response to this objection would
require an elaboration and defense of a theory of (logical)
intuition as an adequate account of our knowledge of logical
truths. Even though the solution to the Problem of Induction
proposed herein requires it, it would go far beyond the scope
of what can be accomplished in this dissertation to give an




adequate account of this theory and its defence. it is
important to note, however, that this objection does not
d^^t this proposal; it only shows that more is needed to
establish it than is provided here. Indeed, there is another
such "gap" in my proposal (see pps. 251 ff)
;
at the end of
this chapter I shall offer some considerations to show that
these "gaps" are actually healthy signs.
Let us return to the other objections outlined above.
Suppose a sceptic fails to go along here and claims that we
are asking him to assume what is to be proved, viz. that
there are deductively valid arguments. I do not think that
this objection can be sustained for the following reason:
That some argument or other is deductively valid is not open
to proof in one important sense: A proof of the validity of,
say, argument A would be a demonstration that the conditional
whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and whose
consequent is the conclusion is a theorem of some axiomatic
system which includes axioms and rules of transformation,
however, an axiomatic system of this sort that comprises the
propositional calculus is really the support machinery that
is offered in the course of giving an explication of the con-
cept of validity. At this stage, the explicatum is not yet
available because we are only at the preliminary clarification
(which, in this case, includes the assuaging of sceptical
doubts) of the explicandum. The sceptic who argues that we
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are begging the question is asking for proof where proof is,
at this stage, in principle unattainable.
With regard to the third objection, if the sceptic under
stands the pre-systematic (i.e. unexplicated) sense of the
term 'deductively valid argument' and understands, with
respect to one or another of a small group of obviously valid
arguments the proposition that such an argument is valid,
then it is impossible for him not to be di sposed to believers
(occurrently) that proposition. This is not an empirical
claim. Obviously, however, this presupposes a certain theory
about the nature of belief. A full elaboration and defense
of that theory would clinch this argument. Unfortunately, i
21Argumen'Ls that have the following logical
included in this list:
form would be
(1) A B. (1) A & B
(2) B . • . (2) A
• * . ( 3 ) A and B
C. (1)
. •
. ( 2 )
A
A or B










(1) If A then B
(2) Not-B
(3) Not-A
This list may not be exhaustive. Also, my claim is not that
any argument of one of these forms would be recognized as
valid; rather, it is that some instance of one of these
argument-forms would be recognized as valid. The reason for
this is the fact that validity is a matter of logical form
is not immediately obvious. It seems that someone could
"grasp" the concept of validity without being explicitly
and clearly aware of this fact.
Hereafter, I shall, following Hume, use the term 'believe'
in its occurrent rather than its dis[)ositi oncal sense. When
it is necessary to speak of belief dispos it ional ].y , I shall
use expressions such as 'disposition to believe'.
r
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do not have such a theory. Nonetheless, this assertion need
not stand completely naked and undefended (or at least it
need not stand naked and undefended alone !) because there
are some analogous cases that seem a little clearer. Now
it seems clear that the relation between two dispositions
to believe need not always be contingent. That Jones is
disposed to believe that Smith is a brother entails that he
IS disposed to believe that Smith is male. That this is
true does not follow from the mere fact that one proposition
entails the other; it is something about the obviousness of
the entailment that makes it true. At this time, I do not
know how to make this relation clearer and more precise.
However, the relation under discussion is not between
two dispositions to believe
; rather what is related is
understanding a proposition (the proposition that a certain
argument is valid) and being disposed to believe somethina
(the same proposition) . Are there any cases of this that
are clearer than the one under discussion? Suppose that
Jones understands the proposition that Smith is a brother.
It seems clear that Smith is disposed to believe that, if
Jones is a brother, then he is male. Thus, his understanding
a proposition entails his being disposed to believe a propo-
sition.
However, they are not the same proposition. Are there
any clear cases of this? Well, T suppose some obvious
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Identities or tautologies would qualify here. if jonos
understands the proposition that this table is identical to
this table, then ho is disposed to believe it. Perhaps
instances of the Law of Non-Contradiction or the Law of
Excluded Middle would also be of this sort.
Obviously, these examples don't constitute much of an
argument for the assertion made on page 251. However, the
last of these examples does suggest the outlines of an
appropriate argument. Consider some simple and obviously
tautology such as 'The moon is identical to the moon'. if
I am correct, then it is impossible that someone understands
tills proposition and yet is not disposed to assent to it.
Serious scepticism about such propositions, then, is in
principle impossible. But, if it is not even possible that
human beings disbelieve a proposition, it is not at all clear
how sense can be made out of saying that this statement
— b^ false. For there to a difference between what we
believe to be the case and what is true, it must somehow make
a difference.
Although this line of defense is surely contentious, it
does, nonetheless, have a certain measure of "initial rational
credibility". Of course, even if this is correct, it only
shows that such beliefs are true and not that they are known
to bo true. That such intuitions constitute knowledge needs
further argument (see p. 250).
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The fourth objection is that it has not been shown that
the belief that the sceptic comes to have is a genuine intu-
ition and not merely a psychologically necessitated belief.
A key logical feature of intuitions (their phenomenological
features are unclear to me, anyway, perhaps because they last
for such a brief period of time!) is the immediacy with which
their objects are apprehended and believed. Now, it may be
that there are a number of things that humans as a matter of
fact are disposed to believe immediately and without argu-
ment. However, it is at least logically possible that some-
one understand one of these propositions (e.g. This is a
tree) and yet is not d isposed to assent to it. It may be, as
Hume has argued, that humans cannot in fact fail to be dis-
posed to believe certain empirical propositions. But scepti-
cism about those propositions is "theoretically" if not in
fact (natural law) possible. Scepticism about the validity
of certain simple arguments is not even ".in theory" possible
for someone who understands the meaning of certain terms.
Yet, this seems to render impossible a view (deductive
scepticism) that has just been given serious and careful
attention.' How is this so? This paradox is resolved by
distinguishing occurrent from dispositional belief. It is
impossible for someone who understands the meaning of the
appropriate logical terms not to believe tlie proposition
that Argument A (or one of the other simple valid arguments)
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IS a valid argument, in the dispositional s
But the disposition, through the "irruption
ense of 'believe',
of other causes"
(e.g. emotional factors, a pig-headed penchant for scepticism,
etc.) may not be activated. In this sense it can be said
that deductive scepticism can be maintained (to paraphrase
Hume) in words only.
It might be objected that this distinction is problema-
tical because there is no real difference between the reso-
lution of (specious) sceptical doubts about deduction and
certain )cinds of empirical doubts (e.g. arboreal scepticism).
In both cases the sceptic refuses to assent to certain asser-
tions and in both oases his sceptical doubts can be easily
overcome almost ostensively (This is an empirical claim.).
Can the difference be specified in a non-question begging way?
Let us return to the case of the arboreal sceptic. He
may, when shown a tree, immediately and without argument
assent to the assertion that there are trees (or that that
particular thing is a tree) . However, if he does not go
along here, one need not conclude that he does not understand
the meaning of the term 'Tree'. The reason for this is that
it is possible to produce an argument to show him that there
are trees. (If it is impossible for him not to be disposed
to assent then , this may show that inductive scepticism is
also untenable; but that is another story.)
The situation is quite different with respect to someone
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who claims to be in doubt about deductively valid arguments.
After showing him certain simple examples, if he does not go
along, there is no (rationally persuasive) argument to
convince him. One ought to conclude that one (or more) of
three things are true: (a) that he did not understand the
meaning of the terms after all; (b) that the examples were
not simple or obvious enough; or, (c) other factors (e.g.
emotional ones) have prevented the disposition from being
activated. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish intui-
tion from psychologically necessitated belief.
It is also possible to distinguish intuitable proposi-
tions from necessary truths that are not intuitable. Con-
sider Goldbach's Conjecture. It is possible (and indeed
it is as a m.atter of fact true that) one can understand both
Goldbach's Conjecture and its denial without being disposed
to assent to either.
The fifth objection is that the irreducibly private and
subjective nature of what one claims to be an intuition
seems to make it publicly unavailable for the systematic
and objective construction of an explication of deductive
validity. Furthermore, how can one be certain that what one
claims to be an intuition is in fact an intuition? The
2 3 ...Unless, of course, one includes in the specification of
the "initial conditions" necessary for the activation of
the belief, a clear and detailed specification of the
proof of Goldbach's Conjecture or its denial.
I
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theory espoused here provides answers to both of these queries.
If this view IS correct, then each and every person (who
understands the language) is capable of "seeing" the truth
of one or another intuitable propositions. Let me extend
an invitation to the reader to see for himself or herself
that Argument A on page 242 is valid. The truth of such pro-
positions is open to immediate public inspection. This points
to the correct answer to the second question. It is impor-
tant to distinguish the following propositions:
(1) Argument A is valid.
(2) S intuits that argument A is valid.
Statement (1) is a necessary truth that can be known immed-
iately and with certainty. Statement (2), on the other hand,
is an empirical proposition and is conceivably false. Even
though (1) may be knowable intuitively, S may not actually
have had an intuition. He may just have a firmly held pre-
systematic belief. Such beliefs are often insidiously im-
planted in the course of one's philosophical education. I
suspect (but am not sure) that intuitions are phenomenologically
similar to pre-systematic beliefs. This might explain, by
the way, that the distinction between pre-systematic beliefs
and genuine intuitions is often blurred.
A proper argument for (2) would be an empirical argument
which cippeals to (among other things) certain phenomenological
features of S's experience at a given time. Tlie point is
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that, while one can be sure of the truth of what is in tact
intuited, one cannot be certain that one is having or has
had an intuition. It would be unreasonable to demand that,
in order to know that argument A is valid, one must know
that one is having an intuition because it is unreasonable
to demand that one must know that one knows.
The distinction between (.1) and (2) allows us to retain
a valuable insight of the Quine-Goodman approach to these
matters. They maintain that any belief is subject to revision
or retraction. In one sense this is true and in another
sense this is false. No proposition that is actually intui-
ted ought to be given up. However, from our point of view,
we cannot be certain about what is actually intuited and what
is not. Thus, from a practical point of view, any belief is
subject to v/ithdrawal or revision.
On what grounds should one be willing to give ud a
proposition such as (2)? Consider the original set theoretic
axiom of class abstraction. One might think that it can be
intuited that, for any property P, there exists a set
{x/x is P}. The Russell Paradox shows through a series of
^ t steps that a contradiction can be derived from
this axiom. The reason that one in fact gives up the axiom
and not one of the self-evident steps that leads to the con-
tradiction is that all of the latter are such that one is
more certain that they are intuited tlian one is about the
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original claim that the Axiom of Specification is intuited.
The reason that one ought to give up this axiom is that the
derivation of the contradiction is valid. And in fact the
Axiom of Specification is not intuited becau.se it is possible
(and indeed it actually happens after one sees the deriva-
tion of the contradiction) that one understands the axiom
without being dispose)^ to assent to it.
These considerations render harmless a number of objections
raised against intuitions on grounds of their alleged varia-
bility. Where one man claims to have an intuition, another
may demur. There are two possible explanations for this.
Either the first person did not really have an intuition at
all (it may be merely a firmly-held presystematic belief)
or the one who demurs really is disposed to intuit the propo-
sition, but the disposition has not been activated (perhaps
because of a general penchant for scepticism) . The fact is
that, under the appropriate conditions (what those conditions
are, by the way, is an empirical matter) everyone who
understands the appropriate terms immediately and without
need of argument assents to an intuitable proposition. What
people believe be be an intuitable proposition varies, as
might be expected. As noted previously, one explanation for
this might be that the phenomenological features of intuition
may be quite similar to those of a firmly held pre-systematic
belief.
This completes the refutation of this form of deductive
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scepticism. .here may to other forms of deductive scepticism,
but 1 hove argued that when one claims to understand what a
deductively valid argument is, one cannot fail to be disposed
to believe occurrently that there are such arguments. Thus
It can be said that this form of deductive scepticism is
literally untenable.
Let us now turn to a consideration of inductive scepti-
cism. Suppose that one is going to explicate the concept
of a strong inductive argument. What happens in the prelim-
inary clarification stage and how can a sceptical challenge
be met here?
As a rough characterization of the meaning of the term
'strong inductive argument', consider the following (equivalent)
Statements
:
a) An argument is inductively strong just in case the
truth of the premises renders highly probable or
likely the truth of conclusion.
b) An argument is inductively strong just in case it
is highly improbable that the conclusion is false,
given that the premises are true.
What is the sense of the term 'probable' here? I
think that the most appropriate way to understand this rela-
tion is to view it as a degree of entailment.
It is a logical relation between the premises and
conclusion of certain arguments. This is essentially
Carnap's view. Just exactly what this means and why it is
2G1
true is unclear to mo at this time.^^ difficulty
involved here is that, at this stage of the exposition,
what is at stake is only a preliminary clarification of the
explicandum. How mud, clarification and argument can be
required here is by no means obvious. It seems to me, any-
way, that the basic concept is "there" and is not so hope-
lessly obscure that it cannot be explicated. It is, of
course, another question whether or not anything answers
to that concept. There are, however, two features of the
concept of inductive strength (as I understand the term)
that suggest that it is a logical relation (like validity)
that actually does obtain between the premises and conclusion
of some invali(3 arguments.
One thing that suggests that in(ductive strength, like
deductive validity, is a logical relation is the fact that
inductive strength, like deductive validity is independent
of the actual truth value of the premises. In both cases
one assumes that the premises are true and then asks whether
it is possible (probable) that the conclusion is false.
Another reason for this is that there is no way to
argue for the claim that a given argument is inductively
The apparent obscurities involved in the exact nature of
the explicandum were pointed out to me by Professors
Aune and Feldman.
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strong without a well-dofinod conceptual network that arises
with the completion of the explicatum. of course one ma_y be
able to argue on a pre-explicative level that a given argu-
ment is inductively strong by showing that it is analogous
in certain ways to some other argument which is known inde-
pendently to be inductively strong. This only postpones the
need for an intuitive judgment. m any event, (just as in
the case of deductively valid arguments) one must, at some
point, intuit that a given example of an inductively strong
argument is in fact inductively strong. If an alleged sceptic
demurs about a number of simple and obvious examples but
claims to understand the concept, one must conclude that the
examples were not simple or obvious enough or that the alleged
sceptic does not really understand the meaning of the term
inductively strong argument', or he is very upset and con-
fused
.
Thus inductive scepticism is as untenable as deductive
scepticism. However, it is not at all clear that this shows
that the form of inductive scepticism considered in Chapter III
is false. Recall that this form of scepticism involved a
statement about the rational credibility or conclusiveness
of arguments, viz.
(iii) The degree of conclusiveness of all predictive-
inductive inferences with the Scime conclusion
(caJ.l it'c') is the same as the degree of con-
clusivencss of that argument (whose conclusion
is c) which has only a tautoloqical premise.
2G3
In order for the foregoing discussion to be of any
value here, there must be a theoretically fruitful relation
between the logical concept of inductive strength and the
epistemic concept of degree of conclusiveness. It must be
shown that there is a comparative inequality with respect
to the inductive strength of two predictive-inductive in-
ferences and that this comparative inequality entails a
corresponding comparative inequality with respect to the
respective degrees of conclusiveness of the arguments.
Recall that the degree of conclusiveness of an argument
IS a measure of the degree of belief that a completely
rational inferrer would have in the conclusion of an argu-
ment given that he has a full and entire belief in the premises
and that his belief in the conclusion is influenced only
by his belief in the premises. Stove believes that the
degree of conclusiveness of an argument is identical to the
^^9 ^
1
relation that I have called inductive strength and
that Carnap has called logical probability. I have
pointed out that this identity is by no means obvious and
that Carnap has abandoned it. I now believe that there are
some good reasons to think that this identity does not obtain
but that there is an obvious and important relation between
the two.
One problem with identifying the logical relation of
inductive strength and rational credibility arises in connec-
2G4
tion with the following two arguments.
I. (1) Many reputable textbooks in set theory assert inthe pref^^ce that they contain a proof of the
logical independence of the Axiom of Choice of
the other axioms of set theory.
(2) Prof. Michael Jubien, a respected and acute
logician, has told me that the Axiom of Choice is
logically independent of the other axioms of set
theory
.
(3) Prof. Terry Parsons, another respected and acute
logician, has told me that the Axiom of Choice
is logically independent of the other axioms of
set theory.
(4) Both Professors Jubien and Parsons have told me
that they have worked through the proof, and they
assure me that they are not joking or lying.
Therefore
(5) The Axiom of Choice is logically independent of
the other axioms of set theory.
II. (!':
) Madame Blavatsky asserts that her crystal ball
tells her that the Axiom of Choice is logically
independent of the other axioms of set theory.
There fore
(5) The Axiom of Choice is logically independent of
the other axioms of set theory.
To be perfectly frank, Argument I virtually exhausts my
relevant information about the independence of the Axiom of
Choice
.
Argument II might be offered by a gypsy logician.
One interesting feature of these arguments is that they
are both valid! Any proposition or set of propositions
entails a necessary truth; since the conclusion of these
arguments is a necessary truth, (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) entail
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(5) , as does (1
' )
.
What of the completely rational inferrer? Since he
never makes any mistakes in reasoning, he would never believe
that either of these arguments is anything but valid.
However, this concept of an idealized inferrer becomes
epistemologically unhelpful and perhaps useless because one
cannot express what appears to be an important epistemological
distinction in terms of it. In fact, it seems that an
Idealized rational being would make a distinction here;
from an epistemic point of view. Argument I is a strong one
;
Argument II is weak. It seems that, for the completely
rational inferrer, his degree of belief in the conclusion
based on Argument I would be greater than his degree of belief
in the conclusion based on Argument II and that in both cases
his degree of belief in the conclusion would be less than
his degree of belief in the premises.
The point of all this is that it does not appear that
the logical relation beyween the premises and the conclusion
is identical to the rational credibility of the conclusion,
based on the premises and that there is more to the measure
of epistemic warrant than strictly logical relations (or
perhaps the logical relations with wliich we are familiar) .
On the other hand, it seems that, if someone intuits
that a certain logical relation obtains between the premises
and conclusion of an argument, then his measure of epistemic
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warrant is measured by this logical relation. Under these
circumstances (assuming that his belief in the conclusion
is influenced only by his belief in the premises and this
intuition (or perhaps his disposition to have this intui-
tion)
) , the person is being completely rational and his
measure of epistemic warrant is identical the degree
of conclusiveness of the argument. Though as the above
example about the Axiom of Choice suggests, the degree of
conclusiveness of the argument is not always measured by
the logical relation that obtains between the premises and
the conclusion, it sometimes is—at least in those cases
where it can be intuited that the relation obtains.
My only argument for this involves an appeal to the
reader's pre-systematic beliefs about the convergence and
divergence of logical and epistemic relations. Consider the
case of a number of simple and obviously valid arguments which
are such that one can intuit that they are valid. It does
not seem that the degree of conclusiveness of any of these
arguments can be anything but the higliest possible--unlike
the two arguments concerning the Axiom of Choice. The com-
pletely rational in ferrer--and the rest of us insofar as
we are rational and capable of having the intuitions— can,
in each case, be certain of the conclusion, relative to the
premises
.
The relation of all of this to the version of scepticism
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considered in Chapter III is this: If it can be shown that
one can intuit, with respect to two predictive-inductive
inferences with the same conclusion, that one is inductively
stronger than the other, than the degree of conclusivenoss
of the two arguments will be unequal, i.e. (iii) on page 138
will be false.
The obvious move to make here is to give an example of
tV70 predictive-inductive inferences with the same conclusion
which are such that one can intuit that one is stronger
than the other. Consider the followincr situation: There are
two giant urns, each containing 10,000 balls at least
some of which are black. Now consider the following two
arguments that might arise after 1000 drawings with replace-
m.ent from each urn^^:
Urn A Urn B
Argument III:
(1) Urn A is thoroughly shaken
after each of the 1000 draw-
ings .
(2) The drawings are carried out
by an independent testing
agency of known integrity.
(3) Ball^ is black
(4) Ball2 is black
Argument IV:
(1) Urn B is thoroughly
shaken after each of
the 1000 drawings.
(2) The drawings are carried
out by an independent
testing agency of known
integrity
.





It might be thought that j.t would be better to consider a
non-random situation (e.g. sunrises). However, since un-
spoken theoretical prosup[5ositions miglit here interfere,
the chiances (!) for a non-intuit.i ve judgment are increased.
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(5) Ball^ is black.
(5) Bal.l^ is wliitc.
(1002) Ball
1000







is black. (1003) ^^li2.001 black .
Now consider the following statement:
(iv) Argument III is inductively stronger than Argument IV.
Statement (iv) is an assertion of a comparative inequal
with respect to the logical relation that obtains between
the premises and conclusion of the two arguments. Since
Statement (iv) can be intuited (the reader is hereby in-
vited to have an intuition)
, the following is true:
(v) The degree of conclusiveness of Argument III is greater
than the degree of conclusiveness of Argument IV.
Statement (v) entails the denial of Statement (ii)
(p. 138) . If (ii) is false, then (iii) is untenable for
the reasons cited on page 138. Since (iii) is false, this
form of scepticism is false. If a potential sceptic demurs
about ( iv)
, the example can be changed— increase the number
of premises of the relevant kind to 10,000.
Someone might object that this judgment of comparative
inequality presupposes that all of the balls in the first
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urn are black. Now I have argued in Chapter III (cf. pps.
97ff) that if that which in presupposed is to be of any
value, it must, together with the other premises, render
the argument deductively valid. That, however, begs the
question because it assumes that the only differential in
degrees of conclusiveness is that which obtains between
valid and invalid arguments.
It IS important to note just how little this example
assumes. There are a variety of judgments that one can make
in cases like this. Carnap distinguishes three kinds of
concepts employed in logical and empirical inquiry—quali-
tative, comparative, and quantitative. There are three cor-
responding kinds of judgments that can be made here.
Comparative judgments of inequality are very cautions. They
do not presuppose that judgments of inductive strength can
be quantitized. Thus it is not necessary that one be able
to intuit the exact inductive strength of either argument.
All that must be intuited is that the inductive strength of
the two arguments is different. Such judgments do not even
tell us very much about the actual strength of each argument.
Nonetheless, some comparative judgments of inequality
do entail that one form of scepticism is false.
What of a charge of begging the question? Well, of
course one cannot prove that what has occurred is an intui-
tion. That claim is not open to proof. Moreover, it is
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very hard to see how this charge could be sustained. The
(alleged) intuited statement is not the denial of (iii);
are a number of clear and self-evident steps from the
inductive intuition to the denial of Scepticism.
One might feel a bit uneasy about this refutation of
scepticism because the two most important concepts--in-
ductive strength and degree of conclusiveness--are not very
clear or well-specified. However, this is just what one
should expect because, at this stage, we are only giving a
preliminary clarification of the explicandum (and assuaaing
(specious) sceptical doubts) . A more detailed and precise
refutation of scepticism that employs the explicatum (the
concept of logical probability?) is unavailable because,
prior to offering an explicatum, one must show (in the fact
of the relevant challenge) that there are things to which
the explicandum applies.
It should be noted that this refutation explains why
there have been few, if any, sceptics about both induction
and deduction in the sense specified. It is hard to see
how anyone who thinks calmly and seriously about these
matters can maintain what really are specious sceptical
doubts about either deduction or induction. Inductive and
deductive scepticism, even though they are specious, are
worthy of serious consideration because why they are specious
is by no moans obvious. Something like arboreal scepticism
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is much more reasonable. Empirical scopticism^^ is a hallmark
of scientific judiciousness.
There may be other forms of scepticism about inductive
inference not refuted by this example. As Prof. Aune has
pointed out (see p. 140), these differing degrees of epistemic
warrant may be viewed as degrees of worthlessness . On
such a view, no inductive inference has a high enough degree
of conclusiveness to warrant rational acceptance. This
form of scepticism is not as important as the form that has
just been considered because, if the latter is false, it is
possible to show that beliefs arrived at by means of the
scientific method (in the form of inductive inference) have
an epistemic ground in past experience (unlike, e.g. super-
stition and enthusiasm)
.
It is tempting to think that a qualitative intuitive
judgment of inductive strength (e.g. 'This is a strong in-
ductive argument') would suffice to show that this other form
of scepticism about induction is false. This would allow us
to devise, via explication, a rule of (rational) acceptance.
o r
Indeed, Carnap thinks^ that the issues surrounding a rule
of (rational) acceptance are superseded by the substantive
26 Rudolf Carnap, "Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition",
op . cit . , p . 265
.
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problems ot quantitative confirmation theory. „is reason
for holding this is that he believes acceptance to be a
qualitative concept, which, with the development of the
science of confirmation theory is superseded by a comparative
concept (greater or lesser degree of conclusiveness)
; this
concept is in turn superseded by the quantitative concept
of degree of confirmation. others have argued, however, that
there is more at stake here than Carnap thinks. The correct
resolution of this debate is not a pressing concern in the
present context because, as I have argued previously, it
IS consistent with this form of scepticism that science has
an epistemic ground in past experience.
Thusfar in this dissertation the main thrust has been
towards predictive- inductive arguments and scepticism con-
cerning such inferences. I do not wish to suggest that all
inductive arguments are reducible to (in some sense) such
arguments. Predictive-inductive arguments have been con-
sidered largely because of their important historical position
in the philosophy of David Hume. However, I suspect (though
I do not have an argument for it) that the important logical
relation of inductive strength is common to all invalid argu-
ments from experience. If the sceptic maintains a broader
position by claiming that no inductive argument is any more
conclusive than any other (with the same conclusion)
, it






Lee Harvey Oswald was in the Texas School BookDepository at the time that Kennedy was she??
Oswald had Communist sympathies.
Iht
revealed that Kennedy was shot fromt e direction of the Texas School Book Depository.
Therefore




Walter Cronkite testified under oath that he sawa man he ]^ew to be Lee Harvey Oswald shoot in thedirection of the Kennedy motorcade at 12-32 P M
on November 23, 1963.
* *
The Pope testified to the same thing.
Many reliable witnesses independently testified
that they saw a man who closely resembled Oswald
shoot at the motorcade.
(4) Oswald owned the murder weapon.
(5) Oswald had recently received one million dollars.
(6) Oswald confessed to shooting at Kennedy.
Lis confession was taken while he was on a Doly—
graph, and the polygraph indicated that he was not
lying.
Therefore
(8) Oswald shot Kennedy.
Both arguments are invalid but that one of them is inductively
stronger than the other is intuitively obvious. Argument VI
does not presuppose that there was no fantastic conspiracy
which included Walter Cronkitc and the Pope. if a premise
or premises were added to that effect, it would either render
the argument deductively valid or inductively stronger. A
requirement that the argument be deductively valid begs the
question, that it be inductively stronger is either un-
necessary (Argument VI is already stronger than Argument V)
or it establishes the falsity of inductive scepticism. of
course not all of the premises are true, much less known to
be true. However, that is irrelevant. Just as in the case
of deductively valid arguments, one assumes that the premises
are true. Then one asks the question, "Is it more likely
or probable that the conclusion of Argument VI is true based
on premises (1) through (7) than that the conclusion of
Argument V is true based on premises (!') through (3')?"
That the answer is 'Yes' is open to immediate inspection (in-
This in turn entails that the conclusiveness of
the arguments differs. Thus, scepticism, more broadly con-
strued, is false.
What is the relevance of all of this to Hume? Admittedly,
not much. However, at one point (see quotation p. 177)
Hume assumes that the conclusiveness of proofs is greater
than that of probabilities. Proofs are predictive-inductive
inferences from observed uniform concomitance; probabilities
are just like proofs except that one or more of the observa-
tional premises state that, in a particular case, the concomi-
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tanco did not obtain. Now it is doubtful that Hume thought
that any proof is more conclusive than any probability. But
If we consider two arguments with a large number of premises
and the same conclusion, and the promises of one state that
there has been an observed constant conjunction but the
premises of the other state that there has been a frequent
but not constant concomitance, it ^ that the conclu-
siveness of the one argument is greater than that of the
other, I am not sure if this is intuitively obvious. The
point is that, at one point Hume assumed that some invalid
arguments are epistemically better than others. If the
argument of the past twenty-five pages is correct, that might
not have been a bad assumption to make. Once the nature and
function of logical intuition is understood, that assumption
does not need much of an argument.
**********
Obviously the outline to the solution of the Problem of
Induction proposed herein presupposes a number of epistemo-
logical doctrines that I have made little or no effort to
defend. Among other things, I have presupposed throughout
a Platonistic theory of meaning and certain doctrines about
the nature of belief and of our knowledge of logical truths.
At tills time it is unclear to me whether or not my proposal
can be formulated in terms agreeable to those with leaner
ontologies. Perhaps more importantly, i have adopted an
essentially Carnapian view of the nature of probability.
Without much argument I have claimed that the relation of
inductive strength is a loaiccU one. A fuller defence of
this claim would involve, among other things, a critical
evaluation of alternative interpretations of probability.
Nonetheless, all of these presuppositions can be seen
in one light as a strength rather than a weakness. The
amazing recalcitrance of the Problem of Induction would seem
to indicate that the problem goes pretty deep. it is prima
fa_cie implausible that an undiscovered solution lies close
to the surface and is largely independent of a wider and more
systematic epistemological theory. Thus a final evaluation
of this proposal awaits the deployment and defense of a more
elaborate theory of knowledge; but this is as we should
expect
.
There are, however, some additional benefits to be
derived from this proposal that I have not yet brought to
the reader's attentions. These can be best appreciated by
recalling the problem faced by those who adopt what I have
called the Carneadean standpoint (see Appendix, Chapter IV).
Recall that Carneades had successfully argued that there
IS no mark by which the mind can distinguish (at least some
of) those impressions wliich accurately represent their
o^i^cts. That is, contrary to the Stoics' claim, there are
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no cataleptic impressions that both compel and (unconditional
ly) authorize our assent; certainty is unattainable. None-
theless, Carneades did not conclude that all impressions wore
equally dubious. Some are more worthy of our assent than
others. Now Carneades believed that the criterion (or
criteria) of truth (i.e. rational acceptance) "lies within
us ; his task v/as to make this more explicit. However, some-
one might well ask, "is it not possible, Carneades, that we
are radically mistaken about what impressions are acceptable?
It is not at all clear if Carneades can, on his principles,
answer this question.
Let us now consider how matters stand with regard to in-
ductive inference. Hume has successfully argued that there
is no mark or not
a
in past experience that can guarantee our
claims about the future. No such claim is certain relative
to our knowledge of the past. However, Hume did not con-
clude that all beliefs about the future are equally dubious,
regardless of past experience. Some of them are more worthy
of belief than others. Just as Carneades believed that the
criteria for acceptable impressions "lie within us", so too
Hume thought (at least until Part ( iv)
)
that the criteria for
.
o 7ctcceptable beliefs about the future lie within us.
2 7'For the sake of simplicity and ease of exposition, I here
gloss over the problem of a rule of acceptance . It would
bo more cumbersome, but nonetheless feasible, to employ
here a comparative concept of epistemic worth.
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However, it is at this point that one can raise a
question that parallels that asked of Carneades : "is it
not possible that we are radically mistaken about what
arguments from experience are acceptable?"
Actually, this question that the challenger asks is
ambiguous. There really are two questions that he might have
in mind:
a) Is it possible for us to hold mistaken beliefs
about what rules are correct?
b) Is it possible that the beliefs that v;e actually
hold (implicitly) about what rules are correct or
mistaken?
It is difficult to see how someone could give a negative
answer to the first question. It would suppose an infalli--
appropriate only to the Author of our being. However,
a positive answer to a) does not entail a positive answer to
b) . On my proposal the rules of evidence are intimately
connected with logical relations. Our knowledge of these
depends ultimately on (logical) intuition. Actually, it is
a bit grandiose to speak of rules of evidence here. They
have yet to be explicated. However, if my argument is
correct, they are "there" to be explicated. The point is
that the answer to question (b) above is a negative one on
my proposal. This provides us with an answer to the scep-
tical challenge that is directed at the Carneadean standpoint.
279
One might well wonder v^y it is that we happen to
operate (implicitly) on the basis of more or less correct
rules of inference. It would be appropriate to let Hume
have the last word liere :
Here is a kind of pre-established Harmony
betwixt tiu' Course of Nature and the
Succession of our Ideas; and though the
Powers and I’orces, by which the former is
govern'd, bt' wholly unknown to us, yet
our Thoiuilits and Conceptions have still, we
find, goru' on in the same Train with the
other Works, of Nature. Custom is that
admirable' Principle, by which this Correspon-
dence has bi'on effected; so necessary to the
Subsistence' of our Species, and the Regu-
Istion of e)ur Conduct, in every Circumstance
and Occurrence of human Life. . . .Those who
delight in the Discovery and Contemplation
of final Causes have here ample Subject to
employ tlu'ir VJonder and Admiration
.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III
Though the focus of this dissertation is on Hume's
Treatise, it would be appropriate to take a brief look at
the Enquiries with regard to a matter of such signal impor-
tance as Hume's argument concerning inductive inference.
An examination of this argument as it appears in the Enquiries
further strengthens the interpretive hypothesis advanced in
this chapter viz . that Hume only intended to establish that
inductive argum.ents have less than the highest possible
degree of conclusiveness and that such arguments are not, on
that account, epistemically worthless.
This argument takes up most of Essay IV "Sceptical Doubts
Concerning the Operation of the Understanding". Though it
is stated in a more forceful and lively fashion here, it is
inferior, in a number of respects, to the Treatise version.
The main problem is that the psychological theory has not
been fully' enough developed for Hume to establish the priority
of and thereby focus his attention on predictive-inductive
inferences. He speaks more generally about arguments from
the observed to the unobserved. Another problem is that his
argument concerning the A Priori inductive inference, which
is compactly expressed in one paragraph in the Treatise , is
here spread over several pages. It is more difficult to
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determine what his epistemic assessment is of such inferences.
If we take Stove's Symmetry Thesis seriously, this makes it
more difficult to determine what Hume's epistemic assessment
of other inductive inferences is.
Nevertheless, there are some direct and indirect clues
about the nature of Hume's final conclusion that make it
fairly clear that he is concerned to show that the mind can-
not achieve (epistemic) certainty with respect to arguments
from experience. Of course, then it becomes important to
show that Hume did not believe that a lack of certainty in
this connection is equivalent to epistemic worthlessness.
Fortunately, there is some direct and indirect evidence here
to suggest that Hume did not think that this v/as the case.
One of the features of Hume's argument of the Enquiries
that makes it appear to be much more strongly sceptical than
it in fact is, is his use of the terms reason and 'reasoning'.
Consider the following two statements of this final conclu-
sion :
I say, then, that even after we
have Experience of the Operations of
Cause and Effect, our Conclusions from
tliat Experience are not founded on






An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , ed
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It is not Reasoning, which engages us to
suppose the past resembles the future
and to expect similar Effects from
Causes, which are, to Appearance, simi-
lar. This is the Proposition, which
I intended to enforce by the present
Essay .
^
My purpose in the remainder of this Appendix is two- fold;
First I shall argue that what Hume means by 'reasoning' in
this Essay is what v/e mean by the expression 'deductively
valid reasoning from acceptable premises' and that the
epistemic content of Hume's conclusion is that the conclusion
of no instance of causal inference is or can be rendered
certain relative to its premises. Secondly, I shall argue
that Hume did not believe that a lack of certainty in this
connection means that the argument is epistemically worthless.
Turning now to Hume's argument of Essay IV Part 2, it
is easy to see that he offers essentially the same argument
twice. The first version occupies roughly the first three
paragraphs of Part 2. He concludes by saying that the in-
ference from the observed to the unobserved is not made by
any chain of reasoning, of which he is aware. He issues an
implicit challenge to anyone to produce such a chain of
reasoning. Such "negative tactics" are often employed by
Hume. However, he feels that he can carry the war into his
opponents' camp. He gives an exhaustive enumeration of the
kinds of arguments that there are and shows, with respect to
^ Ibid . , p . 49.
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each one, that it cannot be used to bridge the logical gap
between statements about the observed and statements made
about the unobserved. This constitutes his second statement
of the argument. After dealing with the likliest moves that
an opponent might make, he brings the essay to a close.
Let us take a closer look at the first version of the
argument. Hume proceeds by way of an examp]. e
.
;
If a Body of like Colour and
j
Consistence with that Bread,
I
which we hav formerly eat, be
! presented to us, we make no Scruple
^
of repeating the Experiment, and expect,
th Certainty
, like Nourishment and
j
Support. Now this is a Process of Mind
I
or Thought, of which I wou.ld willingly
j
know the Foundation (emphasis added)
I
He then points out that there is nothing in the sensible
I
qualities of the object that justifies that certainty. This
j
.
point was argued more thoroughly in Part 1 of Essay IV,
I
which concerns the A Priori Inductive Inference. The only
j




"As to past Experience , it can be
allowed to give direct and certain
Information only of those precise
Objects, and that precise Period Of
Time, which fell under its Cogni-
ii zance. But why this Experience should
be extended to future Times and to
^Ibid . , p . 43.
i
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other Objects, which, for auqht
we know, may be only in Appear-
ance similar;
4
The standpoint here is naturalistic in that Hume is
discussing inductive inferences as they occur in the mind
and how the premises are related to the conclusion. Later,
he will examine in more detail just how such inferences
might be augmented. Notice, however, the (logical) limits
of the epistemic certainty that past experience can grant.
It is clear that he is not talking about psychological cer-
tainty here (contrast the above quotation with the preceding
quotation) .
Shortly thereafter he restates this same point more
clearly and forcefully and draws his final conclusion
But does it follow, that other
Bread must also nourish me at
another time . . . ? The Con-
sequence seems no way Necessary . . . .
There is a certain Step taken . . . , an
Inference which wants to be
Explained ... if you insist, that
the Inference is made by a Chain of
Reasoning, I desire you may produce
that Reasoning.^
From this conclusion, offered as a challenge, much
confusion can arise; for what does Hume mean by a "chain
of reasoning"? Heretofore he has spoken of causal reason-
^Ibid . , pps. 43-44
'^Ibid., p. 44.
i_nq and reasoning from the ouserved to the unobserved. M'hc,’
implication that the inference is not an instance of rear.on-
ing is, on one construal, self-contradictory. Obviously lie
has a very special sense of the term in mind.
To see just what he means here let us look at the second
version of the argument. Here he enumerates the various
kinds of reasoning" and argues, with respect to each one,
that it cannot be used to generate the conclusion of an
inductive argument.
Here the argument parallels almost exactly the Treatise
version. There are no demonstrative arguments here because
it is always logically possible that the course of nature
may change. A demonstrative argument is a valid argument all
of whose premises are necessary truths. He then says that
all arguments from experience proceed on the supposition that
the future resembles the past. Thus any such argument for
this proposition must be circular. However, as I have
pointed out, since the principle of the uniformity of nature
can be formulated in many non-equivalent ways, an argument
from experience for this proposition need not be circular
in that the conclusion appears as one of the premises. None-
theless, for reasons cited previously (see pps . 116-1.19), it
is fair to say that any such argument for this proposition
would be circular, question-begging or involve an infinite
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regress and hence is unacceptable.
Or would it? The claim that any argument from experience
for the Resemblance Thesis has one of these defects is true
only if we restrict ourselves to deductively valid arguments
from experience. If we allow invalid arguments to be used
to substantiate the Resemblance Thesis, it would be clearly
false to say that all arguments from experience for RT have
one of these defects. This suggests that what Hume means by
a 'chain of reasoning" is an acceptable valid argument. Only
on this construal is Hume correct in saying that there is
no chain of reasoning from experience for the Resemblance
Thesis
.
Now what is the epistemological significance of this?
Defenders of Stove's interpretation of this argument would
conclude that Hume believes that only valid arguments have
epistemic merit. However, this conclusion is in no way
forced upon us. The reason for this is that, in the context
of the present argument, an appeal to invalid arguments would
be pointless. Inductive inferences, as they occur in the
mind are invalid. Any attempt to establish the premise that
turns them into valid arguments would have to arise from
another valid argument. Otherwise, there is no point in
trying to see whether or not the Resemblance Thesis can be
established
.
Hume might have believed that only valid arguments have
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epistcmic merit. However, the fact that he allows only valid
arguments from experience cannot be construed as evidence for
this claim because, in the context of this argument of
Hume's, only valid arguments can be of any help.
A defender of Stove's interpretation might well ask
at this point why Hume wants to see if the Resemblance Thesis
can be established. If some invalid arguments are epistemically
acceptable, why even bother discussing the Resemblance Thesis?
There are two reasons for Hume's concern with the
Resemblance Thesis: one is epistemological and the other is
psychological. Let us consider the latter first. Recall
that belief, for Hume, is occurrent and not dispositional.
In the course of making a particular transition from beliefs
about the observed to beliefs about the unobserved, the mind
may not actually have before it some version of the Resemb-
lance Thesis. Hume maintains, nonetheless, that as a matter
of fact the mind is always disposed to believe (some version
of) the Resemblance Thesis. This psychological hypothesis
is necessary to explain why the mind makes the transition
that it does.
If there be any Suspicion that
the Course of Nature may change
and that the past may be no Rule
for the future, all Experience
becomes useless and can give rise
to no Inferences or Conclusions.^
^Ibid., p. 47
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Thus all arguments from experience are "covertly valid" in
that there is an unstated premise which the mind is disposed
to assent to. Having made this psychological discovery, Hume
is interested both in tracing its origin (which turns out to
be custom or habit) and determining its logical and epistemo-
logical significance.
As to the epistemological significance of the Resemblance
Thesis, one might speculate what would be the case if, per
impossible , RT could be established by an acceptable valid
argument. The conclusion of (what was) an inductive inference
would be certain relative to its premises. Whatever one
thinks of the epistemic efficacy of invalid arguments, it is
clear that valid arguments are, all else equal, epistemically
preferable to their invalid counterparts. Thus, from an
epistemological point of view, Hume's attempt to see whether
or not inductive arguments can be "improved upon" so as to
render their conclusions certain relative to their premises.
Is there, however, any evidence to suggest that Hume's only
concern here is to see if the conclusion of such inferences
can be rendered certain relative to their premises?
There are two passages that support this contention
directly. One has been previously quoted (cf. p. ). There
Hume says that the mind expects with certainty that bread will
nourish after it has experienced that fact in the past. However,
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past exporicncG can only provide certainty with respect to
what has been previously experienced. This suggests that
arguments from past experience cannot render certain con-
clusions about what is not observed. From a psychological
point of view Hume can explain why the mind believes with
certainty that the future resembles the past. The epis-
temological point is that there really cannot be any epistemic
certainty here because it is possible that the course of
nature may change.
The other piece of direct evidence occurs a few pages
later. Hume says,
Their secret Nature, and conse-
quently, all their Effects and
Influence may change, without
any Change in their sensible
Qualities. This happens some-
times and with regard to some
Objects; Why may it not happen
always, and with Regard to all
Objects? What Logic, what Process
of Argument secures you against
this Supposition?”^
Again, the point here seems to be that since the course of
nature could change, one cannot be sure, in any given case,
that it will not change. If, per impossible , there was some
"logic or process of argument" here, then we could be guaranteed
! ^ I b d d .
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that the sensible qualities v;ould not change. However much
we are naturally inclined to believe with certainty that
the course of nature will remain the same, there is always
room for some doubt. Hume does not say here, or elsewhere
in Essay IV that this doubt must, from an epistemological
point of view, be total.
Indirect evidence for the claim that Hume only attempted
to establish that the mind cannot achieve (epistemic) cer-
tainty about the unobserved (relative to the observed) is
scattered throughout Essays IV and V. In a number of places
Hume states or clearly implies that arguments from experience
are not lacking in epistemic merit. If this is so, the only
plausible interpretation of the conclusion of Hume's primary
argument of Essay IV is the interpretation that I have sug-
gested. This also shows that Hume did not identify a lack
of certainty with a lack of epistemic value. There are pri-
marily two passages v;here Hume voices epistemic approval of
arguments from experience. Let us consider each of these
in turn.
In Part 1 of Essay IV Hume argues that the mind cannot
discover the cause (effect) merely by examining the effect
(cause). He then makes the following observation:
Hence we may discover the Reason
why no Philosopher, that has been
rational and modest has ever
pretended to assign the ultimate
Cause of any of the Operations of
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Nature .... Tis confess'd, that the
utmost Effort of human Reason is, to
reduce the Principles, productive of
natural Phenomena, to a greater
Simplicity and to resolve the many
Particular Effects into a few general
Causes by Means of Reasonings from
Analogy, Experience, and Observation.
But as to the Causes of these general
Causes we should in vain attempt their
Discovery .... These ultimate Springs
and Principles are totally shut up from
Human Curiosity and Enquiry.^
What Hume is saying here is that Reason, in what might
be called its synthetic employment seeks to unify and sys-
tematize its knowledge of natural phenomena. However, it can
never reach universal and necessary first principles. If
this be reason's goal, it must inevitably fail to achieve it.
However, if the mind is more modest in its demands, it may
achieve its goals.
^
Elasticity, Gravity, Cohesion of
Parts, Communication of Motion by
Impulse; these are probably the
ultimate Causes and Principles we
shall ever discover in Nature; and
we may esteem ourselves sufficiently




^ There is an astonishing parallel between Hume's reasoning
here and Kant's discussion (in the Critique of Pure Reason )
of the difference between reason in Its hypothetical or
regulative employment, and reason in its apodeictic or
constructive employment. (cf. Critique of Pure Reason
A644-649)
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Rccisoning, wg can tracG up tlic par-
ticular Phenomena to. or near to, these
general Principles
.
In light of these passages it is difficult to see how
someone like Stove can maintain that Hume believed that no
argument from experience is epistemically better off than
any other. The general rules by which the mind effects this
systematization are conclusions of arguments from experience.
Though their universality cannot be proved, they are not,
upon that account to be scorned as a sham or mere psycholo-
gically necessitated illusion.
The only way that Stove could accommodate these pro-
nouncements of Hume's would be to argue that, since these
passages occur prior to Hume's discussion of inferences from
past experience, his subsequent argument commits him to
rmouncing even these more modest aims. Quite the contrary
is true, however.
In Essay V Hume discovers that it is custom or habit
that is responsible for the mind's transition from beliefs
about the observed to beliefs about the unobserved. Regard-
ing this discovery he says.
Perhaps we can push our Enquiries no
farther, or pretend to give the Cause
^^David Hume, Enquiries , op. cit . , p. 41.
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of this Cause; but must rest contented
with it as the ultimate Principle, which
we can assign of all our Conclusions from
Experience. 'Tis sufficient Satisfaction,
that we can go so far; without repining
at the Narrowness of Faculties, because
they will carry us no farther.il
These two passages, as endpieces of Hume's famous argument
of Essay IV, suggest that Hume never doubted the epistemic
efficacy of arguments from experience. The important question
of that argument is only, "How much?"
Indeed, there is even a passage within the argument of
Essay IV Part 2 that indicates that Hume never doubted that
arguments from experience are, in some measure, epistemolo-
gically acceptable.
These two propositions are far from
being the same, ^ have found that such
an Obj ect has always been attended with
such an Effect and
, ^ forsee , that other
Objects
,
which are , Appearance ,
simi lar , will be attended with similar
E ffects . I shall allow, you please
that one Proposition may justly be
ihTer'^b~ftom. the~~btTTerl I know
fact that it always is infer'd. But
if you insist that, the Inference is made
by a chain of Reasoning, I desire you may
produce that reasoning. 12
(double emphasis added)




. , p. 44 .
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Now if it is only "chains of reasoning" that produce
justified belief, then Hume in a very short space has flatly
contradicted himself! Of course Stove might say that what
Hume means in the offending sentence is what others (falsely)
believe to be a just inference. The problem with this move
is that there is just no evidence to suggest that Hume thought
this way.
In sum, then, the argument of the Enquirie s is best
explained by the interpretive hypothesis of Chapter III,
vi z . that Hum.e only intended to establish that no argument
from experience can have the highest possible measure of
conclusiveness and that Hume did not believe that, in light
of this fact, such arguments are epistemically worthless.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV
In a discussion of the nature and extent of Hume's
scepticism about induction, it would be helpful to take a
brief look at Hume's relation to some of the Ancient
Sceptics. He was undoubtedly acquainted with the various
schools of ancient scepticism, and his occasional remarks,
both critical and otherwise, should shed some light on his
epistemological position about inductive inference. It is
not my purpose here to give a fina l assessment of Hume's
scepticism. The evidence adduced in Chapter IV suggests
(and most commentators agree, though perhaps for different
reasons) that Hume's views on scepticism changed over the
course of Book I. Consequently, it may not be possible to
give a consistent and coherent account of Hume's scepticism.
In addition, an adequate discussion of Hume's scepticism
would go far beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead,
my purpose here will be to show that my interpretation of
Hume's scepticism in Part (iii) has a clear historical pre-
cedent in the scepticism of Carneades and the Academic
Sceptics and that Hume's discussion of Pyrrhonian scepticism
is best understood against the background of an earlier,
more mitigated (Carneadean) scepticism.
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The two main schools of Creek scepticism were the Pyrr-
honian and the Academic. Let us first consider the major
tenets of the latter, as expounded by Carneades. The Stoics
maintained that true impressions were exact copies of the
objects which caused them. This copy relation specifies the
truth conditions for impressions. This part of the Stoic
doctrine was accepted by Carneades. The obvious epistemo-
logical question that arises is, 'How are we to distinguish
the true impressions from the false impressions? ' The Stoic
answer was that, among the true impressions, there were some
that both compel and authorize our assent. They "drag us
down by the hair." Carneades, however, objected to the
Stoics' claim that there are such perceptions (kateleptike
phantas ia ) . As Charlotte Stough says in Creek Scepticism:
That is, a cateleptic impression
"generates" a proposition that
is immediately evident and certain
requiring no supporting evidence
beyond the unquestionable experience
of the subject himself. The role of
the cateleptic impression is
therefore apparent. In addition to
defining the conditions of truth, it
authorizes claim to knowledge.'^
Briefly, Carneades objection was that there is no nota
or mark by which the (alleged) cateleptic impression can be
distinguished from the non-catelept ic impression, which, by
^Charlotte Stough, Creek Scepticism:
(Berkeley, 19G9), p. 5T7




definition, may^ be false. Thus, no impression carries with
it a guarantee that its "correspondent' proposition (see
above quotation) is true. Since, then, there really is no
cataleptic impression, there is no way for \is to distinguish
the true from the false because it is the cataleptic
impression that gives us access to an independently existing
reality. Without the cataleptic impression, the Stoic is
left with no criterion of truth. If epistemic (and not
merely psychological) certainty is a necessary condition for
knowledge, then it is a consequence of Carneades ' argument
that there can be no knowledge of external things.
Although Carneades has shown that the Stoics' criterion
of truth was unacceptable, he did not conclude that all per-
ceptual statements were equally dubious. To discover the
criterion of truth, he turned to an examination of the rela-
tion between a perception and its perceiver. Not all percep-
tions are equally compelling or convincing. Sometimes, as
Alcmaeon has said, "But my mind agrees in no way with the
vision of my eyes." On the other hand, some perceptions
are apparently true or credible. It is among the credible
perceptions that Carneades searched for the criterion of
truth. It is unnecessary for present purposes to follow
2 Ibid . , p . 48
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Carneades any further. It is important to notice, however,
that an important shift has been made in the conception of
the criterion of truth. Strictly speaking, the criterion
(or actually, as Carneades developed it, the criteria) does
not tell us what is true ; rather it is a criterion of accept-
ance or of what is apparently true. As Stough says.
The criterion of truth coincides
with the apparently true. It follows,
therefore, that to ask, "What is the
criterion of truth?" is not to inquire
when a statement ... is true, but to
inquire, "When are we justified in
making an assertion . . .?" And
Carneades' response would be, '’When
the assertion is supported by our most
credible experience." Nevertheless, it
is also clear that though the criterion
tells us what counts as an acceptable
ground for an assertion, it cannot
guarantee that the assertion is true.
That is, it allows the uncomfortable
possibility that a statement may be
justifiably made even though it is in
fact false .
^
By making apparently true the criterion of truth,
Carneades could be asked, 'Why ought we to accept the
apparently true?' Carneades' reply would be that his cri-
terion more or less accurately codifies and systematizes
accepted practice. If part of the goal of the epistemological
enterprise is to bring us into harmony with the practices and
3 Ibid., p . 58.
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conventions of ordinary life, then Carneadcs has mot with
some measure of success. However, if we allow that it is at
least possible that our common sense beliefs about what we
ought to accept are radically mistaken, Carneades would have
to show that the apparently true has something else to
recommend it. For example, if he could show that the
apparently true is often (though not always) true, his cri-
terion would be acceptable on the grounds that it leads us
to truth more often than not. On the basis of his epis-
temological principles it is difficult to see how he could
do this.
What does all of this have to do with Hume's argument
about induction? It is quite natural to see Hume as carrying
on the tradition of Carneades' scepticism. Recall that
Carneades argued that there is no nota or mark by which the
(alleged) cataleptic impression, v/hich compels and authorizes
assent, can be recognized. Hume argues, in effect, that
though we may be compelled to believe things about the unob-
served, past experience only unconditionally authorizes
belief about the observed. That is, there is no nota or
mark in past experience that guarantees the mind's projections
about the future. He further argues that any attempt to gain
that authorization by supposing a resemblance between the
observed and the unobserved is doomed to failure. Thus, no
beliefs about the unobserved are or can be rendered certain
30 !
relative to the mind's beliets about the observed. That
this conclusion is sceptical is shown by the fact that the
mind does believe with certainty that the unobserved resembles
the observed. Hume even has a psychological explanation for
why this is the case.
;
It by no means follows, nor did Hume conclude that,
j
that all beliefs about the unobserved are equally dubious.
If the argument of this chapter and the last is correct,
Hume followed Carneades in that he located the criterion of
rational acceptance in that which is accepted. That is,
past experience provides some measure of warrant (though
' not the highest possible) for beliefs about the unobserved,
j
We are justified in accepting some of these beliefs, even
though they may in fact be false. Of course, Hume did not
' believe that all accepted beliefs were acceptable. As
I
the quotation on pages 189 and 190 indicates, the acceptable
I
J
beliefs are those that spring from universal and irresistible
principles of human nature. The unacceptable beliefs are
j
those that spring from weak and irregular principles. This
^ recalls Carneades' distinction between the credible perceptions
]
' and those which do not compel our assent.
' However, just as was the case with Carneades' proposal,
1
I one might well ask, 'Why ough t we to make past experience the
!
criterion for (rational) acceptance?' Hume might reply that
30G
his criterion (which is worked out in some detail in Part
(iii) Section 15: "Rules by which to Judge Causes and
Effects
) more or less accurately codifies and systematizes
accepted practice. If part of the goal of the epistemo-
logical enterprise is to bring us into harmony with accepted
i
(everyday and scientific) practice, then Hume's positive
i
proposals of Section 15 have something to recommend them.
I
However, if we allow that it is at least possible that we
are radically mistaken about what beliefs (about the unob-
served) we ought to accept, then one might ask Hume why
accepted practice is, in effect, acceptable practice. Clearly,
this is a deep question. It is not at all obvious that
Hume had a satisfactory answer to this question. In Chapter V
I shall discuss some Humean approaches to this problem. For
the present, it is sufficient to note the striking similarities
' between Carneades' and Hume's approach to closely related
I
epistemological problems. Not only is this similarity evi-
I
dent on the basis of general philosophical considerations,
1








There is, indeed, a more miti gated
I
Scepticism or academical Philosophy
i which may be both durable and useful,
j
and which may, in Part, be the Result
i of this Pyrrhonism or exces sive
! scepticism, when its undistinguished
I
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Doubts are, in some measure, corrected
by common Sense and Reflection."^
Those who have a Propensity to Phil-
osophy, will still continue their
Researches; because they reflect, that,
besides the immediate Pleasure, attend-
ing to such an Occupation, Philosophical
Decisions are nothing but the Reflections
of common Life methodiz'd and corrected.^
Hume s discussions of a more extreme form of scepticism
constitute further evidence that throughout most of Book I
of the Treatise Hume adopted primarily a Carneadean stand-
point. This more extreme form of scepticism is often called
"Pyrrhonian " . Let us turn to Sextus Empiricus, the chronicler
of Ancient Scepticism, for a definition of this version of
scepticism:
[Pyrrhonian] Scepticism is an ability
or mental attitude, which opposes
appearances to judgments in any way
whatsoever, with the result that, owing
to the equipollence of the objects
and reasons thus opposed are brought
firstly to a state of mental suspense
and next to a state of "unperturbedness
or quietude.^ (ataraxia)
David Hume, Enquiries , op. cit . , p. 154.
^^bid. p. 155.
^Sextus Empiricus, Outlines o f Pyrrhonism in Greek and Roman
Philosophy Following Aristotle , ed . by Jason L. Saunders
(n7y. , 1966) , p. 153.
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Sextus proceeds to define all of the key expressions in
this definition. For present purposes, one of these is
v;orth quoting.
' Equipollence ' v/e use of equality in
respect of probability and improba-
bility, to indicate that no one of the
conflicting judgments takes precedence
of any other as being more probable.”^
There can be little doubt that Pyrrhonian Scepticism, as
defined by Sextus, is very similar to the version of
scepticism that Stove has (falsely) attributed to Hume's
argument of Part (iii) Section 6.
Now Hume argues in various places in Part (iv) (and
in the latter essays of the Enquiries ) that the Pyrrhonians'
ataraxia is unattainable. He has primarily two arguments
for this. Briefly, they are: (i) He claims that the mind
is unable to suspend judgment as the Pyrrhonians recommend.
This is just a matter of psychological fact. (ii) Secondly,
if someone could adopt this suspensive attitude, Nature
would shortly put an end to that individual's miserable
existence. Hume's characterization of the nature and extent
8
of the Pyrrhonian 's suspensive attitude is probably inaccurate.
~^
Ibid . , p . 154 .
^Sce Richard Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His
Critique of Pyrrhonism" reprinted in Hume: A Collection of
Critical Essays. Vere C. Chappell, editor . (Notre Dame,
jriidiana, 1968) pages 54-57 .
In addition, Hume's objections are clearly based on empirical
arguments; those arguments may well beg the question against
the Pyrrhonian. However, both of these issues are not im-
portant for present purposes. What I should like to call
attention to is the placement of Hume's Objections to Pyrr-
honism.
Hume feels obliged to disassociate himself from
Pyrrhonism by means of these objections only when he sees
that his own principles appear to draw him towards that
position. The two places where this occurs in the Treatise
are at the end of Part (iv) Section 2 and in Part (iv)
Section 7, the last section of Book I. As I have argued
previously in this chapter, the arguments that lead Hume
towards the Pyrrhonic suspension of judgment are distinct
from and independent of the argum.ents of Part (iii) , notably
the argument of Part (iii) Section 6. Thus the location of
Hume's objections to Pyrrhonism suggests that he did not
believe that, prior to these new arguments, there was any
reason to suspend judgment regarding matters of fact. This
is difficult to understand on Stove's interpretation of the
argument of Part (iii) Section 6; it makes sense, however,
if Hume had adopted a Carneadean standpoint up until Part (iv)
Let us consider the argument of Part (iii) Section 6 in
light of these distinctions between the various forms of
scepticism. Does Hume remain, in the words of John Laird^
"a complete Pyrrhonian regarding all u ltimate principles"?^
The Pyrrhonian Sceptic offers (what he takes to be) equally
good conflicting arguments. They are supposed to result in
the suspension of judgment. Obviously, that is not what Hume
is doing here. He asserts unequivocally that the ultimate
reason for beliefs about the future cannot be known. The
Academics were sceptics in that they abjured from dogmatic
assertions about the world. They were not, however,
sceptics about the mind's claims of (certain and incontrover-
tible) knowledge about the world.
My purpose in this brief Appendix has not been to offer
a systematic appraisal of Hume's scepticism in the Treatise .
Rather I have only tried to show that, once we distinguish
between Carneadean and Pyrrhonian scepticism, Hume's position
through the end of Book I Part (iii) is best interpreted as
a kind of Carneadean scepticism. This entails that beliefs
about the future (or, more generally, about the unobserved)
can have differing measures of epistemic warrant, even if
none of them can have the highest possible such measure.
Since Hume was undoubtedly aware of the v/ritings of Sextus
and Cicero, this Appendix further shows that the conception
of epistemic v^;arrant employed in these chapters was not foreign
to Hume
.
^John Laird, Hume 's Philosophy of Human Nature (l.ondon, 1 932) ,
p. leT.'

